Miks käskis Churchill pommid hävitada?

Miks käskis Churchill pommid hävitada?

Olen lugenud mitmeid väiteid, et Churchill andis käsu hävitada Bombe koodimurdmismasinad, kuid ma ei saa tegelikult aru selle motivatsioonist. Kas saate seda mulle selgitada või viidata?

Kui teil on rahvana võime kommunikatsiooni dekodeerida, siis miks sellest loobuda? See ei sõltu sellest, kas Enigma masinad hävitati või mitte - see võime peaks, kui mitte midagi muud, heidutama teisi isegi proovimast või vähemalt andma juhuse, kui keegi tegi proovige kasutada krüptitud sidet.

Mulle tundub, et see annab märku soovist vähem ähvardada, kuid ma ei arva, et see "sobib" ... meeleolu(?) ajast - ja igal juhul põhineb see ainult minu enda äärmiselt amatöörlikel spekulatsioonidel.


Kui teil on rahvana võime kommunikatsiooni dekodeerida, siis miks sellest loobuda?

See on ekslik oletus ja tõenäoliselt ka teie segaduse allikas. Pommide hävitamine ei tähendanud seda, et britid "loobuksid" oma koodimurdmisvõimest, kuna pommid olid sisuliselt mehaanilised ASIC -id, mis olid loodud spetsiaalselt natside Enigma süsteemide pakutava krüptimise katkestamiseks. Natside lüüasaamisega polnud lihtsalt vajadust Enigma kodeeritud sõnumeid tööstuslikus mastaabis lõhkuda, kuna Briti kuulamisjaamades ei edastanud keegi selliseid signaale. Niisiis, peaaegu kõigil praktilistel eesmärkidel muutusid need seadmed natsirežiimi langemisega kasutuks. Kuid nende masinate taga olnud mõtted olid Suurbritannia valitsusele endiselt kättesaadavad ja vajadusel võis neid kutsuda üles ehitama uusi pomme või sarnaseid masinaid, et murda erinevaid šifersüsteeme.

Nende seadmete hoidmise oht on see, et nad paljastasid, kui hästi olid britid saanud koodimurdmisel, mis oli saladus, mida hoiti väga hoolikalt. Pommi on nimetatud isegi Suurbritannia ajaloo kõige olulisemaks masinaks, mis võib olla ülehinnatud, kuid kindlasti mõjutas see sõja käiku tohutult. Kui sakslased oleksid seda teadnud, oleksid nad kahtlemata kasutusele võtnud vastumeetmed, millest britid ei pruugi olla võimelised läbi tungima ja brittide tohutu eelis oleks kaotatud. See mõte oli kindlasti Churchilli peas, kui ta mõtles nende seadmete saatuse üle - natside lüüasaamine ei tähendanud, et kõik Suurbritannia vaenlased ja vastased oleksid võidetud, ning paljastas nende uskumatu koodimurdmisvõime vastasele (näiteks NSVL). oleks olnud suur strateegiline viga. Turvalisem ja mõistlikum oli hävitada nüüdseks vananenud masinad, mis tõestasid nende koodimurdmisoskust, ja värvata pommide taha matemaatilised geeniused, et ehitada uusi masinaid, et murda uusi või erinevaid koode, mida teised kasutaksid riigid lähevad edasi.

see võime peaks, kui mitte midagi muud, heidutama teisi isegi proovimast või vähemalt alustama juhuks, kui keegi prooviks kasutada krüpteeritud suhtlust.

Noh, siin on kaks asja. Tegelikult on palju soodsam lasta kellelgi suhelda koodiga mõtle on purunematu, kuid saate seda kuulata, kui proovida krüptimist pärssida. Kui teie vastane arvab, et saate tema koodi rikkuda, kasutab ta teist koodi ja/või muudab andmekandja selliseks, mida te ei saa pealt kuulata (suunatud raadiolained, isiklikud kullerid jne), kuid olete kindel, et te ei saa kuulata, nad suhtlevad vabalt ja võimaldavad teil kuulata, rikkudes nende "purunematut" koodi.

Teiseks, krüptanalüüsi alused olid juba Bletchley pargi mõtetes paika pandud ja konkreetselt pommidest poleks tegelikult palju abi koodi edasilükkamisel, olenemata järgmisest šifrist. Tõeline võlu masinate taga oli matemaatika ja masinate aluseks olnud krüptanalüütiline teooria/tehnikad. Just see oli edaspidiseks kasutamiseks väärtuslik. Ja jällegi, parim viis selle võime saladuses hoidmiseks oli hävitada asitõendid (masinad ise) ja hoida nende taga olevad mõtted salajas.


Enamik Enigma koodimurdmisega tegelevaid inimesi ei teadnud süsteemi tegelikku nime ega tehtud jõupingutuste ulatust. See aitas kaasa Enigma purunemise saladuse säilimisele kuni 1970ndateni.

Nii et "vähem ähvardav väljanägemine" pole probleem. Need vähesed riigid, kes teavad, juba teavad ja omavad paremat krüptograafiat. Keegi teine ​​ei tea. Teavet hoiti tõesti tihedalt. USNi allveelaevaohvitser John P. Cromwell läks meelega alla uppuva allveelaevaga, et vältida jaapanlaste tabamist ja võimalusel olla sunnitud saladust avaldama.

Liitlased müüsid pärast Teist maailmasõda vallutatud Enigma masinaid kolmanda maailma riikidesse, sest neid peeti laialdaselt turvaliseks. See on selle valdkonna normaalne määrdunud trikkide tase. Enigma uutelt kasutajatelt saadud materjali kogus oli palju väiksem kui sõja ajal Saksamaalt. Enamikku pommidest polnud vaja.

Kui hävitate enamiku neist või isegi kogu partii, kui on parem asendaja, siis kui saladus lekib, on teil usaldusväärne väide, et te ei saa seda koodi enam lugeda. Samuti väldite suurte, keerukate ja väga salajaste masinate valvamise ja hooldamise kulusid.


Kui teil on rahvana võime kommunikatsiooni dekodeerida, siis miks sellest loobuda? See ei sõltu sellest, kas Enigma masinad hävitati või mitte - see võime peaks, kui mitte miski muu, heidutama teisi isegi proovimast või vähemalt andma alustuseks juhuks, kui keegi prooviks krüpteeritud sidet kasutada.

Teadmine, et teie krüptimine on katki, viib ainult tugevama krüptimiseni.

Enigma oli katki, kuna see oli vigane nii disaini kui ka operatiivse kasutamise osas. Kuid need vead ei olnud põhimõttelised ja neid saab parandada. Kui inimesed teaksid nendest vigadest ja et neid saaks muuta praktiliseks rünnakuks, parandaksid nad need. Kui nad arvavad, et see on turvaline, jäävad nad praeguse olukorra juurde: see on odavam.

Enigma vigu polnud raske parandada, kuid te ei saa parandada seda, mida te ei tea, et see on katki. Saksa luureteenistus B-Dienst oli nii enesekindel Enigma turvalisuse suhtes kui ka alahinnanud oma vaenlase koodimurdmisvõimet. Peamiselt hindasid nad teisi nende enda katsete põhjal ja nende katsed olid leebed, kuna pidasid Enigmat purunematuks.

Nad said lohutust paljudes permutatsioonides. Nad ei kujutanud ette, et nende vaenlane võiks vigu võimalike muutuste vähendamiseks ära kasutada ega arendada nende läbimiseks masinaid. Koodide lõhkumiseks spetsiaalse masina väljatöötamine oli täiesti uus idee, varem oli seda tehtud käsitsi ja nutikalt ning pommi olemasolu saadaks krüptograafid oma algoritme ümber hindama.

Tegelikult fikseeris Enimga sõja ajal ... liitlased. Briti Typex on põhimõtteliselt täiustatud Enigma. USA -l oli ECM Mark II / SIGABA. Neid muudeti nii, et need ühilduksid kombineeritud šifrimismasinaga. Kõik nad on Enigmaga kaasaegsed rootori šifreerimismasinad. Kuigi neil oli vigu, ei olnud nad nii puudulikud kui Enigma.


Me näeme seda tänapäeval mängimas: kuigi paremad algoritmid on saadaval, hoitakse vanemad krüptograafilised algoritmid kasutusel isegi teoreetiliste rünnakute väljatöötamisel. See võtab praktilise rünnaku, enne kui see hulgakaupa hüljatakse. Näiteks SHA-1 on aastaid lagunenud, kuid alles viimastel aastatel on see lõpuks järk-järgult lõpetatud.

Samamoodi saavad inimesed üha enam teadlikuks saadaolevast paralleelse töötlemise võimsusest. Näiteks võib tosin GPU -d anda ründajale mõne tuhande dollari eest omamoodi paralleelse töötlemisvõimsuse, mis varem oleks maksnud miljoneid. See, mis varem oleks olnud puhtalt teoreetiline rünnak, võib nüüd olla praktiline. Turvainimesed kasutavad neid teadmisi, et hinnata uuesti, millised tavad on ohutud ja millised mitte.


Siin on mõned kommentaarid: nad ei olnud kõik hävitatud. Mõnda raamatut selle aja kohta lugedes on tugevaid vihjeid, et vähemalt teatud võimalused on säilinud - nii pommid kui ka täiustatud varustus.

Britid vallutasid palju Enigma masinaid ja ka arenenumat Lorenzi (kui mälu ei peta), mille nad ka purustada said. Mõlemat kasutasid/müüsid liitlased, sealhulgas venelased, ja muidugi jälgisid britid, sest me oleme suurepärased kalduvuses.

Jällegi, tõmmates kommentaaridest teavet, teadsid väga vähesed inimesed sellest värgist kuni 1980ndateni midagi, seega ei olnud teatrit selle hävitamiseks. Ma kahtlustan, et nad hävitasid asju Bletchley's ja mõnes teises kohas puhtalt seetõttu, et need olid Teise maailmasõja ajal vaid ajutised (või neil oli palju rohkem masinaid, kui neil oli vaja), ning säilitasid või ehitasid sama või parema üles püsivamates / sobivamates kohtades, kus oli turvatöötajaid. teenindajad, mitte sõjaaja kokku kogunenud töötajad, kes hakkasid tavalisse ellu tagasi minema.

On tõsi, et Churchill keelas pärast sõda turvalisuse huvides põhimõtteliselt kodus edasise arendamise ning andis USA -le palju uuringuid ja saladusi, et tasaarvestada tohutuid sõjaaja võlakohustusi. IIRC R.V.Jones ütleb midagi järgmiselt: "Ta (Churchill) andis selle kõik liiga odavalt ära" ja tundis, et paneb Ühendkuningriigi suuresti ebasoodsasse olukorda. (Kõige salajasem sõda)

Lisamiseks muutke:

Selle kõige tõelised üksikasjad on tulnud välja väga aeglaselt. Nagu eespool mainitud, oli Churchill kogu asja suhtes paranoiline ja surus seda pärast sõda kõvasti matta, isegi edasise teadus- ja arendustegevuse äärmisel kahjuks.

Arvestades, et Enigma, Bombe, Colossus jms ilmusid alles 30+ aastat hiljem ja mõned Bletchley peenemad üksikasjad on ilmunud alles viimase kümnendi jooksul, siis kõik, mis oli sõjajärgsetel turvateenustel kasulik. Lorenzi värk) võib veel salajas olla. Pole raske ette kujutada, et selle komplekti mõningaid tuletisi kasutatakse hästi külmas sõjas (BT -l oli veel palju Telexi liine, mis töötasid hästi ka 1990ndatel). Rakendage selle suhtes üle 30 -aastane embargo ja me ei pruugi kogu lugu veel kümne või kahe aasta jooksul teada.

Lisaks on lihtne ette kujutada, et kogu tsiviilisikute sõja ajal töötatud kraam hävitati tahtlikult, nii et nad kõik läksid koju, arvates, et see kõik on surnud ja maetud, mitte meeleheitel edasiseks kasutamiseks. Selleks ajaks olid ameeriklastel komplekti koopiad ja me kõik jagasime luuremägesid jne.


Colossuse koodi purustavate arvutite hävitamine oli olulisem asi, ma arvan, et põhjendus oli see, et kui masinad alles jäetakse, kasutavad teised volitused sellist tehnoloogiat. Suurbritannial oli oma šifrimasin typeX, kardeti, et kui šifreerimismasinad muutuvad üldteadmisteks, arendavad seda teised võimud ja suudavad lugeda Suurbritannia kodeeritud šifrimasina sidet. Kui koodimurdmismasinad alles jäetaks, avastataks need palju tõenäolisemalt, kus need lagunemisel ja nende tegevust sõja ajal oleks raskem avastada kui siis, kui masinatega tegeleks jätkuv aktiivne rühm.

Suurbritannia jättis selle otsuse ja kõik ametliku saladusena maha surumise ning vastutavate kirstude lagunemise tõttu suure osa brittide tööst varajases andmetöötluses minema, pannes Briti andmetöötluse vähemalt kümnendi taha, kui see oleks võinud olla väga suur maailma juht.

Koloss

TypeX masin


Midagi muud mõelda. Sõja lõpu seisuga oli Suurbritannia kohutavas majanduslikus vormis, olukord kestis mõnikümmend aastat (mitte ainult sõja tõttu, vaid ka valuutapoliitika tõttu). Asja purunemise hind on palju väiksem kui asja igavese hoiustamise ja turvamise hind.


Pidage meeles, et kiire areng üldistes arvutites vahetult pärast Teist maailmasõda muutis spetsiaalsed koodimurdmismasinad mõne aasta pärast vananenuks. Nende hoidmine kusagil kohas, kus keegi nende otsa võib komistada, suurendaks ainult tarbetult võimalust, et Inglismaa koodimurdmisvõimalused saavad teistele jõududele teada.


Winston Churchill vastutas tegevusetuse eest traagilise Lusitaania uppumise eest

Suure liinilaeva Lusitania hukkumise aastapäev Iiri rannikust mõne miili kaugusel, mais 1915, on paljude siinsete inimeste jaoks kurbade mõtiskluste aeg.

Olen lugenud raamatut, mis elustab elavalt õudust, mis juhtus, kui laev torpeediti ja üle 1000 mehe, naise ja lapse hukkus vetes Corksi krahvkonna Kinsale'i vana juhi vaateväljas.

Loe rohkem

Raamat on "Dead Wake: The Last Crossing of the Lusitania", mille on kirjutanud New York Timesi reporter ja jutustamisloolane Erik Larson. See on tähelepanuväärne lugu ja ma soovitan seda tungivalt.

Raamatus tõstatatud vastuoluliste küsimuste hulgas on võimalus, isegi tõenäosus, et Winston Churchill oli suuresti vastutav uppumise eest, mitte oma tegevuse, vaid tegevusetuse tõttu. Ta teadis ohust ja oleks pidanud tegema mitmeid toiminguid, mis oleksid katastroofi ära hoidnud, kuid ta ei teinud meelega midagi. Kuid hetke pärast tuleme selle juurde tagasi.

Maal, mis illustreerib Luisitania uppumist.

Kõigepealt peaksin mainima Larsoni erakordset võimet ajalugu ellu äratada, näiteks on see, kuidas ta kirjeldab laeva pardal olevate inimeste kohutavat vaimustust, kes nägid tegelikult torpeedot lähenevat.

Meremehe vaatetorn märkas kõigepealt "vahtpuhangut umbes 500 jardi kaugusel", seejärel rööbastee, mis liikus üle mere tasase tasapinna nii selgelt, nagu oleks selle joonistanud "nähtamatu käsi".

See oli veidi pärast kella 14.00. Päike paistis, meri oli nagu klaas, Iiri rannik oli nähtav veidi üle 10 miili ja reisijad jalutasid pärast lõunat tekile.

Mõned neist nägid ka torpeedo lähenemist. Üks märkas "vahutriipu" laine suunas üle pinna. Teine kummardus üle rööpa, et vaadata, mis juhtub, kui see küljele lööb. Ta kirjeldas torpeedot kui "ilusat vaatepilti", mis oli kaetud rohelise vee kaudu kihutades hõbedase fosforestsentsiga.

Üks naine küsis: "See pole ju torpeedo?" Hiljem ütles mees tema kõrval: "Ma olin liiga nõutu, et vastata. Tundsin end täiesti haigena."

See oli sürrealistlik. Hiiglaslik aurik asus Kinsale'i vanast peast vaid mõne miili kaugusel ja lõikas ilusal pärastlõunal läbi täiesti rahuliku vee.

Kuid vaatamata ebareaalsuse tundele oli see tõepoolest just see, mida kõik pardal olijad vaikselt kartsid ja närviliselt nalja tegid pärast seda, kui nad viis päeva varem, 1. mail 1915 lahkusid New Yorgist Liverpoolisse. Edasine oli kohutav, kuna laev läks vaid 18 minutiga põhja ja hukkus 1198 inimest.

Kolm aastat varem oli Titanicu jäämäe tabamisel hukkunud 1514 inimest ja see tragöödia on sellest ajast saadik avalikkuse ettekujutuses püsinud. Lusitaania uppumine on aga suuresti unustatud. Ometi on lugu sama kohutav kui Titanicu oma.

Ja kui te mõtlete raamatu pealkirja „Surnud ärkamine“ üle, siis viitab see torpeedo nähtavale jäljele pinnal, mis on moodustatud 10 jalga allpool torpeedomootorist vabanenud suruõhumullidest. Mullidel kulub pinnale jõudmiseks mitu sekundit, nii et ärkvelolek on „surnud“, sest torpeedo tekkimise ajaks on see temast kaugel ees.

See, et me teame tulemust, ei vähenda selle raamatu mõju, mis on kohati haarav kui põnevik. Larson ehitab loo üles mitmest vaatenurgast korraga, vahetades lühikeste stseenide vahel erinevates kohtades toimuva vahel.

See on lugu peamiselt jahimehest ja kütitud, U-paadist ja lainerist. Kuid see on ka laiem lugu depressiivsest, armsast presidendist Woodrow Wilsonist, kes ei soovi sõtta astuda, ja noorest Winston Churchillist, admiraliteedi esimesest isandast, kes on otsustanud Ameerika kaasata.

Juba varakult kohtame reisijaid, sealhulgas glamuurseid tüüpe, nagu multimiljonär Alfred Vanderbilt, šampanjakuningas George Kessler ja Bostoni raamatumüüja Charles Lauriat, kes kandis Charles Dickensi enda (hindamatut) koopiat „Jõululaulust”.

Samuti oli pardal Dublini kunstikoguja Sir Hugh Lane koos suure maalingutega, mis kuulujuttude kohaselt sisaldasid Rubensi, Monet'i ja Rembrandti teoseid, mis olid täna kindlustatud enam kui 90 miljoni dollari eest.

Tagantjärele võib tunduda hullumeelne reisida sel ajal üldse pärast seda, kui Suur sõda oli alanud eelmisel aastal aastal 1914. Kuid kõigil reisijatel oli võimalus oma ohtu ratsionaliseerida, vaatamata Ameerika ajalehe teatele, mis ilmus kohe kõrval reklaam Lusitaania reisi kohta vahetult enne laeva sõitu.

Teates oli Saksamaa valitsus hoiatanud, et Suurbritannia ümber olevad laevateed on nüüd sõjatsoon ja laevad on „hävimisohus”. Teadaolevalt tegutsesid selles piirkonnas Saksa U-paadid.

Loe rohkem

Ometi arvasid vähesed reisijad 1915. aasta alguses, et sakslased ründavad tegelikult reisilennukit. Isegi kui Lusitaaniat rünnati, oli see kaks korda kiirem kui allveelaev ja võis ületada igasuguse ohu, ütlesid nad üksteisele.

Samuti uskusid nad, et kuningliku mereväe saatja antakse kohe, kui Lusitaania läheneb Iirimaale. Sellest hoolimata jätkus reisijate seas närviline jutuajamine allveelaevade kohta kogu reisi vältel.

Larson selgitab katastroofini viinud asjaolude kokkulangevust - miks Lusitaania hilines New Yorgist lahkumisega, miks sõitis paralleelselt Iirimaa rannaga alla maksimumkiiruse, kuidas sattus kogemata allveelaeva raadiusesse, kuidas udu selgus otsustav aeg, miks oli U-paat seal, mitte Liverpooli lähedal.

Ta oskab väga hästi kirjeldada auruga juhitava Lusitaania-ühe suurepärase "Atlandi-ülese hallikoera"-keerulist tööd ja varajaste allveelaevade nagu U-20 piiranguid.

Lusitaania ja U-20 koonduvate reiside üksikasjad on jube lummatud, sest lugejana, kuigi teate, mis ees ootab, loodate pidevalt, et nad jäävad üksteisest kuidagi ilma. Uppumist ja selle tagajärgi kirjeldatakse suurepäraselt, kasutades ellujäänute kontosid, U-paadi kapteni logi ja hiljuti avaldatud dokumente katastroofi kahest peamisest uurimisest.

Laeva kiire nimekirja lisamise tõttu käivitati 23 päästepaadist edukalt vaid kuus, paljud inimesed purustati prahist ja piirkonnas ei olnud piisavalt lähedal ühtegi laeva, et inimesed õigeks ajaks vette jõuda. Kinsale'i väikesed purjelaevad andsid endast parima, kuid osaliselt rahuliku päeva tõttu olid nad liiga aeglased.

Lisaks veenva loo rääkimisele tegeleb Larson ka kahtlusega, et kuna laeva sees toimus pärast torpeedo plahvatust teine ​​võimas plahvatus, pidi Lusitaania kandma lõhkeaineid. See oli - 170 tonni vintpüssi laskemoona ja 1250 suurtükiväekorpust, samuti 50 tünni tuleohtlikku alumiiniumi- ja pronksipulbrit - kõik see oli toona USA neutraalsusreeglite kohaselt seaduslik.

See võib tunduda palju, kuid see ei olnud sõjavarude osas märkimisväärne summa. Ja see ei andnud kindlasti tagasiulatuvat õigustust uppumisele, mis nõudis üle 1000 tsiviilelaniku elu.

Mehed, kes kaevavad pärast Luisitaania uppumist surnute hauda Corkis.

Larson selgitab ka, miks on kõige ebatõenäolisem, et see materjal plahvatas - suurtükiväe miinid olid näiteks nende laengud - ja miks põhjustas teise plahvatuse kas söetolmu süttimine laeva suurtes punkrites, mis oli siis peaaegu tühi, või külm merevesi, mis tabab ülekuumenenud katlaid ja torusid.

Raamatu kõige huvitavam osa on aga lõik, milles Larson paljastab salajase ruumi 40 toimimise Londoni kesklinnas asuvas vanas admiraliteedihoones, mis on salajase operatsiooni keskus, mida juhib Churchill, kes jälgis ja dekodeeris Saksa mereväe raadiot. sõnumeid. See näitab selgelt, et Churchill ja Admiraliteedi väga kõrged inimesed teadsid kõike U-20-st ja umbes sellest, kus see asub, ja äärmuslikust ohust, mida see lähenevale Lusitaaniale kujutas.

Ometi ei tehtud midagi liinilaeva ja selle reisijate kaitseks, kuigi ruum 40 teadis, et eelneva seitsme päeva jooksul oli Suurbritannia ja Iirimaa ranniku ümber torpeeditud 23 Briti kaubalaeva, neist kolm U-20.

Samal ajal, kui Lusitaania Iirimaale lähenes, kasutati Briti mereväe uhkuse, äsja sadamast lahkunud lahingulaeva Orion, kaitsmiseks mitmeid hävitajaid. Teised hävitajad, kes oleksid võinud Lusitaaniat kaitsta, seoti Briti ja Iiri sadamatesse.

Arvestades kõike, mida tuba 20 teadis tol ajal selle piirkonna allveelaevade tegevusest, oleks tulnud Lusitaania suunata ohutumale Põhja -La Manche'i kanalile (ümber Iirimaa tipu). Samuti oleks pidanud talle Atlandi ookeanilt lähenedes andma mereväe saatja.

Kumbagi ei tehtud ja see tundub väga kahtlane, arvestades Churchilli varasemaid märkusi, mis viitavad sellele, et Ameerika sõtta saamiseks kulub suur katastroof. Sellise katastroofi põhjustas Lusitaania uppumine, mille pardal oli palju ameeriklasi.

Kui Lusitaania uppumine oli, nagu näib, Churchilli tahtliku ja arvutatud tegevusetuse tulemus, siis peab see kindlasti kuuluma suurimate tegematajätmiste hulka.

* Algselt avaldatud 2015.

Liituge IrishCentrali uudiskirjaga, et olla kursis kõige iiri keelega!


Teie juhend 1940. aasta Coventry Blitzist

Ööl vastu 14./15. Novembrit 1940 põhjustas mitusada Saksa pommitajat Coventry tööstuslinnale laastamistööd. 11-tunnine rünnak kujutas endast radikaalset lahkumist õhusõjas, mis tähistaks (ja hävitaks) pommitajalaevastike kasutamise ülejäänud konflikti ajal. Siin selgitab ajaloolane Frederick Taylor, mis juhtus ja miks Coventry sihtmärgiks sai - ja kas Churchilli hoiatati rünnakust ette ...

See konkurss on nüüd suletud

Avaldatud: 29. oktoobril 2020 kell 15.20

Miks oli sihtmärgiks Coventry?

Alates 1940. aasta septembri algusest oli Adolf Hitler eelistanud öiseid rünnakuid Londonile, lootes sundida briteid rahu sõlmima. Hoolimata sellest halastamatust Blitzist kaheksa miljoni londonlase vastu, jäi Suurbritannia siiski novembriks kindlaks. Hitler otsustas laiendada Saksamaa pommitamistegevust ulatuslike rünnakutega Suurbritannia tööstuslinnade, eriti lennukite tootmisega seotud linnade vastu.

Coventry loeti Ühendkuningriigi sõjatööstuse krooni ehteks. Saksa luure oli hästi kursis linna tööstusharude ja olulise infrastruktuuriga-täpselt seal, kus linnas toodeti lennumasinaid.

Tööstus kõrvale jäid aga ka muud põhjused, miks Berliin oli huvitatud Inglismaa südamest. Luftwaffe niinimetatud „Inglismaa komitee”, mis koosnes välisministeeriumi ametnikest ja erialateadlastest, oli planeerijatele teatanud, et Midlands on „konservatiivse, kangekaelse inglise keele bastion”. Kui selliste inimeste moraal puruneb, võidakse riik lõpuks siiski alla anda.

Mis juhtus?

Tegelikult olid suhteliselt lühikesed - kuid mõnel juhul surmavalt teravad - Saksamaa rünnakud Coventry vastu augusti lõpust alates tapnud juba 176 tsiviilisikut. Kuid novembri keskpaigaks kavandatud operatsiooni ulatus-koodnimega "Kuuvalguse sonaat"-eeldatava täiskuu tõttu-nägi ette jõhkra sammumuutuse. Linna veerand miljoni elanikuga elanikke tabab enneolematu kestusega ja kontsentratsiooniga õhurünnak, mille täpsust suurendab revolutsiooniline uus juhtimissüsteem, mida tuntakse X-Gerät (X-aparaat). Prantsuse kanali rannikul asuvatest jaamadest edastatav raadiosignaalide muster kohtus vahetult enne sihtmärki ja selle kohal. Jälgimisseadmed teeotsijalennukite eliitrühma pardal võimaldasid neil jälgida talasid ja tuvastada nende ristumiskohti, lõppkokkuvõttes täpselt üle eelnevalt kavandatud sihtpunkti. Seal heitsid nad pomme, tekitades tulekahju ja juhtides nii pommitajate massi sihtmärgini.

Kõik aspektid arvutati nii, et maksimeerida hävingut ja õhutada terrorit. Tapmine algas 14. novembril kella 19 paiku kesklinnas. Coventry gaasi- ja elektrivarustus, telefonijaam ning selle vee- ja kanalisatsioonivõrgud raisati. Rünnaku alla sattusid ajaloolised hooned, sealhulgas katedraal, ja suured kesklinnas asuvad tehased, nagu näiteks triumfiteos, mis asus katedraali kõrval.

Hilisemad pommitajate lained külvasid keskust veelgi, hävitades ja vigastades seal praegu töötavaid remondi- ja päästemeeskondi. Teised õhusõidukid lendasid äärelinna poole, sihtides rohkem tehaseid ja nendega külgnevaid elamuarendusi. Luftwaffe briifingul soovitati sellistele aladele süütepomme, öeldes: "Mõju tööstusele [Coventry's] võimenduks eriti seetõttu, et tehaste vahetus läheduses elav tööjõud kannataks koos nendega."

Ja nii see tõestas. Kui koidik purunenud, endiselt põleva linna kohal tõusis, oli 568 selle elanikku surnud. Kohalikud ajaloolased on registreerinud peaaegu kõigi hukkunute nimed ja nende hukkumise koha. Terved pered surid koos, sageli algelistes varjupaikades. Veel sadu tsiviilisikuid sai raskelt vigastada.

Millised olid tagajärjed?

Luftwaffe oskas tähistada ja tegi seda häbenemata. Sõna "tsentreeritud" ("konventeerija ” saksa keeles) mõtlesid natside propagandistid selle uue hävitustaseme tähistamiseks välja.

Kuigi moraal Coventry's ja mujal Suurbritannias kõikus, ei purunenud. Välismaal tuli peagi haarang näitamaks Saksa barbaarsust. Juhtraportid, sealhulgas šokeerivad pildid laastatud katedraalist (kuigi harvemini purunenud tehastest) ja tsiviilisikute surnukehadest, mis langetatakse ühishaudadesse, levisid üle maailma, eriti veel neutraalsesse USAsse. Kindlasti oli Ameerika avalik arvamus, kes oli siiani valdavalt isolatsionistlik, 1940. aasta lõpuks nihkunud piisavalt, et president Roosevelt saaks kongressi toetuse hädasti vajalike lennukite ja laevade tarnimiseks Suurbritanniasse.

Seetõttu võis Coventry puhtalt operatiivse vaatevinklist lugeda Saksamaa edukaks, kuid sellele järgnenud propagandalahing tõi kaasa Winston Churchilli räsitud valitsuse otsustava võidu.

Vahepeal võivad Briti lennundusministeeriumi kõrgemad tegelased, nagu näiteks asevalitseja Arthur Harris, kõva ninaga tehnokraat, kes oli pikka aega rafineerinud piiranguid RAF-i tsiviilobjektide pommitamise vastu, väita, et Coventry vabastas Suurbritannia võrdse halastamatusega tagasilöögiks.

Veebruaris 1942 asus Harris juhtima pommitaja RAF. See hakkas süstemaatiliselt pommitama Saksamaa linnu, luftwaffe rünnak Coventry vastu oli midagi plaanilist-aja jooksul aitas seda täiustada navigeerimine ja pommide sihtimise tehnoloogia ning seda tehti üha apokalüptilisemalt. Kolmeaastase kampaania käigus hävitati peaaegu Hamburg, Kassel, Berliin ja teised Saksa rahvastikukeskused, sealhulgas kõige kuulsamalt ajalooline Dresdeni linn 1945. aastal.

Kas Churchill lubas Coventryt pommitada?

Sõjajärgsel ajal on paljud ahvatlenud spekuleerima Coventry märtrisurmast. Kas Enchma koodimurdjad hoiatasid Churchilli rünnaku sihtmärgi eest, kuid ei teinud midagi, kartes oma allikat reeta? Ebatõenäoline. Ehkki talle teatati sellest ilmselt pärastlõunal, tuvastati pärast Luftwaffe juhtkiirt koos selle ristumiskohaga Coventry kohal.

Kas ta oleks siiski suutnud linna kuidagi päästa? Tegelikult võeti vastu vastumeetmeid, sealhulgas õhurünnakuid saatjate X-Gerät vastu, mille asukohad olid brittidele teada. Pommitusväejuhatuse ette planeeritud vastulöögid Berliini ja teiste Saksa linnade vastu olid samuti käimas isegi siis, kui Luftwaffe külvas Coventryle hävingut. Fighter Command sai käsu tegutseda. Kuid Briti ööhävitajad, kellest enamikul puudus endiselt pardal olev radar, ei suutnud vaenlase pommitajaid leida ja ka kohalik õhutõrjekahur osutus ebaefektiivseks.

Niisiis, kas neid nõrkusi arvestades oleks valitsus pidanud proovima Coventryst lühikese etteteatamisega evakueeruda? Vaevalt. Tõenäoliselt oleks tagajärjeks olnud paanika ja kaos. Parem tellida linna inimesed oma varjupaikadesse ja loota.

Üks asi tundub siiski selge ja tõelise ajaloolise tähtsusega: „Kuuvalgusonaat” tõusis Saksamaale ja saksa rahvale kättemaksuga.

Frederick Taylor on paljude Teist maailmasõda käsitlevate raamatute autor, sealhulgas Coventry ja Dresdeni pommitamine. Tema viimane töö, 1939: Rahva ajalugu, avaldas hiljuti paberkandjal Picador

Coventry on tunnustatud rahu ja leppimise linnana


Kuidas Winston Churchill Blitzit talus - ja õpetas Inglismaa inimesi sama tegema

1940. aastal 57 ööd järjest püüdis natsi -Saksamaa Inglismaad põlvili suruda. Lennukilained pommitasid linnu plahvatusohtlike pommide ja süütevahenditega osana kampaaniast, mille eesmärk oli murda inglise vaim ja hävitada riigi suutlikkus sõda pidada. Üks mees seisis rünnaku vastu tugevalt: Winston Churchill.

Ajaloolase Erik Larsoni uues raamatus vaadeldakse põhjalikult seda trotslikku peaministrit, kes peaaegu üksinda soovis oma rahvast vastu hakata. Splendid ja Vile: saagi Churchillist, perekonnast ja trotsist Blitz'i ajal uurib kriisijuhti ja eepiliste mõõtmetega väljakutset ning demokraatia saatus on rippumas. Larson, raamatu autor New York Times parimad müüjad Kurat valges linnas ja Surnud ärkvel, üksikasjad Churchilli julgeolek seista üksi natsiohu vastu, kutsudes kaasmaalasi üles lootusetusest üle saama ja vastu astuma. Ta kammis arhiive uue objektiiviga, et avastada värsket materjali selle kohta, kuidas Inglismaa koondas oma rahva peatsest lüüasaamisest, et seista verise, kuid laskmata vabaduse saarel. Intervjuus kasutajaga Smithsonian, Larson kirjeldab, kuidas ta tuli oma uut raamatut kirjutama ja milliseid üllatusi ta mehe kohta teada sai, kes tuletab meile täna meelde, mis on tõeline juhtimine.

Miks sa selle raamatu kirjutasid? Kas nüüd miks?

See on küsimus, milles on palju asju lahti pakkimiseks. Mu naine ja mina elasime Seattle'is. Meil on kolm täiskasvanud tütart, kes olid kõik lennuki lennanud. Üks asi viis teiseni ja otsustasime, et kolime Manhattanile, kus ma alati tahtsin elada. Kui me New Yorki jõudsime, oli mul see kolmekuningapäev ja#8212 ning ma ei liialda. See oli tõesti omamoodi epifaania selle kohta, milline 11. septembri kogemus pidi New Yorgi elanike jaoks olema. Kuigi vaatasin CNN-ist kogu asja reaalajas arenemist ja olin kohkunud, mõistsin New Yorki jõudes, et see oli suurusjärgu traumaatiline sündmus. Not just because everything was live and right in front of your face this was an attack on your home city.

Feeling that very keenly, I started thinking about the German air campaign against London and England. What was that like for them? It turned out to have been 57 consecutive nights of bombings󈠉 consecutive 9/11s, if you will. How does anybody cope with that? Then, of course, there was six more months of raids at intervals and with increasing severity. How does the average person endure that, let alone the head of the country, Winston Churchill, who’s also trying to direct a war? And I started thinking how do you do something like that? What’s the intimate, inside story?

Remember, Churchill—this was one thing that really resonated with me as a father with three daughters—was not just the leader of Great Britain and a London citizen, but he was a father. He had a young daughter who was only 17. His family was spread out throughout London. How do you cope with that anxiety on a daily level? Every night, hundreds of German bombers are flying over with high-explosive bombs.

So why now? I think the timing is good because we all could use a refresher course on what actual leadership is like.

The Splendid and the Vile: A Saga of Churchill, Family, and Defiance During the Blitz

Sisse The Splendid and the Vile, Erik Larson shows, in cinematic detail, how Churchill taught the British people “the art of being fearless.” Drawing on diaries, original archival documents, and once-secret intelligence reports—some released only recently—Larson provides a new lens on London’s darkest year through the day-to-day experience of Churchill and his family.

Churchill writes in his memoir that he’s ecstatic over the opportunity to lead the country at such a difficult time. Anybody else would be cringing. Where did his confidence come from?

In his personal memoir on the history of the war, he exalts that he became prime minister. The world is going to hell, but he is just thrilled. That’s what really sets him apart from other leaders. Not only was he undaunted, he was actively, aggressively thrilled by the prospect of this war.

Lord Halifax, who was considered by many to be the rightful successor to [prime minister Neville] Chamberlain, didn’t want the job. He had no confidence he could negotiate a war as prime minister. But Churchill had absolute confidence. Where did that come from? Ma ei tea. I’ve read a lot about his past in doing research and I’ve thought a lot about it. I still don’t have a good answer.

What surprised you the most about Churchill?

A lot of things surprised me. What surprised me the most was simply that Churchill really could be quite funny. He knew how to have fun. One scene in particular will stay with me, even as I go on to other books. One night he was at the prime ministerial country estate, Chequers, wearing this blue one-piece jumpsuit he designed and his silk flaming-red dressing gown, carrying a Mannlicher rifle with a bayonet. He’s doing bayonet drills to the strains of martial music from the gramophone. That’s the kind of guy he was. He was said to be absolutely without vanity.

How did you go about your research for this book?

So much has been done on Churchill. And if you set out to read everything, it would take a decade. My strategy from the beginning was to read the canon of Churchill scholarship to the point where I felt I had a grasp of everything that was going on. Then, rather than spend the next ten years reading additional material, I was going to do what frankly I think I do best: dive into the archives.

I scoured various archives in hopes of finding fresh material using essentially a new lens. How did he go about day to day enduring this onslaught from Germany in that first year as prime minister? From that perspective, I came across a lot of material that was perhaps overlooked by other scholars. That’s how I guided myself throughout the book. I was going to rely on the archives and firsthand documents to the extent that I could to build my own personal Churchill, if you will. And then, once I had accumulated a critical mass of materials, I moved on to start writing the book.

My main source was the National Archives of the U.K. at Kew Gardens, which was fantastic. I probably have 10,000 pages of material from documents. I also used the Library of Congress in the U.S. The manuscript division reading room has the papers of Averell Harriman, who was a special envoy for FDR. It has also the papers of Pamela Churchill, wife the prime minister’s son, Randolph, who later married Harriman. And even more compelling are the papers of Harriman’s personal secretary Robert Meiklejohn, who left a very detailed diary. There is a lot of other material describing the Harriman mission to London, which was all-important in spring of 1941.

Churchill views the wreck of Coventry Cathedral, damaged by German bombs. (Fremantle/Alamy)

Numerous accounts detail how Churchill liked to work in the nude or in the tub. How did that tie into your overall view of Churchill?

He did that a lot. And he was not at all shy about it. There’s a scene that John Colville [private secretary to Churchill] describes in his diary. Churchill was in the bath and numerous important telephone calls were coming in. Churchill would just get out of the bath, take the call, then get back in the bath. It didn’t matter. He did have a complete and utter lack of vanity.

That was one of the aspects of his character that really did help him. He didn’t care. As always, though, with Churchill, you also have to add a caveat. One of the things I discovered was while he had no sense of vanity and didn’t really care what people thought of him, he hated criticism.

What fresh material did you find for the book?

The foremost example is the fact that I was thankfully given permission to read and use Mary Churchill’s diary. I was the second person to be allowed to look at it. I thank Emma Soames, Mary’s daughter, for giving me permission. Mary makes the book because she was Churchill’s youngest daughter at 17 [during the Blitz]. She kept a daily diary that is absolutely charming. She was a smart young woman. She could write well and knew how to tell a story. And she was observant and introspective. There’s also the Meiklejohn diary. A lot of the Harriman stuff is new and fresh. There are materials that I haven’t seen anywhere else.

Another example: Advisors around Churchill were really concerned about how Hitler might be going after the prime minister. Not just in Whitehall, but also at Chequers. It’s kind of surprising to me that the Luftwaffe [the Nazi air force] hadn’t found Chequers and bombed it. Here was this country home with a long drive covered with pale stone. At night, under a full moon, it luminesced like an arrow pointing to the place.

What precautions did Churchill take to stay out of harm’s way during dangerous situations?

He didn’t take many. There are a lot of cases when an air raid was about to occur and Churchill would go to the roof and watch. This was how he was. He was not going to cower in a shelter during a raid. He wanted to see it. By day, he carried on as if there were no nightly air raids. This was part of his style, part of how he encouraged and emboldened the nation. If Churchill’s doing this, if he’s courageous enough, maybe we really don’t have so much to fear.

Churchill would walk through the bombed sections of London following a raid.

He did it often. He would visit a city that had been bombed, and the people would flock to him. There is no question in my mind that these visits were absolutely important to helping Britain weather this period. He was often filmed for newsreels, and it was reported by newspapers and radio. This was leadership by demonstration. He showed the world that he cared and he was fearless.

Did Churchill and the people of Great Britain believe that the bombing would lead to an invasion?

That’s another thing that did surprise me: the extent to which the threat of invasion was seen to be not just inevitable, but imminent. Within days. There was talk of, “Oh, invasion Saturday.” Can you imagine that? It’s one thing to endure 57 nights of bombing, but it’s another to live with the constant anxiety that it is a preamble to invasion.

Churchill was very clear-eyed about the threat from Germany. To him, the only way to really defeat any effort by Hitler to invade England was by increasing fighter strength so the Luftwaffe could never achieve air superiority. Churchill felt that if the Luftwaffe could be staved off, an invasion would be impossible. And I think he was correct in that.

England survives the German bombings. What was the feeling like after the Blitz?

The day after was this amazing quiet. People couldn’t believe it. The weather was good, the nights were clear. What was going on? And day after day, it was quiet. No more bombers over London. That was the end of the first and most important phase of the German air war against Britain. It was the first real victory of the war for England.

When we talk about the Blitz, it’s important to realize the extent to which Churchill counted on America as the vehicle for ultimate victory. He was confident Britain could hold off Germany, but he believed victory would only come with the full-scale participation of the United States. Churchill acknowledged that early on when he met with his son, Randolph, who asked him, “How can you possibly expect to win?” Churchill says, “I shall drag the United States in.” A big part of the story I tell is about also how he went about doing that.

Your book covers that very crucial time in 1940 and 1941. In the epilogue, you jump ahead to July 1945 when the Conservative Party is voted out of office and Churchill is no longer prime minister.

What a shocking reversal! I was so moved when I learned how the family gathered at Chequers for the last time. Mary Churchill was saddened by what was happening. They tried to cheer him up. Nothing worked at first, but then gradually he began to come out of it. And I think at that point he was coming around to accepting this was the reality. But it was hard for him. I think what really hurt him was the idea that suddenly he had no meaningful work to do. That just about crushed him.

What did you learn in writing this book?

Writing about Churchill, dwelling in that world, was really a lovely place for me. It took me out of the present. This may sound like a cliché, but it took me back to a time when leadership really mattered. And truth mattered. And rhetoric mattered.

I love that Churchillians seem to like this book and actually see new things in it. But this book is really for my audience. I’m hoping they are drawn to the story and will sink into this past period as if they were there. I think that’s very important in understanding history.

Churchill was a unifier. He was a man who brought a nation together. As he said, he didn't make people brave, he allowed their courage to come forward. It’s a very interesting distinction. To me, as I say in the book, he taught the nation the art of being fearless. And I do think fearlessness can be a learned art.

About David Kindy

David Kindy is a journalist, freelance writer and book reviewer who lives in Plymouth, Massachusetts. He writes about history, culture and other topics for Õhk ja kosmos, Military History, teine ​​maailmasõda, Vietnam, Lennunduse ajalugu, Providence Journal and other publications and websites.


Winston Churchill on Germany’s Unforgivable “Crime”

Germany’s most unforgivable crime before the Second World War was her attempt to extricate her economic power from the world’s trading system and to create her own exchange mechanism which would deny world finance its opportunity to profit.

So Germany’s unwillingness to be looted by international bankers was the reason million and millions of Europeans had to perish? The world elite definitely didn’t want the “Goyim” to get any big ideas after seeing Germany’s remarkable recovery under National Socialism.

Decades before, in 1920, Churchill had actually written on the subject of jewish involvement in the looting of Germany after the first World War:

The same phenomenon [i.e., Jewish involvement with left-wing and Communist movements] has been presented in Germany (especially in Bavaria), so far as this madness has been allowed to prey upon the temporary prostration of the German people. Although in all these countries there are many non-Jews every whit as bad as the worst of the Jewish revolutionaries, the part played by the latter in proportion to their numbers is astonishing.

Churchill also acknowledged the role jews played in bringing about the Soviet terror:

There is no need to exaggerate the part played in the creation of Bolshevism and in the actual bringing about of the Russian Revolution, by these international and for the most part atheistical Jews. See on kahtlemata väga hea, arvatavasti kaalub üles kõik teised. With the notable exception of Lenin, the majority of the leading figures are Jews [Lenin’s paternal grandfather was later found to be a Jew]. Pealegi pärineb peamine inspiratsioon ja liikumapanev jõud juudi juhtidelt.

Jewish power was not confined to Germany or the Soviet Union, but could be found all around the world:

Some people like the Jews, and some do not. But no thoughtful man can deny the fact that they are, beyond any question, the most formidable and most remarkable race which has appeared in the world.

At some point Churchill became an instrument of this power. During World War II Churchill’s loyalty was not to the British people, the majority of whom never wanted war with Germany, but to the small tribe of alien elite that has been fomenting wars and reaping the spoils for centuries upon centuries.

Churchill’s atrocities against Germany make him one of the worst villains this world has ever known, along with his comrade Joseph Stalin.

Senator Homer Capeheart made the following speech before the U.S. Senate on Feb. 5, 1946:

Since the end of the war about 3,000,000 people, mostly women and children and overaged men, have been killed in eastern Germany and south-eastern Europe about 15,000,000 people have been deported or had to flee from their homesteads and are on the road. About 25 per cent of these people, over 3,000,000 have perished. About 4,000,000 men and women have been deported to eastern Europe and Russia as slaves. It seems that the elimination of the German population of eastern Europe – at least 15,000,000 people – was planned in accordance with decisions made at Yalta. Churchill had said to Mikolajczyk when the latter protested during the negotiations at Moscow against forcing Poland to incorporate eastern Germany: “Don’t mind the five or more million Germans. Stalin will see to them. You will have no trouble with them: they will cease to exist.”


Churchill's Bomb: A Hidden History of Science, War and Politics by Graham Farmelo – review

"Death stands at attention," wrote Winston Churchill in 1924: in the next war mankind would possess, for the first time, "the tools by which it can unfailingly accomplish its own destruction". Yet when he came to sanction the development of the atomic bomb during the second world war, Churchill displayed none of his characteristic vision and imagination.

His early prescience owed less to science than to science fiction. Although as a boy he liked playing with model trench-diggers and conducting the odd experiment with gunpowder, he was much too expensively educated to be taught anything scientific. Later, when given an elementary explanation of radar, he confessed that it was beyond him. But Churchill did become a fan of HG Wells, regarding him as a "seer" and especially admiring Ajamasin, "one of the books I would like to take with me to Purgatory". Churchill was also fascinated by Wells's military predictions, notably about the role of aircraft and "land ironclads", otherwise known as tanks. These he championed during the first world war, inviting Wells to see prototypes in action.

The two men parted company, though, on the question of whether wars were best run by technocrats. Churchill was profoundly suspicious of experts – he once told his oculist: "I entirely disagree with your diagnosis." He believed that the boundless ignorance of the plain man was a safer guide than the limited understanding of the specialist, above all the military specialist, from whose dominion, he prayed, "good Lord deliver us".

But then even Ernest Rutherford, who achieved fame by splitting the atom in 1917, was fallible in his chosen field. He insisted that the "nucleus is a sink, not a source of energy" and that anyone proposing to find power in the transformation of atoms "was talking moonshine". Still, Rutherford (assisted by his "boys" at the Cavendish laboratory in Cambridge, such as James Chadwick, Ernest Walton and John Cockcroft) had a far more sophisticated grasp of nuclear physics than his Oxford counterpart, Frederick Lindemann. Yet Lindemann was the one expert in whom Churchill did have faith, much to the detriment, Graham Farmelo writes in this dazzling book, of Britain's wartime endeavours to develop the atomic bomb.

"The Prof", as Churchill called Lindemann, was an odd sort of friend for him to have. He was a teetotal, non-smoking vegetarian, resolutely buttoned-up and bowler-hatted. A snob and an antisemite, he pursued vendettas that were savage even by academic standards, once attempting to enforce an obscure statute enjoining celibacy on the canons of Christ Church. He was said to run the Clarendon lab, which admittedly resembled a medieval alchemist's den when he took it over in 1919, like a Prussian dictator. Lindemann was "a genuinely horrible figure", wrote Isaiah Berlin. "He is the only person, I think, whom I have ardently wished to murder."

Nevertheless the Prof appealed to Churchill. He was a staunch anti-appeaser. He was also outstandingly brave: having worked out what caused spin in aeroplanes, he learned to fly in order to prove his theory and during the blitz he was unfazed, reading PG Wodehouse in bed. Churchill admired him as a sorcerer with a slide-rule, who could work out how much champagne he had drunk during his lifetime (only enough to fill half a railway carriage, to his disappointment) and helped with his lucrative articles on subjects such as "Death Rays" and "Are there Men on the Moon?"

Lindemann also had a knack of giving comprehensible (if not flawless) accounts of scientific arcana such as quantum theory. Churchill became intrigued by the subject, noting that the process of radioactivity "constitutes a liberation of energy at the expense of structure", something that suggested "the breakup of empires into independent states". He and the Prof also shared a fondness for new battlefield contraptions, which Churchill called "funnies". Before the war they favoured aerial mines (to the disadvantage of radar) and during it they endorsed the construction of experimental weapons such as the "Great Panjandrum", a devastating rocket-propelled wheel that regularly ran amok.

Farmelo's main charge is that Churchill, as prime minister, relied too exclusively on the Prof for scientific advice, particularly over the crucial matter of the atomic bomb. It's true that Lindemann sanctioned its development in 1941, when Chadwick reported that it could be made in two and a half years. But, overestimating British capacities, he did not press Churchill to accept President Roosevelt's offer of equal collaboration in creating nuclear weaponry. Consequently America went ahead alone, pouring vast resources into the Manhattan Project and freezing Britain out. According to Farmelo, Churchill thus squandered the lead of British scientists and "missed one of the great opportunities of the war". He temporarily recouped Britain's position at the Quebec conference in 1943, persuading Roosevelt to sign an agreement whereby their two countries would co–operate over production of the bomb and have a mutual veto on its use. But after Hiroshima – something Churchill never regretted, even hankering to threaten Russia with something similar at the inception of the cold war – Harry Truman tore up what was essentially a private accord. Britain made its own bomb (a policy Attlee concealed from everyone except Stalin's spies) and the special relationship became so one-sided, Churchill was perturbed to discover in 1951, that the White House was entitled to launch nuclear strikes from US air bases in East Anglia without even consulting Downing Street.

This made Britain a prime target, and no one had a more apocalyptic view of the possible consequences than Churchill. Having described the explosion of the atomic bomb as "the second coming in wrath", he said that the hydrogen bomb was as much of an advance on it as it had been on the bow and arrow. Britain had to have the H-bomb, he believed, to preserve the balance of terror. But Churchill spent much of his last premiership seeking détente with the Soviet Union, a noble but doomed enterprise.

Farmelo, prize-winning biographer of the physicist Paul Dirac, recounts this important story with skill and erudition. But he does make the occasional slip (Labour had no "programme" to dismantle the empire after 1945, quite the contrary) and his essential case is not altogether watertight. As the global colossus, America was bound to take the lead in nuclear development and Churchill, though slow off the mark, played a weak hand well. Ultimately, moreover, he had to adjudicate between the boffins – and he was sometimes startlingly right.

For instance, he sided with RV Jones against Henry Tizard on the question of whether German bombers were being guided by radio directional beams, thus making a vital contribution to the wizard war. And even Lindemann had his plus points: he made jobs in Oxford for Jewish scientists facing Nazi persecution and encouraged Churchill to create his eponymous college in Cambridge to promote British science and engineering. Still, it's the paradoxes and the nuances that make this episode in history, now illuminated as never before, so compelling.


Why did Churchill order the destruction of the bombes? - Ajalugu

Just another sad, but unremarkable tale of a bright kid who squandered his potential and ruined his life by turning to a career in IT.

Since first embarking down this dark path, I've done a little bit of everything, from small businesses to large datacenters, Linux to Windows, networking and security, DBA roles and, in my darkest moments, even some light mainframe operations.

These days it's Microsft products paying the bills, for what difference it makes. Whether it's a multi-domain AD environment with tens of thousands of users, a small cluster of Linux webservers, or a tangled web of network cables, systems are all just complex tools to do complex jobs, perpetually in need of someone to make them perform better and ensure they're always available when someone needs them.

Since being a lawyer seemed too boring, being a doctor seemed too hard, and my idea of a good time usually involves using a powerful computer anyway, I really can't imagine doing anything else.

Dear HopelessN00b Genius of network. it's easy for you to speak. If I could explain my problems in my language probably also an hysteric like you could help me, but in another Language (english) is no easy for me. Anyway thanks, I'll continue to try online. Ps. I make this job from 1998 when you were probably coming out of college. So before to speak. think!


If You're Going Through Hell, Keep Going - Winston Churchill

Seventy-two years ago tomorrow, a chubby, stoop-shouldered, funny faced man with a speech impediment took a new job. The man was 65-years old and until a year earlier was generally considered to be a crackpot and a political has-been. His taking the new job was one of the most momentous events of the entire 20 th Century.

The man was Winston Churchill, and the job was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. On May 10, 1940, the British looked to be finished. They stood alone against the vicious and victorious Nazis.

Two weeks after Churchill came into power, France was knocked out of the war, and 340,000 British troops had to scramble to escape over the beaches at Dunkirk. The Germans had absolute control of all of Europe. It seemed impossible that Britain could survive.

With almost no hope left, the nation turned to Winston Churchill, the one man who had spoken the truth for years, saying nasty things about Adolf Hitler and the Nazis, even though it cost him in terms of political success and personal reputation.

Churchill’s first speech to the British people as PM laid out his program bluntly, “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.” He followed that with another speech shortly thereafter: “. . . we shall fight on the seas and oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills we shall never surrender.”

In other words, his plan for success: Complete and total defiance.

“We shall never surrender.” When you have nothing left but defiance, commit to it with everything you have. Like Prince Hal in Shakespeare’s Henry V, Churchill used language to rouse the fighting spirit he believed was still alive in the British people, saying, “If you're going through hell, keep going.” And the line that summed up his personal career and the spirit that led the British people to victory: “Never, never, never give up.”

Churchill would later describe what he did this way, “It was the nation and the race dwelling all round the globe that had the lion's heart. I had the luck to be called upon to give the roar.”

He was right about the lion’s heart. Within months, the Luftwaffe would duel the Royal Air Force in the Battle of Britain. The RAF was badly outnumbered by its German opponents, but that didn’t stop it from beating the Germans day after day, month after month. Finally the Germans admitted defeat by changing tactics and began the Blitz, the strategic bombing of London and southern England.

Londoners proved Churchill’s lion’s heart remark again, taking care of each other in the tube stations during the air raids while firefighters made sure that St. Paul’s survived the bombing.

As we emerge from the recession of the last few years, it’s good to remember things could be a lot worse. Take a few pointers from Churchill as you try to lead your organization into recovery:

Remember that “Attitude is a little thing that makes a big difference,” as Churchill said.

No matter what kind of shape your business is in, if your attitude is never, never, never give up, you stand a much better chance of succeeding. The folks you work with will pick up on your sincerity and conviction, and they’ll begin to operate the same way. And it will enable all of you to take the difficult steps necessary.

Be absolutely honest. Has any organization’s leader ever been blunter than Churchill when he told his desperate countrymen that he had nothing to offer them “but blood, toil, tears and sweat”? If Churchill could be that forthright as he faced annihilation, you can be too, no matter what it is you’re facing. So . . . never surrender. If you need to:

  • Declare bankruptcy and reorganize, do it. (GM did this, and it worked. Really worked.)
  • Renegotiate debt and lines of credit — what are you waiting for?
  • Innovate in the making of your products and services — get to it. (Apple's been doing this for years, and look at their stock value.)
  • Be straight with “your people”: shareholders, customers, and employees. (Maybe Rupert Murdoch and News Corp. should try this policy.)

For Churchill and England surrender was not an option, which freed Churchill to do whatever he had to do, including making some brutally harsh decisions. As the Battle for France raged in May 1940, French leaders begged Churchill for British air support. But the RAF’s commanders told Churchill that it was urgent that they conserve their fighters for the anticipated battle in their own skies. Churchill left the French to fend for themselves and held back the fighters, positioning the RAF for its triumph in the Battle of Britain.

Support innovation. Churchill had been one of the early backers of tanks, hoping they could be deployed in World War I to break the awful stalemate of trench warfare. In 1944, he would champion the use of artificial harbors called mulberries — cement-filled ship hulls that could be sunk where needed to create instant harbors for troop deployments and supplies.

But the most innovative and most important thing Churchill supported was radar (the British were the first to deploy effective radar systems). The Brits created a number of radar stations in southern England to use as an early-detection system, and coupled it with a brilliant fighter-command system that allowed the RAF’s air marshals to dispatch fighters where and when they were needed. Radar went a long way to neutralize the Germans’ gigantic superiority in numbers. (The Brits, at Churchill’s urging, shared radar’s secrets with the United States, and the Americans put it to very good use as well.)

Once America entered the war, as Churchill later confessed in his history of World War II, he knew that the Germans would be defeated. But for nineteen months, Churchill had to rally a beaten people against an unstoppable foe. How did he do it? He understood the people he was leading — and he understood what it was they wanted, what it was that the Nazis were trying to destroy. He said, “All the great things are simple, and many can be expressed in a single word: freedom, justice, honor, duty, mercy, hope.” He was able to lead because he knew the people he was leading and never separated himself from them. He was, quite literally, willing to die for them.

Most managers aren’t asked to be that willing. But your commitment should be close to Churchill’s — as close as you can get when the situation is not life-and-death. If you haven’t got that commitment, maybe you should be looking for another line of work.

Just in case you were asleep for a large portion of the 20th Century (or were born very late in it), I’ll catch you up on what happened to Mr. Churchill. After saving his country from the brink of destruction, Churchill was forced out of office by a vote of the British people just before the end of the war in 1945.

Churchill was hurt but showed the classic British stiff upper lip by saying, “History will be kind to me — for I intend to write it.” Write it he did, a six-volume history called Teine maailmasõda, which was the primary reason he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1953.

But history was going to be kind to him whether he wrote it or not. The British people returned him to the office of Prime Minister, 1951-1955. Queen Elizabeth offered to create Churchill as Duke of London, but he declined. In 1963, by an act of the U.S. Congress, he was the first living person named Honorary Citizen of the United States.

When Winston Churchill died on January 24, 1965 at the age of 90, the Queen decreed that he should have a state funeral, the first ever in English history for a non-royal. The former has-been and crackpot had journeyed a very long way on the strength of his courage and commitment.

Note: This post was adapted from an earlier blog.

Or, with summer approaching, maybe you'd like a good beach read. Please try Double Blind, a thriller about two blind dates with two beautiful women and two deadly secrets.

You can even read it (thanks to free apps from the two retailers) on your iPad, iPhone, Android, Mac or PC.


The destruction of Warsaw: the Nazi plan to obliterate a city

On the 1st of September 2019, President Frank-Walter Steinmeier of Germany took to the podium in Warsaw’s Piłsudski Square at an event to mark the eightieth anniversary of the Nazi invasion of Poland.

'In no other square in Europe do I find it more difficult to speak, and to address you in my native language of German,' Steinmeier told the assembled crowds. 'I ask for forgiveness for Germany’s historical guilt and I recognise our enduring responsibility.'

But why did the president find it so difficult to say those words in that particular square? Because seventy-five years before, the Nazis set about wiping Warsaw off the face of the earth.

The planned destruction of Warsaw had been on the cards before German tanks and troops rolled over the border into Poland at the start of September 1939. Three months before the invasion, a plan to replace the Polish capital with a small German town had caught the eye of Adolf Hitler. This was the ‘Pabst Plan’, named after its creator, Friedrich Pabst. The plan presumed the city would be cleared of its inhabitants and razed to the ground during and after a war between Poland and Germany. In its place, a small town of 130,000 German inhabitants would be built on the right bank of the River Vistula. To service the town, a slave labour camp would be built on the left bank housing 80,000 Polish prisoners. Rifling through the Pabst Plan, Hitler liked what he saw.

The next five years of occupation would be a truly brutal affair.

Eight days after Germany invaded Poland, the bombing of Warsaw commenced. The assault culminated in what was then the biggest air raid the world had ever seen on the 25th of September 1939. On that terrifying day, the city was pummelled by 560 tonnes of high explosives, 72 tonnes of incendiaries and heavy artillery fire. By the end of what would become known as the Siege of Warsaw, approximately 18,000 civilians had lost their lives, 40% of the city’s buildings had been damaged and a further 10% had been completely destroyed. Worse - much, much worse - was to follow.

The Wehrmacht entered the city of Warsaw on the 1st of October. The next five years of occupation would be a truly brutal affair. The first to feel the full force of Nazi cruelty were the Jews. The city was home to around 270,000 Jews before the war. That number had swelled as both Polish and Jewish refugees flooded into the heavily defended city as the Nazis advanced towards the capital.

After Warsaw fell, most of the city’s Jews were rounded up and crammed into a vast ghetto – the largest of the war – situated immediately to the northeast of the city’s ancient Old and New Towns. The Warsaw Ghetto was a walled-off, disease-infested slum area where death was a daily occurrence. The ghetto’s inhabitants were subjected to regular roundups lined up and marched off to transportation trains heading for extermination centres such as Auschwitz and Treblinka. Eventually, a resistance movement arose aiming to stop these mass deportations, leading to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of January 1943 that saw Jewish resistance fighters valiantly holding off the Nazis for four months before the uprising was crushed in April. After the Nazis regained control of the ghetto, all remaining Jews were either shot or rounded up and deported to concentration camps. The ghetto was then razed to the ground, with hardly a building left standing across over one square mile of the city centre.

'When we crush the uprising, Warsaw will get what it deserves – complete annihilation.'

Elsewhere in the city, the Nazis operated a policy of collective responsibility, which meant any act of resistance was punished by the deaths of not only those who had been involved but of the innocent as well. This meant that by 1944, many thousands of the city’s inhabitants had been murdered. This led to the Warsaw Uprising which began on the 1st of August 1944 – a last desperate act of resistance against a brutal regime that would eventually be crushed sixty-three days later. By 1944, 60% of the city’s population, some 800,000 people, had been killed. The rest, 250,000 people, were deported from the city after the uprising. Many would end their days in concentration camps.

'When we crush the uprising, Warsaw will get what it deserves – complete annihilation.' These were the words of Hans Frank, the head of the German government in Poland. Hitler and Himmler agreed, and Warsaw’s fate was sealed.

Nothing was to be spared. Engineers armed with flamethrowers and high explosives were dispatched all over the city, supervised, astonishingly, by German architectural experts and historians. Street by street, these demolition teams methodically burned and dynamited everything in their paths. Special attention was given to the city’s most important historical buildings, as well as to the National Archives and the city’s libraries and monuments.

The Royal Castle, a 16th Century baroque pile that stood at the entrance to the city’s ancient Old Town had already been badly damaged and looted after the invasion of 1939. On the 4th of September 1944, the castle’s walls were dynamited, leaving nothing but a huge pile of rubble.
In October, the Nazis turned their attention to Warsaw’s rich artistic and written heritage. Thousands upon thousands of priceless manuscripts, books, pamphlets, drawings and prints were deliberately destroyed – an irreplaceable loss. The libraries and museums that housed these treasures were themselves then razed to the ground.

In November, St. John’s Cathedral - already badly damaged during the Warsaw Uprising - was dynamited into dust. St. John’s was one of many of the city’s exquisite ecclesiastical buildings that the Nazis destroyed. Other notable examples were the 16th Century Gothic Church of the Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the 17th Century Polish Mannerist Jesuit Church. The twin-towered Holy Cross Church’s baroque facade had already been blasted to smithereens by Goliath tracked mines in September. The Germans would destroy the rest of the church in January 1945.

By the time the Nazis abandoned the city in January 1945, about 85% of Warsaw had been completely destroyed.


The evolution of mutual assured destruction (MAD)

Commencing with U.S. Pres. John F. Kennedy’s administration, greater emphasis was placed on a doctrine of all-purpose flexibility, including a larger conventional ground force as well as counterinsurgency forces to deal with “brushfire wars” such as the one in Vietnam. In the ensuing atomic era, SAC yielded in delivery importance to guided missiles fired either from permanent silos or from nuclear submarines. All three of these systems—manned bombers, land-based ballistic missiles, and nuclear missile-armed submarines—would comprise the so-called nuclear triad of U.S. defense capability. The rationale for maintaining so many nuclear weapons with such varied delivery systems was to ensure that the United States could carry out a second strike against any preemptive nuclear attack. Although the U.S. employed civil defense techniques such as those spelled out in the “ duck and cover” campaign, strategic planners understood that these measures would be effectively worthless in the face of an actual nuclear attack. The arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union continued.

The Cuban missile crisis (October 1962) brought the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust, and U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara responded with a dramatic shift in U.S. nuclear doctrine. McNamara had previously promoted a counterforce or “no cities” strategy that targeted Soviet military units and installations. Under this paradigm, it was believed that a nuclear conflict of limited scope could be fought and won without it escalating to a full nuclear exchange. This strategy relied on both superpowers abiding by such a limitation, however, and neither believed that the other would do so. In 1965 McNamara instead proposed a countervalue doctrine that expressly targeted Soviet cities. McNamara stated that this doctrine of “assured destruction” could be achieved with as few as 400 high-yield nuclear weapons targeting Soviet population centres these would be “sufficient to destroy over one-third of [the Soviet] population and one-half of [Soviet] industry.” McNamara proposed that the guarantee of mutual annihilation would serve as an effective deterrent to both parties and that the goal of maintaining destructive parity should guide U.S. defense decisions. McNamara based this tenuous equilibrium on the “assured-destruction capability” of the U.S. arsenal.

The term “mutual assured destruction,” along with the derisive acronym “MAD,” was not actually coined by McNamara but by an opponent of the doctrine. Military analyst Donald Brennan argued that attempting to preserve an indefinite stalemate did little to secure U.S. defense interests in the long term and that the reality of U.S. and Soviet planning reflected continued efforts by each superpower to gain a clear nuclear advantage over the other. Brennan personally advocated on behalf of an antiballistic missile defense system that would neutralize Soviet warheads before they could detonate. Such an obvious break with the status quo would thoroughly undermine the Soviets’ “assured-destruction capability” and would likely trigger a new arms race. Nevertheless, Brennan’s plan would find supporters in the U.S. government, the most prominent of whom was U.S. Pres. Ronald Reagan. Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, proposed in 1983, would become the centrepiece of disarmament negotiations throughout the 1980s, despite the fact that the technology behind the program was far from proven. The Soviets did indeed attempt to pursue their own antiballistic missile defense system for a time, but shrinking military budgets and, finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of the superpower model that had enabled the mutual assured destruction doctrine.

The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica This article was most recently revised and updated by Michael Ray, Editor.