Neerwindeni lahing, 18. märts 1793

Neerwindeni lahing, 18. märts 1793

Neerwindeni lahing, 18. märts 1793

Neerwindeni lahing, 18. märts 1793, oli Austria suur võit revolutsioonilise Prantsusmaa armeede üle, mis aitas prantslased ajutiselt Hollandist välja saata ja põhjustas Jemappesi võitja kindral Charles Dumouriezi kukkumise. 1. veebruaril 1793 laiendas Prantsuse Vabariik esimese koalitsiooni sõja ulatust, kuulutades sõja Suurbritanniale ja Hollandile.

Alguses oli Dumouriezi sissetung Hollandisse edukas. Kuigi ta ründas ja vallutas mitmeid kindlusi ranniku lähedal, alustas kindral Miranda Hollandi lõunatipus Maastrichti piiramist, kuid 1. märtsil alustas Austria armee Saksi-Coburgi vürsti juhtimisel vasturünnakut üle Roeri. , alistades 1. märtsil Aldenhovenis prantslased ja sundides nad seejärel 2. märtsil Aix-la-Chapelle'ist välja minema. Dumouriez oli sunnitud lahkuma oma armeest Hollandis ja sõitma lõunasse, püüdes päästa armeed Belgias.

Dumouriez liitus selle armeega 13. märtsil Louvainis ja otsustas peaaegu kohe rünnakule asuda. Pärast mitmeid väiksemaid kokkupõrkeid Liège'i ja Brüsseli vahelisel teel oli Saxe-Coburg asunud positsioonile Kleine Geete taga, mille keskus oli ümber Neerwindeni küla.

Austria parempoolne, ertshertsog Karli juhtimisel, paigutati üle Tirlemont-Maastrichti maantee, Kleine Geete jõest ida pool. Austria vasakpoolsus kindral Clairfayti juhtimisel postitati Neerwindenist (põhjas) Oberwindeni (joonest lõuna pool), jõest veidi tagasi, Mittelwindeni mäega kahe küla vahel.

Dumouriezi plaan eeldas, et austerlaste omad on tugevaimad paremal pool, kus nad kaitsevad oma varustusliine, ja nii otsustas ta rünnata tugevalt nende vasakpoolset ümbrust. Armee oli jagatud kaheksaks kolonniks. Prantsuse paremal pool pidi kindral Valence kasutama ühte veergu, et Oberwindenist mööda sõita, teist rünnata küla pea ees ja kolmandat Mittelwindeni mäe hõivamiseks. Kesklinnas pidi Duc de Chartres kasutama oma kahte veergu Neerwindeni ümbruse ründamiseks. Vasakul pool pidi kindral Miranda kasutama ühte oma kolonni Leau hõivamiseks põhilahingust põhja pool ja ülejäänud kahte ründama mööda maanteed.

Rünnak Prantsuse parempoolsetele algas üllatuslikult jõe ületamisega kell 7.00, kuid Valence ei suutnud Mittelwindeni mäge vallutada enne lõunat. Neerwinder tabati varakult ja seejärel hüljati. Chartres'i hertsog vallutas selle prantslaste jaoks tagasi, kuid aeti välja. Veel lõuna pool võtsid prantslased Oberwindeni, mille Clairfayt vallutas. Seejärel sundis Austria ratsaväe rünnak prantslasi kaugemale tagasi tõmbuma. Dumouriez üritas rünnata kogu parema äärega, kuid edutult. Päeva lõpuks oli Austria vasakpoolsus ligikaudu samadel positsioonidel kui päeva alguses, Dumouriez ja prantslaste parempoolne olid endiselt nende ees.

Vasakul Miranda alustas oma põhirünnakut lõuna paiku, olles juba vallutanud Orsmaeli küla, kuid peamised lahingud toimusid kella kolme ja kuue vahel pärastlõunal. Miaczynski veerg vallutas Dorsmaeli küla, kuid seejärel visati sealt välja sihikindlate Austria vasturünnakutega. Miranda teine ​​kolonn ründas ertshertsog Charlesit, kuid ei suutnud oma tugeva kaitsepositsiooni vastu midagi ette võtta ja oli sunnitud taanduma, kui Austria väed ründasid Dorsmaelist. Lõpuks lõppes rünnak Leau vastu ebaõnnestunult, kui kolonn sattus Austria teise rea ossa. Miranda oli sunnitud taanduma üle Kleine Geete'i Tirlemonti poole. 21. märtsi kirjas teatas Miranda, et üks kindralohvitser tapeti ja üle kolmekümne ohvitseri hukkus või sai haavata, sealhulgas tema abiline, samal ajal kui tema küljel hukkus või sai haavata 2000 meest. Prantsusmaa kaotus oli umbes 4000, austerlased aga kaotasid 2000 meest.

Kas lahingupäeva hilisel päeval või varahommikul avastas Dumouriez, et on Neerwindeni ees isoleeritud, ja oli sunnitud taganema. Prantsuse revolutsiooni kahtlases õhkkonnas sattus igasugune lüüa saanud kindral kohe kahtluse alla. Miranda toed süüdistasid Dumouriezit selles, et nad ohverdasid tahtlikult oma kangelase, keda ta poliitiliselt enam ei usaldanud, andes talle korraldusi, mida ei saanud edukalt täita. See võib olla mõnevõrra ebaõiglane - kui rünnak Austria vasakpoolsete vastu oleks õnnestunud plaanipäraselt, siis poleks Miranda nii raske ülesande ees seisnud.

Dumouriezi käitumine sattus Prantsusmaal peagi pideva rünnaku alla. Pärast väikest kaotust Louvainis 21. või 22. märtsil alustas ta austerlastega läbirääkimisi. Kindral Mack (kuulsalt Ulmis lüüasaanud) nõustus laskma Prantsuse armeel häirimatult taanduda Brüsselist kaugemale - see korraldus aitas seda armeed säilitada, kuid see paljastas Dumouriez veelgi radikaalide rünnakule. Nüüdseks kaalus ta tõsiselt katset kasutada oma armeed üha radikaalsemaks muutuva rahvuskonvendi vastu, kuid aprilli alguses selgus, et tema armee ei toeta teda selles ning 5. aprillil läks ta austerlaste poole.

Napoleoni koduleht | Raamatud Napoleoni sõdadest | Teemaindeks: Napoleoni sõjad


Kataloog

Allalaadimisvormingud
Kataloogi püsiv identifikaator
APA tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. & amp; Johnston, Alexander Keith. & amp; William Blackwood ja pojad. & amp; W. & amp; K. K. Johnston Limited. (1852). Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793.

MLA tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. ja Johnston, Alexander Keith. ja William Blackwood ja pojad. ja W. & A. K. Johnston Limited. Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S 1852

Austraalia/Harvardi tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. & amp; Johnston, Alexander Keith. & amp; William Blackwood ja pojad. & amp; W. & amp; K. K. Johnston Limited. 1852, Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S

Wikipedia tsitaat
Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S

Neerwindeni lahingu kaart 18. märts 1793, mis näitab Prantsuse ja Austria positsioone enne lahingut ja lahingu ajal, sealhulgas ratsavägi, jalavägi ja suurtükivägi koos reljeefidega, mida näitavad hahaurid.

Paremas alanurgas: W. & amp; A.K. Johnston, Edinr.

Tahvel 7 alates: Atlas kuni Alisoni Euroopa ajalugu / Archibald Alison. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & amp; Sons, 1852.

Alisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas.

Alates: Alison, Archibald, Sir, 1792-1867. Alisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas

000 01285cea a22002897a 4500
001 3624581
005 20090319130654.0
007 aj canzn
008 060119s1852 stkd a 0 eng
035 | a3624581
040 | aANL | beng
043 | ae ------
045 0 | bd1852
100 1 | aAlison, Archibald, | cHärra, | d1792-1867.
245 1 0 | aNeerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 | h[kartograafiline materjal] / | cA.K. Johnston F.R.G.S.
260 | aEdinburgh: | bWilliam Blackwood ja amp Sons, | c[1852] .
300 | a1 kaart.
500 | aNeerwindeni lahingu kaart 18. märts 1793, mis näitab Prantsuse ja Austria positsioone enne lahingut ja lahingu ajal, sealhulgas ratsaväge, jalaväge ja suurtükiväge koos reljeefidega, mida näitavad hahaurid.
500 | aParemas alanurgas: W. & amp A.K. Johnston, Edinr.
500 | aTahvel 7 alates: Atlas kuni Alisoni Euroopa ajalugu / Archibald Alison. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & amp; Sons, 1852.
700 1 | aJohnston, Alexander Keith, | d1804-1871.
710 2 | aWilliam Blackwood ja pojad.
710 2 | aW. & amp; K. K. Johnston Limited.
740 0 | aAlisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas.
773 0 | iSaatja: | aAlison, Archibald, söör, 1792-1867. | tAlisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas | w(AuCNL) 284913
852 8 | bMAPR | hKAART Ra 135 | mTahvel 7
984 | aANL | d66003624581

Selle manustatud video vaatamiseks peab teil olema lubatud Flash Player 8+ ja JavaScript.

Selle manustatud video vaatamiseks peab teil olema lubatud Flash Player 8+ ja JavaScript.

Selle manustatud video vaatamiseks peab teil olema lubatud Flash Player 8+ ja JavaScript.


Sisu

Prantslased vallutavad Belgia Neerwindeni lahingu (1793) _section_1

6. novembril 1792 alistas Prantsuse armee Charles François Dumouriezi juhtimisel Jemappesi lahingus Saxe-Tescheni hertsogi Alberti Austria armee. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_16

Prantslastel oli tohutu arvuline üleolek 40 000 jalaväe, 3000 ratsaväe ja 100 relvaga Austria armee vastu, mille arv oli 11 628 jalga, 2168 ratsanikku ja 56 relva. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_17

Ühe kuu jooksul vallutasid Prantsuse armeed suurema osa Austria Hollandist, mis on tänapäeval Belgia riik. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_18

Paremal äärel liikus Ardennide armee eesotsas Jean-Baptiste Cyrus de Valencega mööda Meuse jõge Huy poole. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_19

Teel loobus Valence väest Louis-Auguste Juvénal des Ursins d'Harville juhtimisel Namuri piiramiseks. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_20

Dumouriez ise koos Belgia armeega vallutas Liège'i. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_21

Francisco de Miranda juhitud Põhja armee piiras Antwerpeni. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_22

Sellega liitus kolonn Benôit Guérin de Berneroni all, mis marssis esimesena Athist kirdest Leuveni (Louvain). Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_23

Mechelen (Malines) kapituleerus 16. novembril 1792 Henri Christian Michel de Stengelile ja 6000 prantslasele ning selle Austria Württembergi jalaväerügemendi ühe pataljoni garnison nr. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_24

38 lubati vabaks minna. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_25

27. päeval võitis Stengel koos 8000 Belgia armee sõduriga Liège'i lähistel Voroux-lez-Liers'is väikese hagi Anton Sztáray ja nelja austerlaste pataljoni pärast. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_26

Antwerpen langes 29. novembril Miranda 17 600 jalaväe ja 1245 ratsaväe alla. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_27

Hohenlohe 1. pataljoni Austria garnison Nr. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_28

17, kaks Vierseti ettevõtet Nr. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_29

59 ja neli Würzburgi jalaväerügemendi kompaniid, pluss 140 laskurit alistusid pärast kahe surnu ja nelja haavatu kaotamist. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_30

Prantslased vallutasid 57 suurtükki, 50 täiendavat 3-naelist rügemendi kahurit, 3150 musketti ja 1523 sada püssirohtu. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_31

2599-meheline Namuri garnison Johann Dominik von Moitelle juhtimisel alistus pärast neljanädalast piiramist 2. detsembril Valence'ile ja Harville'ile. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_32

Austria kaitsjate hulka kuulus kaks Kinsky jalaväerügemendi pataljoni nr. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_33

36, üks Vierseti pataljon, kaks Le Loup Jägeri pataljoni kompaniid, Esterhazy Husaaride rügemendi pooleskadrill nr. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_34

32 ja 90 laskurit. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_35

Harville'i diviisis oli 13 256 jalaväge, 1425 ratsaväge ja 266 artillerit. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_36

Hollandi Vabariigi ja Austria vasturünnaku Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _section_2

Dumouriezil oli võimalus koos austrialastega Reini läänekaldalt koos Keskuse armeega välja ajada. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_37

Selle asemel jätkas ta oma lemmikloomaprojekti, Hollandi Vabariigi sissetungi. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_38

Ta lootis minna hollandlastega sõtta, hoides samal ajal Suurbritannia kuningriigi neutraalsena. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_39

Kuid Prantsuse valitsus sundis teda, kuulutades 1. veebruaril 1793 Suurbritanniale sõja ja käskis tal Hollandi Vabariigi vallutada. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_40

Dumouriez võttis invasiooni ette koos 15 000 jalaväe ja 1000 ratsaväega, keda peagi tugevdati. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_41

Jättes Miranda piirama Maastrichti, mida kattis Valence'i armee ja Harville'i korpus, lükkas Dumouriez põhja poole. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_42

Sel ajal luges Põhja armee 18 322 meest, Belgia armee 30 197, Ardennide armee koosnes 23 479 sõdurist, Harville'i korpus oli 12 051 tugev, Hollandi armees oli 23 244 sõdurit ja Belgia garnisonides oli 15 000 meest. . Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_43

Kokkuvõttes oli Prantsuse armee tugevus Madalmaades 122 293 meest. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_44

Prantsuse armee muutus liiga enesekindlaks, uskudes end võitmatuks. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_45

Vahepeal olid rahvuskongressil kibedad poliitilised võitlused mõõdukate girondistide ja äärmuslike jakobiinide vahel. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_46

Sel perioodil lagunes armee varustussüsteem hooletuse tõttu. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_47

Dumouriez ületas Hollandi piiri 16. veebruaril 1793. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_48

Breda kindlus langes pärast kiiret piiramist 21. - 24. veebruarini 1793. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_49

3000 Hollandi kaitsjat, kelle hulka kuulus 2500 jalaväge ja draakonirügement, loovutasid linna oma 250 kahuriga ja lubati vabaks minna. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_50

Ka 21. päeval investeeris Maastrichti Miranda armee 10 000 sõdurit. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_51

Austria kindralmajor Hesse-Darmstadti vürsti Karl Wilhelm Georgi juhtimisel oli 8000 Austria ja Hollandi kaitsjat. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_52

Piiramistööd Maastrichtis talveilmaga olid prantsuse vabatahtlikele liiga palju ning paljud jätsid oma üksused maha ja läksid koju. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_53

150 relvaga Geertruidenbergi kindlus kapituleerus pärast piiramist 1. – 4. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_54

Kahe pataljoni ja kahe eskadroni Hollandi garnisonil lubati vabaks minna. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_55

Nii Breda kui ka Geertruidenberg olid bluffinud loobuma sõjainsenerist Jean Claude le Michaud d'Arconist, kes oli kavandanud ujuvpatareid Gibraltari suurel piiramisel. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_56

Nelja kindluse Klundertis vallutas 4. märtsil 4000 meest Berneroni juhtimisel. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_57

Pisike garnison pidas karmi võitlust ja kaotas 60 hukkunut, enne kui 73 ellujäänut alla andsid. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_58

Olles valmis Hollands Diepi serval, plaanis Dumouriez ületada ja marssida läbi Rotterdami, Delfti, Haagi ja Leideni, et vallutada Amsterdam. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_59

Pärast Maastrichti vallutamist ühines Miranda temaga, liikudes läbi Nijmegeni ja Utrechti. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_60

Hollandi vabariigiga hõivatud Prantsuse ülem oli austerlastele liiga palju aega taastumiseks andnud. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_61

Saxe-Coburg-Saalfeldi prints Josias koondas Reini läänekaldal Austria armee. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_62

Teda abistas paljulubav staabiohvitser nimega Karl Mack von Leiberich. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_63

1. märtsil pühkis Coburg Aldenhoveni lahingus kõrvale René Joseph de Lanoue kattearmee. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_64

Prantslased loobusid 3. märtsil Maastrichti piiramisest. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_65

Coburg jälitas aeglaselt ja Prantsuse väed koondusid 9. päeval Leuveni juurde. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_66

Dumouriez loobus aeglaselt oma Hollandi projektist, kuid Prantsuse valitsus nõudis, et ta võtaks Belgias juhtimise enda kätte. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_67

Jättes Louis-Charles de Flersi Hollandi armee juhtima, saabus Dumouriez 11. märtsil Leuveni. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_68

Dumouriez arvas, et tema sõdurite moraal oli taandumiseks liiga ebastabiilne, nii et ta läks edasi Coburgi armeesse, otsides lahingut. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_69

Kiirustades ei suutnud Prantsuse ülem kutsuda täiendusena Harville'i korpust ega Hollandi armeed. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_70

Varem oli François Joseph Drouot de Lamarche Tienenist (Tirlemont) välja aetud, kuid 16. märtsil vallutasid prantslased selle pärast jõulist lahingut tagasi. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_71

Prantslased ründasid Tieneni 10 000 sõduriga, Tescheni hertsog Charles aga kaitses linna 6000 sõduri, kuue püstoli ja kahe uhmriga. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_72

Prantsuse ohvreid oli 500, samas kui nende vastased kandsid 800 hukkunut, haavatut ja kadunut. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_73

Coburg tõmbas oma armee tagasi Little Gete jõe taha. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_74

Uskudes, et ta ületab oma vaenlasi, oli Dumouriez edu suhtes väga kindel. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_75

Sajand varem olid prantslased võitnud samal pinnal Landeni lahingu. Neerwindeni lahing (1793) _lause_76


Kataloog

Allalaadimisvormingud
Kataloogi püsiv identifikaator
APA tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. & amp; Johnston, Alexander Keith. & amp; William Blackwood ja pojad. & amp; W. & amp; K. K. Johnston Limited. (1852). Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793.

MLA tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. ja Johnston, Alexander Keith. ja William Blackwood ja pojad. ja W. & A. K. Johnston Limited. Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S 1852

Austraalia/Harvardi tsitaat

Alison, Archibald. & amp; Johnston, Alexander Keith. & amp; William Blackwood ja pojad. & amp; W. & amp; K. K. Johnston Limited. 1852, Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S

Wikipedia tsitaat
Neerwindeni lahing 18. märts 1793 [kartograafiline materjal] / A.K. Johnston F.R.G.S

Neerwindeni lahingu kaart 18. märts 1793, mis näitab Prantsuse ja Austria positsioone enne lahingut ja lahingu ajal, sealhulgas ratsaväge, jalaväge ja suurtükiväge koos reljeefidega, mida näitavad hahaurid.

Paremas alanurgas: W. & amp; A.K. Johnston, Edinr.

Tahvel 7 alates: Atlas kuni Alisoni Euroopa ajalugu / Archibald Alison. Edinburgh: William Blackwood & amp; Sons, 1852.

Alisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas.

Alates: Alison, Archibald, Sir, 1792-1867. Alisoni Euroopa ajaloo atlas

Internetis

Raamatukogus

Taotlege selle üksuse vaatamist raamatukogu lugemissaalides, kasutades oma raamatukogukaarti. Üksuste taotlemise kohta lisateabe saamiseks vaadake seda lühikest veebivideot.


1911 Encyclopædia Britannica/Neerwinden

NEERWINDEN, Belgia küla Liége provintsis, mõne miili kaugusel E. poolt Tirlemont, mis annab oma nime kahele suurele lahingule, esimene võitlus 1693. aastal Inglismaa liitlasvägede vahel William III juhtimisel. Inglismaa ja prantslased Luksemburgi hertsogi ajal ning teine ​​1793. aastal austerlaste vahel Coburgi vürsti Iosiase ja prantslaste vahel kindral Dumouriezi juhtimisel.

Neerwindeni lahing. või Landen, 1693 (vt GRAND ALLLANCE, WAR või THE): - Luksemburg, olles oma kavatsustega Williamit oma osade armeest eraldama viinud, kogus kiiresti üle suure hulga liitlaslaagreid, mis paiknesid Elissemist karmil poolringil. rightito Neerlanden ja sealt mööda vasakpoolset Landeni oja ”(18. – 28. juuli 1693). Williamil polnud mõtet Geete jõe äärde taanduda ja kinnistas tugeva joone Laerist läbi Neerwindcni kuni Neerlandeni. Selle liini paremal lõigul (Laer kuni Neerwinden) oli maa palju ristunud ja andis mõlemale küljele palju katet ning see lõik, mida peeti positsiooni võtmeks, oli tugevalt garneeritud keset avatud maad Neerwindcni vahel ja Neerlanden oli kindlalt juurdunud ning selle ees hoiti Rumsdorpi edasijõudnud ametikohana. Vasakpoolne Neerlandenis toetus Landeni ojale ja oli raskesti ligipääsetav. Williami õigus, kuna taandumisjoon ulatus üle Geete, oli tema ohtlik külg ja Luksemburg teadis, et kuna liitlaste rind on seda kaitsvate numbrite jaoks mõnevõrra pikk, sekkuvad väed, mis on tõmmatud ühelt tiibalt teise tugevdamiseks oleks peaaegu kindlasti hilja. Nendes tingimustes oli Luksemburgi üldine plaan visata oma rünnaku raskus Laer-Neerwindeni lõigule ja eriti Neerwindcnile ning säästa oma vägesid-kui „jõumajandust” mõisteti enne Napoleoni aega mujal, pakkudes rünnakuid või meeleavaldusi, mis võivad olla vajalikud ja seega takistavad

Sellesse kohta tekstis peaks ilmuma pilt.
Kui teil on võimalik seda pakkuda, vaadake Wikisource: Piltide juhised ja Help: Piltide lisamine juhendamiseks.

liitlaste keskus ja vasakpoolsed parempoolsete abistamisest. Luksemburgis oli umbes 80 000 meest Williami 50 000 meheni. Keskuse kinnistumiste vastas koondas ta peaaegu kogu oma ratsaväe kuueks reaks, kusjuures kaks rivi jalaväelasi olid vahele pandud. Neerlandeni ja Rumsdorpi rünnakuks öeldi jalaväe- ja draakonikorpusele ning põhirünnakuks määratud väed, 28 000 relvast, moodustati Neerwindeni vastas rasketes massides. See osa, mis moodustas umbes kolmandiku kogu jõust, mida otsustaval rünnakul rakendati, osutus salakavalaks. Liitlaste keskuse ja vasakpoolsuse vastas olevad väed pidid oma ohjeldava ülesande täitmiseks tegutsema suurima energiaga ning Laer-Neerwindenis osteti rünnaku edu alles vägede täieliku kurnatuse hinnaga. .

Pärast pikka suurtükki liikusid prantsuse kolonnid rünnakule, lähenedes Neerwindenile, väikseim vägi ründas Laeri. Külade serva kanti, kuid sisemaal algas mõrvarlik võitlus, kus vaidlustati iga maapind ja mõne aja pärast saatis William ise, juhtides rasket vasturünnakut, ründajad mõlemast külast välja. Teine sama energiaga surutud rünnak võeti vastu sama kindlalt ja vahepeal olid prantslased mujal väljakul oma meeleavaldused koju vajutanud. Isegi keskuses olnud kuus ratsaväge, kes olid pärast liitlaste tulekahju mitu tundi kestnud, traavisid üle lagendiku ja kuni süvenditeni, et saada teatud lüüasaamist, ning Neerlandenis ja Rumsdorpis oli raske käsikäes hghting. Kuid vahepeal olid Prantsuse keskuse kaks puutumatut jalaväerivi vasakule nihutatud ja moodustasid tuuma viimaseks suureks rünnakuks Neerwindenile, mis osutus kurnatud kaitsjatele liiga suureks. Nad langesid aeglaselt ja kindlalt tagasi, trotsides tagaajamist ning Briti Coldstream Guards tabas isegi värvi. Kuid praeguse kriisi ajal algatas alluv kindral, kuulus sõjaväekirjanik Feuquières (q.v.), muutis raskelt võidetud kohaliku edu hiilgavaks võiduks. William oli hakanud vägesid teisaldama oma keskusest ja vasakult paremale, et kohtuda Neerwindeni suure rünnakuga, ja Feuquières juhtis seda tähele pannes prantsuse keskuse ratsaväelasi taas otse hoonete juurde. Seekord sõitsid prantsuse eskadronid, kes üllatasid liitlasi manööverdamistegevuses, üle kõikide väeosade, keda nad kohtasid, ja liitlaste jaoks ei jäänud muud üle kui taganemine Geete kohal. Briti vägede kangekaelne tagakaitsja, keda juhtis ainult William ise, päästis liitlaste armee, millest kõik, välja arvatud vasak tiib, võideldi ja olid korrarikkumised. Luksemburg oli võitnud oma suurima võidu tänu Feuquiérese ärakasutamisele, kuid oleks rünnanud Neerwindeni, nagu oleks teinud Napoleon-ühe kolmandiku asemel pool või kaks kolmandikku tema vägedest oleks võit olnud määrav , ja Feuquières oleks loorberid võitnud, mitte otsust sundides ratsaväe kulutamise hinnaga, vaid liitlaste armee jäänuste hävitamisel tagaajamisel. Lahingu materiaalseteks tulemusteks oli kaksteist tuhat liitlast (võrreldes kaheksa tuhande prantslasega), haavata ja vangi ning kaheksakümmend relva ja suur hulk prantslaste võetud standardeid ja värve.

18. märtsi 1793. aasta lahing lõpetas Dumouriezi katse madalaid riike vallutada ja liitlaste sissetungi Prantsusmaale alguse. Austerlased Coburgi juhtimisel Maestrichtist Brüsseli suunas edasi liikudes kohtusid 15. märtsil Tirlemontis kiiruga koguneva Prantsuse armee juhtidega ja asusid positsioonile Neerwindeni ja Neerlandeni vahel. 18. päeval aga tõmbas Coburg pärast väikeseid eelvõitlusi lühikese vahemaa tagasi ja korraldas oma armee ümber pikemale rindele Racouri ja Dormaeli vahel, nii et see hõlmas Prantsuse poolt Tirlemontist alustatud ümbritsevat liikumist. Järelikult oli Dumouriez sunnitud võitlema paralleelsetel rinnetel ja kuigi külades endas kompenseeris prantsuse sõduri individuaalsus ja entusiasm tema ebapiisavat väljaõpet ja distsiplineerimatust, oli suurem osa kokkupuutepiirist avatud maa, kus Austria veteranide püsikliendid olid vaieldamatud. Nendes tingimustes oli katse võita rünnaku kasuks teine ​​Jemappes numbrilise koefitsiendiga 11 kuni 10, mitte 1: 1, katastroofile ja revolutsioonilise armee tagasilöök oli signaal selle peaaegu täielikuks lagunemiseks. Neerwinden oli suur katastroof, kuid mitte suur lahing. Selle üksikasjad näitavad vaid võimatust sõdida 18. sajandi süsteemis halvasti koolitatud vägedega. Meetodid, mille abil sellised väed võitsid võitu, "sans culotte" lahingu pidamise viisi, töötati välja alles hiljem.


Landeni lahing [Neerwinden]

Aastatel 1689–1692 oli saak kehv, kuid 1693. aasta saak ebaõnnestus täielikult kogu Prantsusmaal ja Põhja -Itaalias. Seistes silmitsi vähenevate ressurssidega, andis Louis armeele esikoha rahaliste vahendite rahastamisel pärast viimast laevastiku tegevust Lagose lähedal, kui konfiskeeriti 80 Anglo-Hollandi kaupmeest Smyrna laevastikust (27. juuni 1693), merevägi keskendus kaubandusretkedele partei kursus. Louis otsustas korraldada suuri maarünnakuid Kataloonias, Saksamaal ja Hollandis, et alustada suurt alliansi rikkalike rahutingimustega. Samaaegne diplomaatiline algatus arreteeris Rootsi lahkheli Suurliiduga ja suunas Rootsi head ametivõimud lõhede avamisele Saksa vürstide seas ainult valimisväärikuse kingitus veenis Hannoveri Ernst Augustit mitte loobuma Suurest Allianssist, kuid nõuti ka järeleandmisi. hoidma kõikuvat Saksimaa Johannes George IV.

Prantsuse diplomaatia raskus oli aga suunatud Piemonte poole, kus Victor Amadeus oli otsustanud Pinerolo tagasi võtta. Pärast üksuste saatmist Hispaania kindrali, markii de Legafiez'i alla Casale'i maskeerima, suundus ta läände. Catinat lahkus Tesse'st Pinerolos ja taandus Fenstrellesse, et kaitsta Tesse ’ suhtlust Susaga. Rünnak Pinerolo vastu oli poolik, rohkem pommitamine kui piiramine ja lõppes sellega, et Victor Amadeus uuendas 22. septembril Gropello kaudu diplomaatilisi avamisi Tesse'i. Victor Amadeuse tuhisedes ründas Catinat vasturünnakut. Kataloonia ja Reini vägede abil tugevdatud ta jõudis Pinerolo kohal asuvatelt mägedelt edasi ning oli 29. septembriks üle Victor Amadeuse ja#8217 side Torinoga.

Pinerolo pommitamisest loobudes kiirustas Savoyadi armee itta, piiramisrongist koormatuna. 4. oktoobril La Marsaglias kaotas ülekaaluline, väsinud ja üleüldine Piemonte 6000 meest. Kuigi Cuneo ja Torino olid rünnakule avatud, takistasid varustusraskused Catinatit oma võitu ära kasutamast ning pärast lõunast Saluzzosse sissemaksete tasumist läks ta talveks.

Louis ’ kolm maismaarünnakut algasid Kataloonias, kus Noailles piiras Rosat (28. maist kuni 9. juunini 1693), Kataloonia peamist mereväebaasi, kasutades nii oma armeed kui ka viiskümmend sõjalaeva. Lorge ületas mais 50 000 mehega Reini ja vallandas Heidelbergi teist korda nelja aasta jooksul. Seejärel liikus ta ettevaatlikult Frangimaale, kuid Badeni Ludwig asus Ilzfeldtis (26. juuli ja 28. august) tugevalt kindlustatud blokeerimispositsioonile, millest Lorge ja Dauphin ei suutnud tungida. Hollandis manööverdas Luksemburg, juhtides 68 000 meest, keda toetas Boufflerite juhtimisel 48 000, nii et William pidi Flandria, Brüsseli ja Liege'i kaitseks jagama oma 120 000 -liikmelise armee kolmeks korpuseks. Olles saavutanud kohaliku ülekaalu 66 000–50 000, püüdis ta 29. juulil Maarjamaast läänes asuva Landeni ja Neerwindeni külade ümber piiratud ja ebamugavasse olukorda lõksu Williami. Kuigi liitlased kaotasid vaid 12 000 Prantsusmaa kaotusega võrreldes, langes William valdkonnas Luksemburg võitis võita, piirates ja vallutades Meuse kindluse Charleroi (10. oktoobril).

Üheksa aasta ja#8217 sõja (1688-1697) suur lahing, mida peeti Flandrias. Maréchal Luxembourg tõi 80 000 prantslast võitlema William III ja#8217 50 000 liitlasväeosa vastu. Luksemburg meelitas Williami oma ratsaväega lahingusse lahingutega, seejärel üllatas liitlaste armeed selle laagris. Võitlus algas sellega, et mõlemad pooled asusid lahingujoonele varahommikuses udus, mis muutus lähedaste soiste alade poolt teravaks. Liitlased olid juurdunud kõrgele maapinnale nende keskel asuva madala kuristiku taha, servad ulatusid kahele väikesele külale. Nagu ta tegi Fleurus (21. juuni/1. juuli 1690), ründas Luksemburg taas mõlemat vastaskülge, samal ajal kui Prantsuse suurtükivägi lõi vaenlase relvi. Pärast neli tundi kestnud rasket lahingut langes Neerwindeni küla Prantsuse ja Šveitsi eliitkaartide eliitüksuste lõplikule rünnakule. William tõmbus tagasi, jättes 84 oma 91 raskest relvast koos 12 000 mehega, kes jäid platsile ohvriks, ja veel 2000 võeti vangi. Prantslased kandsid ka suuri kaotusi, umbes 8000 meest. Nagu enamik selle aja Flandria lahinguid, ostis isegi nii kõrge hind vähe operatiivset või strateegilist kasu. Nii jätkus kallis ja kurnav positsioonide sõda.

1690. aastatel muutus jalavägi harva vastastega käsikäes võitlema, kuigi oli muidugi märkimisväärseid erandeid, nagu Steenkirk (1692), kus Inglise ja Hollandi pataljonid jagunesid prantslastest vaid hekkidega. Üldiselt pidasid komandörid aga oma jalga enam -vähem staatilise tulejõu allikaks, kui nad olid järsult üles liikunud musketipiirkonda, tuginedes ratastega ratsanikele, kes otsustasid lõpliku küsimuse.

Kuigi üldistada on ohtlik, võib väita, et teatud riike peeti haugi ja tikutule kombinatsiooni viimastel päevadel jalaväe võitluses teistest paremateks.

Britid mängisid aktiivset rolli 1690. aastate suurel relvastamisel, kui haugid asendati pistikupesaga varustatud musketitega ja tikk-musketid asendati tulekividega. Kui musketi silindrisse asetatud varasemate pistikutõkete abil oli enne musketi tulistamist vaja tääk eemaldada, võimaldas pistikupesa bajonett tulistada, kui bajonett oli paigas. The Ordnance Office displayed flexibility in this rearming, using the capacity of the Birmingham gunsmiths and thus circumventing the monopoly of their London counterparts. All the new regiments raised from 1689 were equipped with flintlocks. The Land Pattern Musket could be fired at least twice a minute and weighed one pound less than the matchlock previously used.

However, as the French were re-equipping in a similar fashion, the British did not benefit from a capability gap. Certainly the weaponry available did not play a crucial role at Steenkirk or Neerwinden. In the former, the difficulty of mounting a successful frontal attack against a prepared defence was crucial. At Neerwinden, heavy French massed attacks eventually drove William from his poorly chosen position, but only at the cost of heavier casualties. The experience gained of campaigning on the Continent was to be important for the next conflict.

The introduction of the socket bayonet increased firepower, but it did not greatly encourage attacks because bayonet drills were for a long time based on pike drills, with the weapon held high and an emphasis on receiving advances. It was not until the 1750s that a new bayonet drill, with the weapon held waist-high, made it easier to mount attacks.

The Dutch infantry were widely considered to be amongst the best serving the Allied cause. Their showing in the War of 1672 had been far from impressive, but William III had subsequently overhauled their training and organization, and by 1688 they had few peers for stalwart bravery and coolness – qualities deemed the most important in the infantryman of that day. Their conduct at Fleurus (1690) drew a warm tribute from their opponent, Marshal Luxembourg, who wrote soon after his victory that ‘Prince Waldeck has very reason to be proud of his infantry.’ An Allied observer of the same battle, William Sawle, wrote that:

The French infantry could not so much as dare look them in the face could the Dutch be left alone to them, they would esteem them as nothing.

Even the highly critical William in expressed himself as well satisfied with his Dutch foot’s performance on a number of occasions. Their calm rallying after the defeat at Landen (1693) evoked widespread admiration. After the steady Dutch, the comparatively amateur and immature English infantry soon earned a redoubtable reputation for valiant behaviour in action. Notwithstanding their sub-standard equipment and bad reputation for indiscipline at the outset of the Nine Years’ War, they soon earned Prince Waldeck’s commendation for their bravery at the action of Walcourt (1689): ‘I would never have believed so many of the English would show such a joie de combattre’ Their later conduct against overwhelming odds of five to one amongst the hedgerows of Steenkirk and their showing at the battle of Landen added further lustre to their reputation despite the unfortunate outcome on both occasions. Their years of fullest achievement, however, still lay ahead.

The French, on the other hand, were generally rated to be somewhat indifferent infantrymen in the early years of the Nine Years’ War. At Fleurus, for example, French victory though it ultimately turned out to be, ‘the French horse were several times forced to rally their foot and bring them up under their cover.’ So disillusioned with their performance did Louis xiv become that in 1691 he ordered Luxembourg to avoid infantry action in future, for he believed that such an engagement ‘involves heavy losses and is never decisive’. Nevertheless, the French foot substantially redeemed their reputation at Steenkirk and Landen, though in the former instance they required a massive superiority of numbers to convert their initial rout into a narrow success. On other fronts, however, the French infantry enjoyed a reputation worthy of their greatest days. Marshal Catinat reported in glowing terms their conduct at Marsaglia in North Italy (1693), where with great intrepidity they stormed the key to the Austrian position with the bayonet. ‘I believe there never was an action’, wrote their proud commander, ‘which showed better what your Majesty’s infantry is capable of.’ Such successes, however, encouraged French generals of several generations in the belief that the true metier of the French foot was cold steel – and this assumption led them to disregard the refinements of infantry fire tactics, with what proved to be near-fatal results in the following war.

William III’s Dutch and English regiments made little impression on their French opponents. Shortly after the battle of Fleurus (1690), Marshal Luxembourg, while paying compliments to the sturdy Dutch infantry, was moved to remark that ‘the Prince of Waldeck has good reason to resent his cavalry for ever.’ A year later, the same French commander rubbed home the point at the Combat of Leuze. Learning that Waldeck (who had just taken over the Allied command from William in) was passing his army over the river La Catoir without taking proper precautions prior to entering winter quarters, confident that the French were too far distant to be able to interfere, Luxembourg determined to end the campaign on a high note by bearding his opponent. He conducted a secret forced march from Espierre over 17 kilometres under cover of a convenient mist at the head of 28 squadrons of horse and dragoons (many of them belonging to the Maison du Roi and including in their number the youthful Villars) and fell upon the 75 squadrons and five battalions of the Allied rearguard on 19 September 1691. Surprise was almost complete. Leaving two regiments of dragoons to engage the Allied foot near Caparelle, Luxembourg attacked the disordered horse – who had only managed to form a single line – and proceeded to administer a sound drubbing. But for a heroic counter-charge by the English Life Guards – one of whose guardsmen fought his way through the French ranks to engage the Marshal in personal combat – the defeat might have been even more humiliating for William’s forces, but as it was the Allies lost 1,500 casualties and 40 standards before being able to extricate themselves to the further bank of the river. So pleased was Louis xiv at the outcome that he ordered a commemorative medal to be struck, and awarded a special standard to the troop of Horse Grenadiers of the Maison which had particularly distinguished itself in the action.

Throughout the War of the League of Augsburg, indeed, there seems to have been no stopping the French cavalry, and at Landen (1693) they again demonstrated their superiority by storming William III’s earthworks at the fourth attempt, a feat which enabled them to capture Neerwinden village from the rear.

The movement of iron and brass monsters weighing an average of three tons apiece clearly required the services of vast numbers of horses and drivers, as did the drawing of the large number of attendant wagons. The first problem facing every train commander at the outset of a campaign was the finding of adequate draught-animals and transport. The ability of any army to take the field at the opening of the campaigning season depended to no small degree on the success of the officers at wheedling, cajoling or stealing horses and oxen, and delays were not unknown. Jacob Richards noted in his diary on 25 April 1693 that ‘the Gunnes were fitted up and all the pontoons fixed for a march, wanting nothing now but Colonel Goor with the Contractors’ horses and waggons, as also Mr Fletcher with our recrute [sic] stores from Rotterdam.’ It was not until 18 May, however that the train commander made his somewhat belated appearance with ‘the greatest part of our horses and waggons so that now our traine will soon be fixed for the first orders that may come. William’s armies were notoriously slow off the mark compared to the French each year.

Other English and Allied armies were not so fortunately endowed or administered. The campaigns in the barren vastness of Spain and Portugal. Even when the horses were produced by the contractors, many often had to be rejected as unsuitable. In 1689, for example, General Schomberg felt compelled to turn down horses intended for use in Ireland on the grounds that ‘they appear to me too slight . . . Besides one was lame, another an old cart-horse and most of them faulty.’ Small wonder that generals were continually assessing and reassessing local resources in the areas they expected to be operating in. One such document survives from 1692 in which it is regretfully noted that the district of Liege – currently under French contribution – might prove capable of providing the foe with 2,353 waggons and as many as 14,000 local pioneers, whilst on the other hand Flanders could provide the Allies with only ‘four to five hundred waggons which would serve to transport that which is coming from Brussels’. William in in person was plagued with transport considerations: in his hand-written ‘Memorandum on Military Matters’ dated 6 December 1689 we find under the heading ‘Artillerie and what depends on it an item reading ‘contracts for wagons and horses. To send for Flanders.’ If it is true to assert that armies could operate only over such distances they could carry their bread, it is equally clear that they could only conduct effective operations against such places as their guns could reach. In both respects, one key consideration was the availability of horses, drivers, waggons and fodder.

The problems associated with the continuing reliance in many armies on civilian drivers and boys for the trains have already been alluded to. These personnel constituted a considerable martial hazard, through their well-known proclivity for flight the moment danger threatened and through their general intransigence towards those in authority over them. Even the able and long-suffering Colonel Goor was moved to request William Blathwayt, Secretary at War, ‘that a representation be made to his Lordship [the Master-General] of the want of a Comptroller upon the place to look after the civil part of the Trains in Flanders’.

Probably the most intransigent basic problem involved in moving the trains was the poor quality of European communications in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Although Louis xiv improved the four great ‘strategic’ highroads traversing France running from Picardy to Bayonne, Lower Brittany to Marseilles, Languedoc to Normandy and Santoigne to Bresse, these main arteries were of little tactical significance. Most roads in Europe were little more than earthen tracks, often deeply rutted, turning into quagmires in wet weather or miles of frozen, axle-breaking ruts in winter. Hills presented major problems – whether going up or down – and the efforts of the pioneers could do but little to ameliorate the situation. This was one major reason for the restriction of campaigning as a general rule to the period from April to September each year. Even at the height of the ‘season’, the movement of the trains could be hell on earth in the event of unusually wet weather.

By the end of the long reign of Louis xiv, generals had come to regard the symmetry of their twin battle formations to be sacred, just as admirals considered the maintenance of their ships’ line of battle at sea an inviolable principle. It was rare for an army to have a reserve – although sometimes a force of dragoons was retained in the rear – and as armies grew gradually larger so the extent of their lines developed. Extended lines stretching over three to four miles were potentially vulnerable, and the prime duties of the artillery in battle were considered to be to sustain the individual sections of the line and to form batteries for the support of key strongpoints for use in attack or defence. The first task was particularly the responsibility of the regimental artillery – the pair of 2- or 3-pdrs which English, Dutch and Austrian battalions habitually took into battle with them – but in armies like the French which possessed no real regimental pieces until the 1740s, both tasks depended upon the resources of the field park.

Armies moved up for battle in between three and ten columns, each following its own route. As we have noted the guns often came either well to the rear, or all in the centre (as at Fleurus in 1690) when Luxembourg advanced on Waldeck’s forces in five columns, the central one consisting wholly of the train). Then, whilst the horses and foot slowly took up their precisely regulated battle positions, the senior officers of the artillery would ride forward to select the best available battery positions. As a general rule they sought the highest ground available with the least impeded and longest field of fire the size of the batteries they established varied according to circumstances between four and twenty pieces thus at Entzheim (1674), St Hilaire drew up his 32 guns in four batteries whilst at Malplaquet the battery destined to wreak so much havoc with the Dutch Guards numbered 20 pieces. It was comparatively rare, however, for guns to be retained ready-limbered and prepared to accompany an advance at this time, although it seems that this was done by Catinat’s artillery at Marsaglia (1693). The fact that it proved possible to deploy the lighter guns so far forward in this way should not disguise the scale of the problems generally involved in so doing. The guns were equally expected to cover any retreat by the main forces. On many occasions it proved impossible to bring the guns off at the end of an unfortunate engagement, but on others a great deal was in fact achieved. Colonel Jacob Richards writes as follows of the Allied defeat at Steenkirk in 1692:

In our retreat the enemy got 12 pieces of our Cannon, but we retook the four of them again (of wh. 4 was Dutch). The heat of this dispute held (lasted) about three howers, that is ffrom one to four, about wh. time all ffires ceased, and by the King’s command we retreated wh. was done in great order, the Enemy never attemptingto make any advantage thereby untill we were all on March, and then appeared the left of their army wh. advanced as ffar as the Grounde wh. we stood upon. But our cannon was so advantageously posted that they thought it was not discretion to come /forward and so wee parted ffor this cause, but through the ffear and neglect of the carters some ammunition waggons were overset wh. wee ourselves afterwards burned.

All in all this represented a dignified withdrawal, despite the incident of the munition-carts. It was not repeated next year at Landen however. On this occasion the Allies ‘left the field, their artillerie and what baggage they had with them’ to the tune of 84 cannon. Such loss of metal was not exceptional amidst the confusion and panic of defeat.

Luxembourg, captured so many flags at Landen that he could make a “tapestry” with them inside the Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris. For this reason he was nicknamed le Tapissier de Notre-Dame.

duc de Luxembourg, François Henri de Montmorency, (1628-1695). Maréchal de France.

Like his cousin the Great Condé, Luxembourg fought in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648). He saw action at Lens (August 10, 1648), one of the last fights of that long and dirty conflict. Also like Condé, during the Fronde, Luxembourg turned against the monarchy and entered the service of Spain. He was captured at Rethel (October 15, 1650) but was soon released. He spent the next eight years fighting Louis XIV. He fought reluctantly at the Dunes (June 4/14, 1658). He returned to France and relative favor, along with his then more famous cousin, following promulgation of a royal amnesty that accompanied the Treaty of the Pyrenees (October 28/November 7, 1659).He led a French army that occupied Franche-Comté in 1668 during the War of Devolution (1667-1668). He fought again during the Dutch War (1672-1678), so well at the beginning in the campaign around Cologne, and so well and often thereafter, that in reward, the “Grande Monarque” raised him to the rank of “maréchal de France” in 1675. Luxembourg fought at Seneffe (August 11, 1674) alongside the Great Condé, and later commanded in the Rhineland as the successor to Turenne. He saw more action at Cassel (April 11, 1677). He opposed William III (then still Prince of Orange) at the needless battle of St. Denis (August 4/14, 1678).

Luxembourg fell from royal favor in 1679 over an odd court scandal concerning supposed use of black magic and performance of sacrilegious acts. He was confined for some months. He was back in favor at court within two years, following the intercession of Condé, and served as captain of the Gardes du Corps. One year into the Nine Years’War (1688-1697), he was restored to command of the main French army. He retained command in Flanders until his death in 1695, fighting and winning several minor and three major battles during those years. Most dramatically and daringly, he defeated Waldeck at Fleurus (June 21/July 1, 1690), after which he besieged and took Mons in March-April 1691. He commanded the French army of observation during the first siege of Namur (May 25-June 30, 1692). He beat William in the field at Steenkerke (July 24/ August 3, 1692) and again, and most bloodily, at Neerwinden (July 19/29, 1693).

Yet, Luxembourg’s field victories changed little in the larger context of the war. His main tactical and operational preoccupation remained maneuvers and positional warfare, which always dominated the Flanders theater of operations. The noted reluctance or inability of Luxembourg to pursue a beaten enemy after each of his battlefield victories is sometimes attributed to restraints placed on his freedom of action by Louis XIV. However, a greater commander would have made the case for hard pursuit and insisted upon carrying it out.


Louis Phillipe I. Orleans´dies in 1793 during/after the battle of Neerwinden

What was his impact before 1830?
His travels between 1793 ans 1815 sound really cool. Living in Switzerland as private tutor, then with a vicar in Lapland, in Boston and in Havana - he was much more of a globetrotter than I knew. Thios alone could serve to shake up the butterflies immensly.
I mean, in 1796 or 1797 he met with Washington, Hamilton and other American celebritie. If he is dead, they will have different schedules, meet different people, say different things. During his 15 years in England he will have also done things that affected his hosts.

The death of LPh will not affect the eventual Bourbon restoration and the accession of Louis XVIII, nor the latter's lack of children. Charles X will succeed, and tema already has two sons: Louis Antoine, born 1775, and Charles Ferdinand, born 1778. The first is a well known reactionary, so he will probably not survive politically when the unrest starts in

1830.
CF, the Duke of Berry, will not be assassinated in 1820. 27 years of LPh being dead will create enough ripples to prevent such a fluke incident.
CF seems to have been more personable. Maybe he manages to secure the succession for himself or for a hypothetical son. His OTL marriage might not happen the same way - different wife, different children.
But if he only marries after the restoration like in OTL, his son will be still minor in 1830. The distinguish that son from OTL persons, let's call him François.
We might see a situation where the Chambre of Deputies proclaims François III. nagu King of the French under a regent, trying to educate him as liberal king. It's anyone's guess if that can succeed.
By now, changes have accumulated for almost two generations. It is very difficult to say any substantial over politics.
Just one example: The whole Egyptian expedition of General Bonaparte, its troubles and the aftermath with the power struggle between Ottomans and Mamluks, the coup of Mehmet Ali with the extermination of the Mamluks are all in the future of the PoD and were partiallyshaped by small random incidents, so in the 1830 the situation in the "Orient" will be different enough to completely change French policy.


So Corporal Trim begins one of the many rambling episodes of Tristram Shandy, which is framed by how he fell in love and diverts into whether groin or knee injuries are worse. But the Battle of Landen was no laughing matter when the French defeated William III's army on 29 July 1693, and cam close to killing King Billy himself, around 27,000 soldiers were killed, which made it the bloodiest battle of the entire War of the League of Augsburg - which on a moderately generous reading includes both the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 and the fall of Barcelona in 1714.

In fact the battle happened not in Landen but at the nearby village of Neerwinden, which happens to be very close to where my daughter B lives, so I took her there this afternoon to have a look at it. And in a classic two-for-the-price-of-one deal, at Neerwinden you can inspect not only the site of the Battle of Neerwinden in 1693, but also the site of the Battle of Neerwinden on 18 March 1793, where the Austrians crushed a demoralised French force with the result that the defeated French commander unsuccessfully attempted a coup in Paris, and then (along with the future King Louis Philippe) defected to the Austrians who he had just been fighting. It was a smaller affair, though, with 7-8,000 casualties, less than a third of the death toll of a century earlier.

I found it really very difficult to translate the available maps of the two battles onto today's geography. These are my attempts to do so, maps found from the internet on the left, my attempts to interpret them on the right, French in blue and their opponents in red in both my maps, and in the orignal 1693 map (confusingly, the French are red and the Austrians yellow in the 1793 map):

1693
1793

The shaded contours on the older maps bear very little relevance to what's on the ground. What does become clear is that the triangular plateau to the north of Neerwinden, with the town at its apex, is the strategically important target it was the territory that William III and his allies were defending in 1693, and was the contested ground between the French and Austrians a century later. At the same time it's interesting to see how the tides of history wash in different directions at different times - from south to north in 1693, from east to west in 1793.

It is a typically flat Flemish landscape ("mijn vlakke land") with a very few gentle rises. The only thing really worth photographing is the Chapel of the Holy Cross, on the eastern edge of the plateau. It has an explanatory noticeboard hinting at the enormity of what happened here.


There is a sheltered grove around the chapel demarcated by the Stations of the Cross, with a park bench in which B (who likes to wear her hood up in all weathers) sat happily, refusing to move.

Within the chapel (which I'm sorry to say has been repeatedly vandalised), worshippers have left votive offerings and intentions.

In the summer of 1694, Lord Perth travelled across the scene of the battle, and in a letter to his sister - later quoted by Macaulay - was the first person that I know of to use a simile that has become very familiar, 220 years before John McCrae:


In Neerwinden itself, an ancient standing stone has been moved to the front of the modern 1950s church, and although there is also an official somewhat brutal war memorial, it is the older obelisk that the locals have chosen to place their poppies at perhaps because, here of all places, it was not only the wars of the twentieth century that marked the people and the land, and a monument without a date, which was erected by people long forgotten except in their attempt to express the inexpressible, is more appropriate to commemorate the trauma of past conflict than one whose initial reference point is 1914.

British Army Lineages

The English language wiki on the Battle of Neerwinden conveniently gives an order of battle of the British regiments present at that battle. Unfortunately, that order of battle uses (more) modern titles for the regiments, unknown in 1693. The section's title ('English, Scottish and Irish Order of Battle') may make the reader think there were separate English, Scottish and Irish components in the army in Flanders. Though there were English, Scottish and Irish regiments, they were all on the English Establishment. There are some minor inaccuracies as well.

Presented here is a somewhat revised order of battle is given, with 17th century titles (i.e., understandable for contemporaries and EMEMH-ians). A more modern title, usually the territorial designation valid for around 1900, is given between brackets and should be understood by the younger generations.

The corrections were largely made using d'Auvergne's account of the campaign of 1693, and Walton's history of British Standing Army.

Ratsavägi

- Life Guards - three squadrons: 1st, 3rd and 4th Troops of Life Guards. The latter one was actually the Dutch Garde du Corps. This unit came over to England in 1688, and was on the English Establishment between 1689 and 1699. In England it ranked as the 4th Troop of Life Guards. The regimentation of these three troops may have been for convenience and tactical purposes only. The wiki shows the Royal Horse Guards, which were in England in 1693 and should be considered an error.
- The Queen's Regiment of Horse - 3 sqns (1st Dragoons Guards)
- Lord Berkeley's Regiment - 2 sqns (3rd Dragoons Guards)
- Francis Langston's Regiment - 2 sqns (4th Dragoons Guards)
- Hugh Wyndham's Regiment - 2 sqns (6th Dragoons Guards)
- Earl of Galway's Regiment - 3 sqns (a Huguenot regiment, disbanded in 1699 and not in the wiki)

Lord Fitzharding's Regiment of Dragoons - 3 sqns (4th Dragoons)

- First Regiment of Foot Guards - 2 bns (later Grenadier Guards)
- Coldstream Regiment of Foot Guards - 1 bn (Coldstream Guards)
- Scots Regiment of Foot Guards - 2 bns (Scots Guards)
- Royal Regiment of Foot - 2 bns (Royal Scots)
Remark: it should be remarked that the battalions of the regiments of guards were temporary, tactical, formations, and not necessarily distinctive, ever-present and unchanging administrative formations as we came to know battalions at a later period. The Royal Regiment, however, was really organised into two battalions.
- William Selwyn's Regiment of Foot - 1 bn (Queen's (West Surrey))
- Charles Churchill's Regiment - 1 bn (Buffs (East Kent))
- Henry Trelawney's Regiment - 1 bn (King's Own (Lancaster))
- Royal [Regiment of] Fuziliers - 1 bn (Royal Fusiliers (City of London))
- John Tidcomb's Regiment - 1 bn (West Yorkshire)
- Francis Collingwood's Regiment - 1 bn (disbanded in 1700, not in wiki)
- James Stanley's Regiment - 1 bn (Leicestershire)
- Thomas Erle's Regiment - 1 bn (Green Howards (North Yorkshire))
- Francis O'Farrell's Regiment - 1 bn (Royal Scots Fusiliers (Ayrshire))
- Earl of Leven's Regiment - 1 bn (King's Own Scottish Borderers)
- Andrew Munro's Regiment - 1 bn (Cameronians)

- Sir Charles Graham's Regiment - 1 bn (Scots Brigade)
- Aeneas Mackay's Regiment - 1 bn (idem)
- George Lauder's Regiment - 1 bn (idem)
Remark: the previous three regiments are dubbed as Dutch mercenaries on the aforementioned wiki. In reality this were Scottish regiments in pay of the Dutch Republic. They came over to England in November 1688, and were placed on the English Establishment in early 1689. In 1697 the regiments returned onto the Dutch payroll. The designation 'mercenaries' is not really appropriate, in the author's opinion. Graham's regiment is not mentioned in Walton's overview of infantry officers casualties (p. 270-1), but is found in d'Auvergne's account of the campaign of 1693 (pp. 91-5).


English Historical Fiction Authors

The British campaign in Flanders, between 1793 and 1795, feels like an often-overlooked footnote in British military history. A disaster, that if we somehow look away, will be neatly swept under a rug, and we can return to the familiar narrative of a series of coalitions against France until the victory of Waterloo. Fortescue’s British Campaigns in Flanders is still the seminal work for understanding this campaign and sets the two diaries in context. The anonymous writer known as ‘Officer of the Guard’, was a member of the Duke of York’s staff and is a mixture of beautiful verse and pithy prose. Robert Brown’s account as corporal in the Coldstream Guards, is observant of the everyday. A shared war from very different social strata.

In February 1793, the French Convention declared war on Great Britain. In response, Great Britain sent a small army, a brigade initially with more men to follow. It was necessary to be on the continent, to be seen to be ‘doing our bit’ to restore the French monarchy there were after all, political prizes to be had! While the Guards’ officers were no doubt keen to be rid of an overcrowded ship, Corporal Brown makes no mention of the hardship, instead comparing the villages around the port of Helleveotsluis to the country he had just left, ‘The streets are regular and kept remarkably clean, as well as the outside of their houses, which they are continually washing’.

The gaining of Terra Firma was an obvious relief to all the Duke’s soldiers. It had been a less than auspicious start.

The port of Hellevoetsluis at Hollands Diep

The parade of two thousand guardsmen which had set off along the Mall had turned into a drunken ramble by the time it had reached Greenwich. Soldiers were loaded into three overcrowded transports. A soldier slipped on a gang-plank, fell and shattered his leg. Amongst the doctors in the three battalions, no medical supplies could be found. None had been loaded but at least the campaign furniture of the Guards officers had. Some consolation at least. The young officer from York’s inner circle foreshadowed the days ahead, “Somewhere there was a fault.”

The epitaph of the Flanders campaign.

The ships that sailed into Hollands Diep narrowly avoided a storm that would have surely wrecked them. Such an auspicious start was compounded by the constraints of operational orders sent by the government, and Henry Dundas in particular, which attempted to shackle the Duke’s army to a protection of the landing places along Hollands Diep. In early March 1793, there were around 2000 men under the Duke’s command. Two weeks earlier, the French convention had passed a law to levy 300,000 men to be added to a standing army that John Lynn in The Bayonets of the Republic suggested had shrunk from 450,000 in November to 290,000 in February 1793.

While the French were fighting on every border, the Army of the North, under General Dumouriez was around 23,000 with the Army of the Ardennes also nominally under his control. Fortescue paints Dumouriez as the supreme chancer, his aims with the Army of the North uncertain. It seems more likely that Dumouriez had designs on capturing Amsterdam and its gold rather than The Hague and the seat of the Dutch Stadtholder.

The war for Corporal Brown is one that any soldier across the ages could identify with. Marching, waiting, marching again. In fact, there was to be no major engagement in Holland. The French had begun a siege of Willemstadt, a fortress on the south bank of Hollands Diep, but the arrival of a strong Austrian army under Prince Josias, drew Dumouriez and the bulk of his men in the direction of Brussels and a fateful battle.

As the moment of high drama approached, the tempo of the ever present politicking increased. The Duke of York was given license to move further inland but strict instructions from Dundas that the ‘British army’ was not to become just another corps in Josias’ ranks. Two thousand men would barely constitute an Austrian corps but that was being rectified. Hanover was to supply 15,000 infantry and around 5,000 cavalry. More Germans, Hessian troops, would follow as well as several squadrons of British cavalry. All this due by May, but by then the emergency and the chance to secure the peace dividend and political prize could well be lost.

The Duke of York. The King's choice as the commander
of the British army on the continent in 1793.

Dunkirk might seem a strange choice as compensation for Great Britain’s efforts but, along with other French colonies in the West Indies, Fortescue suggests that such a deal had been brokered by Austria. The Imperials from Vienna were playing a much greater endgame, to ensure both its close ties with the restored House of Bourbon but also to expand north into Saxony. By greasing the palms and soothing the consciences of other nations, Prussia was also to receive French territory in the Austrian plan, who could deny Austria a rightful prize when she alone asked nothing of France. Pitt’s embattled administration thought that possessing a little part of France would play well at home with the mob.

Such manoeuvring was scarce confined to the allies. Dumouriez, the master strategist, had a foot firmly planted in both worlds and a step light enough to stay one move ahead of the guillotine. He was perhaps the last man to hold a private counsel with Louis XVI before the King’s execution. A courtier of some thirty years but also the Revolutionary Minister for War and now Commander of the Army of the North. Dumouriez believed that his men were more loyal to him than to France, much as Lafayette had done, the year before. A miscalculation that had nearly cost his predecessor his life.

When the negotiations between Dumouriez and Prince Josias first occurred, I cannot be certain. On the 18th March 1793, the two armies fought at Neerwinden. The Austrian victory sent the French reeling back towards their northern border. Somewhere in that time frame, the Convention in Paris heard that Dumouriez planned to defect. By the 1st of April, a delegation had arrived from Paris to arrest the traitorous general, only for Dumouriez to have them arrested and sent to the Austrian camp.

The timeframe is too tight for these events to play out consecutively. Eleven days for secret negotiations to be discovered, reported to Paris, a decision made and a delegation dispatched to the frontier? Which draws the obvious conclusion of collusion between Dumouriez and the Austrian Prince Josias before Neerwinden, making the battle a bargaining chip and the treachery to have been relayed to Paris from within the General’s close circle. If Dumouriez won, he had more choice. Amsterdam could still be taken. And with money, why restore an unpopular monarchy when a new-style of revolutionary leader might be more acceptable to the masses? The defeat weakened his hand but would the ultimate gambit of changing sides bear fruit?

Five thousand Frenchmen followed Dumouriez into exile, less than one in eight that had taken the field at Neerwinden. The rest of the Army of the North could return to France on the swearing of oaths by officers that its men would not bear arms again. Prince Josias was roundly condemned by his allies, even publicly by his own Emperor for the attempts to woo Dumouriez. For the rest of April, the Allies bickered about how best to impose peace, without it seems, the smallest concern that they still had to beat the French to accomplish such lofty goals. At the end of April, Prussia proposed its own negotiations with the Army of the North, to affect a mass defection, and found itself on the end of various verbal attacks from rest of the coalition.

Dumouriez, a man for all seasons?

A plan was eventually agreed, the capture of the fortress at Valenciennes, which opened a route to Paris. The battle itself, called the battle of Camp Famars, foreshadowed the events of 1794. There were no maps of the terrain. If any reconnaissance had been undertaken, that information failed to reach the frontline. What it did expose was the propensity of the troops to plunder, a scene that appalled Corporal Brown “Every house was plundered in a most unseemly manner, by the Austrians and others of the foreign troops whose hardened hearts, neither the entreaties of old age, the tears of beauty, the cries of children, nor the moving scenes of the most accumulated distress can touch with pity.

Valenciennes fell in a protracted siege at the end of July. The Army of the North, whose leaders had either defected, died at its helm or faced the guillotine for their ‘failures’, retreated. The allies pursued and Paris was just eleven days march away. But the coalition faltered again. The fortress of Lille would be at the backs of the allied forces and the Austrians feared having their supply lines severed. The Duke of York, with two brigades of British infantry and his Hanoverian and Hessian contingent was under pressure to secure Dunkirk before it was too late. After all, grabbing the city once the revolution had been beaten might look a little disingenuous. There was a last meeting between Prince Josias and the Duke of York before the British, with a corps of 10,000 Austrians acting as corps of communications, moved north.

With this moment of separation, the coalition lost the momentum and tempo of the war and would never regain it.

If ever you do attempt to follow the machinations of this campaign, do invest in a map of northern France. How the Austrian corps that accompanied the Duke was meant to protect communications between Josias and York has baffled my understanding. Lille and Dunkirk are around 50 miles apart. That is just one of the many farces that this rich campaign has still to reveal.

The story of Dunkirk and the fateful days of September 1793 are for another post.

The King’s Germans is a project that has been many years in the making. Currently Dominic Fielder manages to juggle writing and research around a crowded work and family life. The Black Lions of Flanders (set in 1793) is the first in the King’s Germans’ series, which will follow an array of characters through to the final book in Waterloo. The King of Dunkirk will soon be released and Dominic hopes that the response to that is as encouraging as the reviews of Black Lions on olnud.
Dominc lives just outside of Tavistock, in Devon where he enjoys walking on the moors and the occasional horse-riding excursion as both inspiration and relaxation.