Pukseeritakse 155 mm relva M1, Rendova

Pukseeritakse 155 mm relva M1, Rendova


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Pukseeritakse 155 mm relva M1, Rendova

See pilt 155 mm relvast M1, mida pukseeritakse Rendova saarel, näitab paksu muda, mis takistas enamikku saare tegevusi.


M114 155 mm (155 mm Howitzer M1)

Autor: Personalikirjanik | Viimati muudetud: 07.02.2019 | Sisu ja koopiawww.MilitaryFactory.com | Järgmine tekst on ainult selle saidi jaoks.

Enne 1979. aasta haubitsa M198 kasutamist tuginesid Ameerika Ühendriikide sõjaväelased (ja paljud selle liitlased) Teise maailmasõja ajastu pukseeritud haubitsale, et täita oma 155 mm kaugusväe suurtükiväe nõue. Relva teenis Korea sõjas (1950–1953) ja Vietnami sõja kampaaniates (1955–1975), enne kui nägi ametlikku pensionile jäämist Ameerika vägede juures. Relva projekteerimistööd algasid 1939. aastal ja ulatusid aastani 1941, milleni jõudis süsteem enne kasutuselevõtmist läbi vajalikud katsed. Tootmine kestis aastatel 1941–1953, kuni Rock Islandi arsenali osariik tootis lõpuks umbes 10 300 ühikut ja litsentsi alusel lisanäiteid mujal. M114 teenib mõnes armees ka täna (2013). Märkimisväärsed praegused operaatorid on Afganistan, Argentina, Brasiilia, Iraan, Iraak, Lõuna -Korea, Liibanon, Pakistan, Filipiinid, Taiwan, Tai, Türgi, Venezuela, Vietnam, Indoneesia ja Malaisia. Märkimisväärseteks endisteks operaatoriteks said Austria, Belgia, Kanada, Horvaatia, Taani, Prantsusmaa, Kreeka, Iisrael, Itaalia, Jordaania, Liibüa, Norra, Madalmaad, Portugal, Saudi Araabia, Singapur ja Hispaania (täieliku loendi leiate altpoolt).

M114 päritolu seisnes tegelikult USA armee algatuses kavandada ja arendada kaasaegne vankrisüsteem M1918 155 mm. M1918 oli midagi enamat kui Esimese maailmasõja ajastu Prantsuse Canon de 155 C mudeli 1917 Schneideri süsteemi koopia, mille kogus Ameerika sõjavägi. Kui otsustati vanemate M1918 relvade sel viisil kaasajastamise vastu, töötati välja uus relvasüsteem M1. Vanker muutus lõhestatud jäljetüübiks ja relv ühendati hürdopneumaatilise tagasilöögisüsteemiga. Puksil oli kaheastmeline "aeglase koonusega" katkestatud kruvi. Püstoli paigaldamine võimaldas tõsta -2 kuni +63 kraadi ja liikuda 25 kraadi paremale või vasakule. Relv toodeti tootmisse 155 mm haubitsana M1. Alles 1962. aastal muudeti nüüd muudetud M1A1 ümber mudeliks M114/M114A1.

M114 klassifitseeriti kui "keskmine" suurtükivägi ning oli oma üldise disaini ja funktsiooni poolest tavapärane. Relva aluseks oli 155 mm püstolitoru (M1- või M1A1 -seeria), mis asus kinnituse kohal, mis toetas ka vajalikku M6 -seeria tagasilöögimehhanismi. Püstolitorul puudus igasugune suupidur. Poolitatud käru (seeria M1A1 või M1A2) suleti transpordiks ja avati põletusprotsessi toetamiseks. Vankris oli ka üks telg, mis oli kahekordselt väsinud terasvelgede ja kummist ratastega. Süsteemis oli tavaliselt 11 meeskonda, sealhulgas üksuse ülem, relva kiht ja laskemoona käitlejad. Mõõdud hõlmasid jooksupikkust 24 jalga, laiust 8 jalga ja kõrgust ligi 6 jalga. Kogu kaal oli 12 500 naela. Väljaõppinud meeskond võis üksuse 5 minutiga tööle panna (valmis laskmiseks).

M114 leib ja või oli selle 155 mm kest, millel olid järgmised maitsed: kõrge lõhkeaine, keemiline, valgustus ja suits. Laskemoona pakkumist piiras ainult laskemoona kandja. Iga tüüpi kasutati vastavalt lahinguvälja nõuetele ja M114 oli üldiselt kaudtulerelv (mitte-nägemisulatus), mis oli ette nähtud mürskude laskmiseks vaenlase positsioonidele. HE, kemikaalide ja suitsuringide koonu kiirus oli ligikaudu 1850 jalga sekundis, samas kui valgustusvoor prognoositi madalamaks 1160 jalga sekundis. Kõrg- ja keemiaringid suutsid ka pikema kaasamisulatuse ulatuda 16 355 jardini. Suitsuringil õnnestus 9700 jardi ulatuses valgustusvoor, mille tipp oli 7100 jardi. Koolitatud relvameeskond võis tulistada kiirusega 40 lasku minutis. Iga mürsk oli laetud kotti.

Oma mitmekülgse karjääri jooksul osutas M114 oma lahingurollis suurepärast teenindust. Kuna see on selle kirjutamise ajal (2013) aktiivne mitmes maailma armees, annab see tunnistust suurepärasest inseneri- ja tavapärasest disainist. Arvestades oma ajalugu, peaks M114 järgmiseks aastakümneks kusagil maailmas aktiivseks teenistuseks jääma.


Sisu

Rendova saar kuulub New Georgia gruppi ja asub New Georgia mandriosa lääneranniku lähedal, mida eraldab sellest Blanche'i kanal. See on ligikaudu ristkülikukujuline, orienteeritud kirdesse, edelaotsaga, mis ulatub nagu kinga varvas Tetepare saare poole. [7] Lahingu ajal oli saare tähtsus selle läheduses Munda Pointiga New Georgia saare läänerannikul, kuhu jaapanlased olid rajanud lennuvälja. Pärast 1943. aasta alguses lõppenud Guadalcanali kampaaniat koostasid liitlased plaanid liikuda läbi Kesk -Saalomoni Bougainville'i suunas koos täiendavate operatsioonidega Uus -Guineas osana jõupingutustest vähendada Jaapani peamist baasi Rabauli ümbruses. operatsiooni Cartwheel varjus. [8] [9]

USA planeerijate poolt operatsiooni Toenails määratud kampaania Uus -Gruusia turvamiseks hõlmas esialgset maandumist, et kindlustada peatuspaigad ja lennuväli Uus -Gruusia lõunaosas, et toetada vägede ja varude liikumist Guadalcanalist Rendovasse. mis asus baasiks edasistele operatsioonidele New Georgia linnas, mis keskendus Munda lennuvälja turvamisele. [8] [9] Rendova rannad sobisid hästi laevade maandumispunktideks ja saare keskel asuv kõrge maastik pakkus head vaatlust. Sadamat kasutataks selles piirkonnas tegutsevate Jaapani praamide ja saarel paiknevate suurtükiväeoperatsioonide toetamiseks piirkonnas toimivate Jaapani praamide vastu, et toetada tegevust New Georgia läänerannikul. [10]

Jaapani garnison Rendoval oli väike ja koosnes 120–290 sõdurist kahest Kure 6. erimere dessantväe ja 229. jalaväerügemendi kompaniist. Need kaks kompaniid moodustasid osa kindralmajor Minoru Sasaki Kaguosast, [11] mille peakorter oli Mundas. Kolonel Genjiro Hirata juhtis 229. asukohta New Gruusia baasil. [2] [12] Need väed olid saabunud Uus -Gruusiasse 1943. aasta veebruarist maini osana Jaapani jõupingutustest sektori tugevdamiseks pärast Guadalcanali kampaaniat. [13]

Maandumised olid ajastatud toimuma koos sarnaste operatsioonidega Nassau lahes, Uus -Guineas ning Woodlarkis ja Kiriwinas. [14] Pärast 29. juunil Guadalcanalist purjetamist [15] takistasid liitlaste dessantvägede töörühma 31 vihma ja udu. Selle väe peamine maapealne lahinguelement oli kindralmajor John H. Hesteri 43. jalaväediviis. Töörühma lähenemist kattis Catalinas, kes lendas ööpatrulle läbi Blanche'i kanali. Koidueelsel ajal (umbes 02:25) ameerika hävitajad USS Talbot ja USS Zane eraldati põhiväest, et maandada Sasavele saarel ja Baraulu saarel Uus-Meremaa koolitatud ja juhitud Fidži ja Tonga komandod [16] [17] ning Ameerika 169. jalaväerügemendi kompaniid A ja B. Kuigi saared kindlustati kiiresti, kuigi Zane, halva nähtavuse tõttu maandus rifile, jäädes nii pärastlõunani. Need saared olid strateegiliselt olulised, kuna asuvad New Georgia rannikul ja kontrollivad Blanche'i kanali kaudu Roviana laguuni sissepääsu. [18] [19]

Admiral Richmond K. Turner juhtis oma lipulaevalt ründetranspordi laevastikku, mis koosnes neljast transpordi- ja kahest varustuslaevast, mille sõelus läbi kaheksa hävitajat [20]. McCawley. Väike edasijõudnute seltskond kahest kompaniist 172. jalaväerügemendist saadeti Rendova sadama ümber kaldale Briti ohvitseri major Martin Clemensi ja Austraalia kuningliku mereväe ohvitseri leitnant Frederick Rhoadesi juhtimisel. Koos väikese rühma kohalike politseikonstaablitega kavatsesid nad ühendada Austraalia rannavalvuri, lennuleitnant Dick Hortoniga, kes aitaks neil enne peamist maandumist rannapea kindlaks teha. Tugevad tuuled lükkasid edasijõudnud partei kursilt kõrvale ja lõpuks ei saanud nad Hortoniga ühendust enne, kui esimene laine oli kaldale jõudnud. [18] Pärast õiget randa jõudmist juhtisid Clemens ja Rhoades oma mehed kiirrünnakus Rendova istanduses asuva maja vastu, tappes ranna taga kaks jaapanlast. [21]

Kell 06.00 olid liitlaste peamised dessandid Rendoval, mis toimetasid 43. diviisi vägesid, küll kaootiliselt. USA merejalaväe ametlik ajalugu kirjeldab esialgset maandumist kui "kiirustamist", "[millel on] regatti välimus, mitte koordineeritud maandumine" ja "kaootiline äärmuslikult" [22], kuid sellegipoolest on väed 103. Pataljon koos mereväelastega 9. kaitsepataljonist ja Seebeesiga 24. mereväe ehituspataljonist turvasid ranna, kuigi neid takistas juhuslik snaiprituli. Edenemist aeglustas ka Jaapani pommitaja Betty ilmumine, mis tiirutas ümber maandumispiirkonna, kuid ei rünnanud. [23] [24] Jaapani kaitsjad teatasid oma ülematele, et "vaenlase hävituslennukite visa sekkumise tõttu ei saanud otsustavat lööki vaenlase maabumiskolonni vastu panna" ja et maandumised olid "täiesti imelised" ja "vaenlase kiire lahkumine." [25]

Pärast esimest ešeloni kahjusid 43. diviisi ülema abi, brigaadikindral Leonard Wing ja viitseadmiral William F. Halsey, kes juhtisid operatsiooni New Georgia kindlustamiseks, pärast paadi maandumist umbes 50 jardi (46 m) kaldale. ) rannast. [26] 2. pataljon, 172. jalaväerügement rajas rannapea ümber kaitsepiirkonna, kuid koges raskesti vettinud pinnase tõttu sissemurdmist. Lõpuks olid nad sunnitud oma kaitseliinid kõrgemale maapinnale viima. [27] Sissetungi edenedes tungisid ameerika varud rahvarohketesse randadesse, kui jalavägi surus Jaapani kaitsjad sisemaale. 9. merekaitsepataljon hakkas lisaks Jaapani vägedega tülitsemisele kindlustama ja puhastama oma etteantud suurtükiväe positsiooni eesmärke ning 24. mereväe ehituspataljonist pärit meremehed alustasid laagri puhastamist meditsiiniabi jaama jaoks. [28] Meremeeste tööd takistas snaiprituli, samas kui tugev vihm muutis maapinna kiiresti mudaks, mis häiris sõidukite ja raskete traktorite liikumist, mille ülesandeks oli raskete suurtükiväeosade paika lohistamine. [29]

Vastuseks maandumisele hakkasid Jaapani suurtükipatareid Bangaa saarel ja Munda ümbruses tulistama nelja USA hävitajat, kes purjetasid maandumisrannast läbi Blanche'i kanali. See mürsk kahjustas hävitajat Gwin, tappes kolm ja haavates seitset, enne kui ekraanilt ilmusid veel kaks laeva -Farenholt ja Buchanan- hakkas kalda patareisid sisse lülitama, samal ajal kui need olid kahjustatud Gwin varjas transpordivahendid suitsuga, et vältida nende kaasamist. [30] 11. nulllennuväe laevastiku 27 nullist koosnev vägi asus vahetult enne keskpäeva võitleja pühkima üle rannapea, lükates edasi USA transpordivahendite mahalaadimise, samal ajal kui liitlasvägede hävitajad neid maha tulistasid. [31] [32] [33]

Rünnak, kuigi algselt kaootiline, maandas edukalt Rendovale kuus tuhat Ameerika sõjaväelast. [1] Need jõud jõudsid kaldale suures osas vastuseisuta, kuna saare väike garnison oli üllatunud ja nad ei suutnud enne USA vägede saabumist oma kaitset õigel ajal mehitada. Jaapanlased kogunesid esialgu maandumisranna taha kookospähkliistandusse ja püüdsid luua raadiosidet Mundaga, alustades samal ajal väikseid rüselusi ja pannes lähedalasuva istandiku kuulipildujatest ahistavat tuld. Esialgses lahingus hukkus umbes 12 jaapanlast. Seejärel tõmbusid nad tagasi sisemaale. 172. jalaväerügemendi väed ajasid taganevaid jaapanlasi taga, tulistades maha mitu snaiprit ja hävitades mitu kuulipildujate positsiooni, kui nad aeglaselt Pengui jõe poole liikusid. Seal sattusid ameeriklased pideva tule alla, kuid pärast mörditoega tule üleoleku saavutamist ja jõekalda äärde kindla baasi rajamist ründasid USA väed. Päeva lõpuks oli tapetud 50–65 jaapanlast, sealhulgas Jaapani ülem. Hukkus neli USA sõdurit ja veel viis sai haavata, sealhulgas 172. jalaväerügemendi ülem kolonel David Ross. [2] [34]

30. juuni pärastlõunal kaalusid veokid ankrusse ja hakkasid piirkonnast lahkuma umbes kell 15.00. Pool tundi hiljem algasid Jaapani õhurünnakud tõsiselt, kui admiral Jinichi Kusaka andis korralduse streikida 25 Betty torpeedopommitajat, keda saatis 24 nulli. Hoolimata sellest, et 16 mereväe hävitajate eskadroni 221 korsaari võtsid pealt ja sattusid tugeva õhutõrje alla, suutis üks Bettyst vabastada torpeedo, mis tabas McCawley, hukkus 15 meremeest ja sai haavata kaheksa inimest. Pukseerimise ajal Kaalud, sattus laev taas Val sukeldumispommitajate rünnaku alla, mis moodustas osa suuremast õhurünnakust, mis koosnes 21 nullist, üheksa Valsist ja 13 F1M vesilennukist. See rünnak löödi tagasi ilma liitlaste kaotusteta, [35] kuna Jaapani õhurünnakud maandumispiirkonnale lõid edukalt ära nii Ameerika hävituslennukid kui ka maa- ja merepõhised õhutõrjerelvad. [36] [37] Liitlaslennukid hakkasid Jaapani positsioone Villa ja Munda ümbruses pommitama, [38] [39] ning kella 17.00 -ks oli sadamasse rajatud 103. välikahurpataljoni 105 mm suurtükipüssid ja alustati sihtmärkide registreerimist. mandril. [31] [40]

Esimese päeva õhu- ja mereväe kaotused on vaieldavad. Jaapanlased väitsid, et tulistasid alla 50 liitlaslennukit, kuigi liitlased teatasid vaid 21 lennuki kadumisest. Lisaks väitsid jaapanlased, et nad on uputanud ristleja ja hävitaja ning kahjustanud veel kahte hävitajat ja kaheksat transpordivahendit, mille kohta teatasid liitlased, et laevakadu on üks hävitaja ja üks transport uppunud. Liitlaste poolel väitsid nad, et tulistasid alla 106 Jaapani lennukit, kuid Jaapani tegelased toetavad vaid 30 kaotatut. [6]

Öö jooksul, McCawley, olles puksiiriga kohtunud Pawnee, uputati ekslikult Ameerika PT paatide poolt, lüües kell 20:23 kaks torpeedot. Selleks ajaks oli Turner oma lipu hävitajale üle andnud Farenholt. [41] [42] Samal ööl ebaõnnestus Jaapani mereväe katse rünnata Ameerika rannapead, kui Rendova lääneranniku juurde ilmus viis Jaapani hävitajat, kuid ei saanud vägivaldse tuisu tõttu rünnata. [43] Pärast kergelt vaidlustatud maandumist 30. juunil taandus suurem osa ellujäänud Jaapani vägedest Munda Pointi lähedal New Georgia osariigis, liikudes kanuu kaudu tagasi. 172. jalaväerügemendi väed laiendasid rannapead 1. juulil, patrullid kindlustasid pool saart, samal ajal kui 3. pataljon, 103. jalaväerügement maandus Poco istandiku ümber dessantlaevade jalalaevadel. [44]

Sadamas oli mahalaadimisprotsessi takistanud halb planeerimine ja suutmatus eraldada piisavat personali rannakontrolli ja mahalaadimistööde jaoks. Rannapea puhastamiseks ja lahingupoodide jagamiseks olid jalaväelased töö tegemiseks üksikasjalikud. [45] Kui teine ​​transpordiešelon saabus, maandusid paljud paadid avamerele ja kaldale kahlavad väed pidid need käsitsi maha laadima. Tugev vihm aeglustas jätkuvalt kaupluste levikut ja rasketehnika liikumist. [46] Teine ešelon maandas ka raskekahurväe 192. väli suurtükiväepataljonist ja patarei 9. kaitsepataljonist. [47] Kohale jõudes ehitasid USA väed Rendovale suurtükipositsioonid ja suutsid 155 mm pikkused "pikad Tom" relvad ellu viia, tulistades mürske üle 15 km laiuse Blanche'i kanali Jaapani positsioonidele Lambeti istanduses ja Munda õhus. valdkonnas. [48] ​​192. asutasid oma positsioonid Kokorana saarel, kus tugev korallialus pakkus nende rasketele relvadele loomulikku kõva seisukorda. [49] Kuus PT paati ülemjuhataja leitnant Robert B. Kelly juhtimisel saabusid Rendovasse ka 1. juuli alguses, just see jõud vajus kogemata alla McCawley Blanche'i kanali kaudu. [50]

2. juulil alustasid Rendoval viibivad USA jalaväelased ettevalmistusi, et astuda tagasi edasisteks operatsioonideks New Georgia saarel. [51] Sel pärastlõunal pommitas Jaapani õhurünnak, mis koosnes 24 Mitsubishi G4M Betty pommitajast ja 44 hävitajast, lõuna poolt Ameerika rannapead. [52] Ameerika hävitajate lennukid olid rünnaku ajal halbade ilmastikutingimuste tõttu tagasi võetud ja Jaapani lennukid olid vastuseisuta. Pommitamine oli täpne ja pahaaimamatutel Ameerika vägedel polnud aega reageerida. Rünnaku tagajärjel plahvatas poolsaarel hiljem geeligniidist prügila, mida tuntakse kui "Suitsiidipunkti", tappes 64 sõdurit ja vigastades veel vähemalt 89 inimest. [53] Mõni tund pärast seda esimest reidi korraldas 25 Jaapani hävituslennukit järelreidi. Neid tabasid Ameerika hävituslennukid ning järgnevas õhulahingus tulistati alla kuus Jaapani ja kolm Ameerika lennukit. [54]

Ööl vastu 2. juulit Jaapani ristleja Yūbari ja üheksa hävitajat üritasid Rendova rannapead pommitada, kuid halb ilm ja rannapea väiksus panid kõik nende kestad kahjutult ümbritsevasse džunglisse kukkuma. Samal ööl transporditi väikesi USA jalaväerühmi LCM -ides üle väina New Georgia avamere saartele operatsiooni Drive on Munda Point avamise faasis. [54] Jaapani ründaja 35 pommitajat Mitsubishi Ki-21 ja hävituslennukid üritasid 3. juulil Rendoval positsioone rünnata, kuid Ameerika hävituslennukid võtsid nad pealt ja teatasid, et kukutasid alla 11 Jaapani lennukit, kaotades kolm liitlaslennukit. Pärastlõunal pommitas suur lend Ameerika ja Uus -Meremaa lennukeid Munda Pointi ning teatas, et põhjustab suuri kahjusid. [54]

4. juulil, Ameerika iseseisvuspäeval, teatasid Ameerika ülemad Rendovast "turvaliselt". Varsti pärast seda alustasid jaapanlased saarele tugevat õhurünnakut. USA garnisoni oli tugevalt tugevdatud õhutõrjerelvade ja -radaritega ning Rendova sadama mahalaadimistoimingute kaitseks oli loodud tugev hävitusekraan. Üle 80 Jaapani lennukist koosnev jõud, mis koosnes 17 pommitajast ja 66 hävitaja saatjast, ründas seejärel saart idast. Vähemalt 11 Jaapani lennukit tulistati alla, kuigi USA kaotused ja nõuded on endiselt ebakindlad, jaapanlased väitsid, et tulistasid alla palju kaitsvaid hävitajaid ja uputasid mitu transpordilaeva. USA merejalaväe ajaloolase John Rentzi sõnul loobusid jaapanlased tugeva õhutõrje tagajärjel laiaulatuslikest õhurünnakutest Rendovale, [55] kuigi väikesed õhurünnakud Rendovale jätkusid ka augustis. [56]

Liitlasväed võitlesid maandumisele järgnevatel kuudel Jaapani pidevate õhurünnakutega. Need rünnakud põhjustasid inim- ja materiaalset kahju, kuid ei ohustanud kunagi tõsiselt Ameerika jalamit ja baase saarel. Selle tulemusena kasutati Rendovat edukalt suurtükiväebaasina New Georgia kampaania järgnevatel etappidel, mis hõlmas 2. juulil kanali ületamist mandrile, kuna USA väed 169. ja 172. jalaväerügemendist maandusid Zanana ümbruses. Sellele maandumisele järgnes seejärel sõit läände Munda Pointil ja lennuvälja vallutamine augusti alguses toimunud Munda Pointi lahingu ajal. [57]

Baasi arendustööd Rendova ümbruses algasid vahetult pärast maandumist, 24. mereväe ehituspataljon võttis ette teedeehitustöid, sealhulgas velveteede loomist, et hõlbustada raskeveokite ja suurtükiväe liikumist poristes tingimustes. Õhurünnaku ähvardusel hävitati selle jõupingutusega kolm buldooserit ja 20 meest sai surma. [58] Randa laiendati koralltäitega, samas kui ka Marston Mattingit püüti muda vastu võidelda, kuid nende kaal koos 155 mm suurtükiväe nihutamiseks kasutatud raskeveokite omaga põhjustas teede vajumise. muda. [59] 118. [60]

Meremehed töötasid ka stividoritöödel, ladustades kauplusi ja varustust transpordilaevadelt. Kogu 24. RKP kolimine Rendovasse viidi lõpule alles 1. augustil, kuid kuu keskel viidi see Mundasse. Pärast Munda Pointi vallutamist paigutati suurtükivägi ümber Mundasse ja oktoobris 1943 ehitas USA mereväe 20. mereväe ehituspataljon "Seabees" Bau saarele PT paadibaasi, laagriala ja laod. Märtsis 1944 lisas 73. pataljoni meremees rajatisele mootorilao, täiendavad teed ja kütusetorud. [61]


Sisu

Suurel osal 1930. aastatest oli uus käru väljatöötamisel olemasoleva Esimese maailmasõja ajastu 155 mm haubitsa jaoks, mis oli litsentsi järgi ehitatud prantsuse Canon de 155 C modèle 1917 Schneider kuni 1939. aastani, kui mõisteti, et see pole tundub loogiline panna uus vanker vananenud haubitsa alla. Nii et areng algas uuesti käruga, mis oli mõeldud kasutamiseks 155 mm haubitsa või 4,7-tollise (120 mm) püstoli jaoks. See viidi lõpule 15. maiks 1941, kui vaguni M1 Howitzer M1 standardiseeriti. Haubits ise erines vanemast mudelist 20 kaliibriga pikendatud tünni ja uue tõstemehhanismiga. Ainulaadselt oli see ainus „aeglase koonusega” katkestatud kruvimehhanism, mis sisenes USA teenistusse pärast 1920. aastat. [1] See tähendas, et sulguri avamiseks oli vaja kahte eraldi liigutust, võrreldes üheaegselt pöörleva „järsu koonuse” mehhanismi ühe liigutusega. ja tõmbas tuka tagasi. [ tsiteerimine vajalik ]

M1A1 nimetati ümber kui M114A1 1962. aastal. tsiteerimine vajalik ]

Vankrit kasutas ka 4,5-tolline relv M-1. See läbis aja jooksul mitmeid väiksemaid muudatusi. Mudelil M1A1 asendati esialgsed Warneri elektrilised pidurid Westinghouse'i õhkpiduritega. Nii vankritel M1 kui ka M1A1 kasutati keskteljel asuvat tulistamisalust, mida pikendati põrkmehhanismi abil. M1A2 asendas põrkme keeratava tungrauaga ja muutis ka reisilukku. Vanker M1A1E1 oli mõeldud kasutamiseks džunglis ja mudasel maastikul ning asendas M1A1 rattad vabakäigulise roomikutega vedrustusega, kuid projekt lõpetati pärast V-J päeva ilma tootmisse jõudmata. Vankrid T-9 ja T-10 olid projektid, milles kasutati madala kvaliteediga terasesulameid, mis tühistati, kui neid enam ei vajata. T-16 oli kergekaaluline vanker, mis kasutas kõrgekvaliteedilist terast ja mis säästis hinnanguliselt umbes 1200 naela (540 kg) tööd, mis algasid juulis 1945 ja jätkusid pärast sõda, kuigi tundub, et sellest pole midagi tulnud. [1]

1960ndate keskpaiga variant oli 155mm XM123 ja amp M123A1 abimootoriga haubitsad. XM123 tootis American Machine and Foundry ja see oli varustatud kahe 20-hobujõulise õhkjahutusega mootoriga, mille on tootnud Consolidated Diesel Corporation, juhiiste, rool ja juhtratas vasakul rajal, võimaldades seda kiiremini paigaldada peamine mootor, samas kui XM123A1 pakkus ühe 20 -hobujõulise elektrimootoriga mootori. Vasakul rajal olev lisaraskus nihutas haubitsat pärast iga ringi tulistamist, nõudes selle ümberpaigutamist ja projektist loobuti. Kontseptsioon kopeeriti 1954. aastal välja töötatud ja õhujõudude kasutuses olnud Nõukogude 85 mm SD-44 tankitõrjepüstolist. [ tsiteerimine vajalik ]


Teise maailmasõja andmebaas

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" Ükski pätt ei võitnud kunagi sõda oma riigi eest suremisega. Sa võidad sõja, pannes teise vaese lolli pätt oma riigi eest surema! "

George Patton, 31. mai 1944

Teise maailmasõja andmebaasi asutab ja haldab C. Peter Chen ettevõttest Lava Development, LLC. Selle saidi eesmärk on kahekordne. Esiteks on selle eesmärk pakkuda huvitavat ja kasulikku teavet Teise maailmasõja kohta. Teiseks tuleb tutvustada Lava tehnilisi võimalusi.


M1, M2, M59 pukseeritav 155 mm püss "Long Tom"

155 mm pikkuse Tom on algselt kujundanud prantslased Esimese maailmasõja ajal, tähistades M1917, M1917A1 või M1918 GPF (Grande Puissance, Filloux). USA modifikatsiooniks oli M1 155 mm välipüstol, millele järgnes rannakaitse ja korpuse suurtükiväepataljonide M1A1. 1940. aastal kujundati relv ümber koos pneumaatilise rehvikanduriga ja muud täiustused, mis muutsid ümber M2 155 mm välipüstoli. M2 oli raskekahurväe selgroog, tuhandeid teenis nii Euroopas kui ka Vaikse ookeani operatsiooniteatrites. Hiljem määrati see ümber kui M59 155 mm pukseerimispüstol.

M2 "Long Tom" 155 mm püstoli standardmootor oli raskeveok (vt Mack NO) või hiljem II maailmasõjas roomik M4 või M5 jõuülekanne (vt M4 High Tractor), mis oli ka laskemoona kandja . Kui tavalist jõuülekannet polnud saadaval, võis iga pika veoautoga vedada "pikka tomot". Raja alla paigaldatud kaherattaline otsik, mis on ühendatud tavalise sõjaväe konksuga. "Pika Tomi" paigutamiseks tulistamisasendisse kulus umbes 30 minutit.

"Pikk Tom" kaalus 30 600 naela, sellel oli poolitatud rada ja kaheksa teljega kaheksa õhkrehvi, seda liigutas traktor ja seda teenindas 14 või 15 -meheline kombineeritud meeskond.

155 mm pikkune „pikk Tom“ tulistas sama 95–100-naelast HE, suitsu- ja gaasimürskude laskemoona nagu 155 mm haubits, kuid suurema laskekauguse ja täpsusega. Kuigi "Long Toms" on mõeldud kaudtuleks vahemikus 10-14 miili, on seda kasutatud otseseks tulekahjuks erakorralistel asjaoludel, näiteks Jaapani koobaste kindlustuste vähendamiseks Peleliu linnas II maailmasõja ajal.

Teise maailmasõja ajal oli relv kujutatud sõjatoodangu plakatil "Kaitse vajab kummi", kuna sellel oli kümme rehvi. 155 mm pikkust "pikka tomot" on kasutanud USA liitlased kogu maailmas ja see on kasutusel 21. sajandil.


76 mm püstol M1

The 76 mm püstol M1 oli Ameerika Teise maailmasõja aegne tankipüstol, mille töötas välja USA relvajõudude osakond 1942. aastal, et täiendada 75 mm püstolit põhitankil M4. Seda kasutati ka M18 Hellcat tankihävitaja relvastamiseks.

Kuigi relva katsetati 1942. aasta augusti alguses ja see klassifitseeriti 17. augustil 1942, [1] alles 1943. aasta augustis [2] töötas sõjaväeosakond välja M4 tanki kinnituse, mida tankiväed aktsepteerivad. See võeti lahinguks vastu alles 1944. aasta juulis. [3] Jaanuaris 1943 tehti otsus paigaldada 76 mm sõidukile, millest saab M18. [4] 1944. aasta maikuuks hakati seda lahingutestima kui T70. [5]

Disain ja arendus

75 mm relvast parema relva väljatöötamine oli ette nähtud enne, kui USA-l olid lahingukogemused hästi soomustatud Saksa tankidega. 11. septembri 1941. aasta esialgsed sõjaväe spetsifikatsioonid tankile M4 võimaldasid paigaldada arvukalt relvi, sealhulgas 3 -tollist relva. [6] 76 mm relvaga M1 muutuva relva esimesi isendeid hinnati augustis 1942, samal ajal kui USA asus Euroopa/Aafrika piirkonna maismaasõda alustama alles 1942. aasta novembris toimunud operatsiooniga Tõrvik.

3 -tollist relva peeti liiga raskeks [6], kaaludes umbes 900 kg. [7] Uue tugevama terasega [8] loodi umbes 1200 naela (540 kg) kaaluv relv. [9] Tegemist oli uue relvaga, mille tagumik oli sarnane 75 mm M3 püstolile, kuid millel oli uus toru (toru ja padrunikamber), et mahutada uus padrun. [6] See tulistas samu mürske kui 3-tolline (76 mm) M7 püstol, mis oli paigaldatud 3in Gun Motor Carriage M10 tankihävitajale ja pukseeriti 3-tolline tankitõrjepüstol Gun M5, kuid erinevast padrunikestast. [6] Nimetus "76 mm" valiti selleks, et hoida laskemoona tarnimine kahe kahuri vahel segamini. [10] 76 mm erines ka selle poolest, et järjestikused mudelid said koonupiduri ja kiirema vintpüssi.

Aberdeen Proving Ground alustas esimeste T1 -ga kuulipildujate hindamist umbes 1. augustil 1942. [11] Esimeste katsepüstolite ava pikkus oli 57 kaliibrit ja M4 Shermani paagil katsetades leiti, et pikk tünn põhjustas tasakaaluhäireid. [6] Veel üks T1 testpüstol toodeti lühendatud tünniga ja tasakaalu parandamiseks lisati vastukaalu. [11] Pikkuse vähendamine 15 tolli (38 sentimeetri) võrra ei vähendanud jõudluse läbitungimist sama, mis 3 -tolline püstol. [12]

17. augustiks oli laskemoonaosakond klassifitseerinud lühema tünniga proovipüstoli 76 mm M1 [13] ja loonud pretsedendi relvaga relvastatud M4 tankide tähistamiseks, hõlmates "(76M1)". [1]

M1 -tüüpi relvade testid näitasid, et kahuril oli oma vastukaaluga probleeme sidumisega, kui üritati torni pöörata, kui tank oli järsu nurga all. Tasakaalu parandamiseks lisati torni tagaosale 800 naela (360 kg) hoiukast [1], mille hindamised toimusid 1943. aasta alguses ja lõpparuanne kuulutati välja aprillis 1943. [14] See töötas, kuid soomusvägi lükkas selle tagasi torn on kitsas. [14]

Rahuldavam kinnitus leiti augustis 1943, kasutades 76 mm püstoli kandmiseks M4 šassiil T23 paagi torni konstruktsiooni. [15] Loodi kahuri 76 mm M1A1 versioon, millel oli pikem tagasilöögipind, mis aitab tasakaalustada, võimaldades trusside paigutamist ettepoole. [15]

Tankihävitajate aktsepteerimine

76 mm relvastatud uus mootorpüstol M18 oli tankipurustajate sellise sõiduki taotluse tulemus ja nad võtsid need vastu.

Tootmiseks vastuvõtmine tankivägede poolt

1943. aasta augustiks oli modifitseeritud T23 tornis 76 mm relvastatud tank Osakonnaosakond M4 lõpuks tootmiseks valmis. Tankiväed tegid ettepaneku lahingukatsete jaoks 1000 tanki proovisõiduks ja kui see õnnestus, siis kogu M4 tankide tootmisvõimsus pühendati 76 mm relvale [2], kuid see muudeti kiirusega, mis varustaks 1/3 tankidest M4 76 mm püstoliga. [16]

Tootmisettepanek oli 1943. aasta septembris märgukirja osa, milles toodi välja relva mitmesugused puudused, mis muutsid selle tanki jaoks vähem soovitavaks: koonuplahvatus, kõrge lõhkeainega kest, laskemoona käitlemine ja laskemoonahoidla. Kokkuvõtteks võib öelda, et 76 mm pakkus umbes 1 tolli (25 millimeetrit) lisatud soomuste läbitungimisvõimet, et kaotada teatud maapealse rünnaku tulejõud. [17] In a meeting in April 1944 held to discuss the assignment of the first production M4(76M1) tanks received in Britain to units, a presentation comparing the 76 mm to the 75 mm went over similar points, adding that the 76 mm was more accurate and did not have an appropriate smoke round. [18]

Muzzle blast

The 76 mm obscured the target with smoke and dust. This could prevent the gunner from seeing where the projectile struck.

The Ordnance Department reduced the amount of smoke by using a long primer that gave a more complete burn of the propellant before it exited the barrel. [19] The revised ammunition began to be issued for use in August 1944. [20]

Later production guns were threaded for a muzzle brake to redirect the blast left and right (M1A1C and M1A2). [19] This was tested in January 1944, authorized in February 1944 with production starting June 1944. The threads of those without a brake were covered by a protector (visible in many pictures). [21]

For those vehicles that did not have a muzzle brake, once the Armored Force began to accept M4s, it was recommended that tank commanders stand outside the tank and "spot" the strike of rounds to guide the gunner. [18]

High-explosive capacity

The situation with the high-explosive shell was that the 3 inch M42 projectile for the 76 mm gun carried a filler of about 0.9 lb (0.41 kg) of explosives while the 75 mm gun M48 high explosive projectile carried 1.5 lb (0.68 kg). [22] Far more high explosive ammunition was used by tankers than armor penetrating types, the ratio being about 70% HE, 20% AP and 10% smoke overall, [23] The ratio could vary by unit: From August 3 to December 31, 1944 the 13th Tank Battalion fired 55 rounds of M62 APC-T armor piercing versus 19,634 rounds of M42 high explosive. [24]

Smoke ammunition

The M88 smoke round for the 76 mm provided a "curtain" of smoke. [25] The tankers found the 75 mm M64 WP (White Phosphorus) smoke projectile useful not only for providing smoke coverage but also attacking targets including enemy tanks. [26] Some units equipped with the 76 mm preferred to maintain a 75 mm armed tank on hand to provide the M88 WP projectile. [27]

Round size

It was thought that the longer and heavier 76 mm might hamper handling inside the tank's turret, slowing the rate of fire. [17] This may have been more of a concern than was warranted: on April 22, 1945 an M4 76-mm tank came suddenly onto a strange vehicle and the ". 76 roared twice in rapid succession. " adding a friendly British scout car (waiting to ambush passers-by) to the tank's kill tally before (as the British gunner stated) ". I could lay my hand on the trigger." [28]

It was also thought that the longer 76 mm would reduce ammunition capacity. [17] The 76 mm was first tested on the M4A1 series tank which carried 90 rounds of 75 mm ammunition, [29] while most other models carried 97 rounds of 75 mm. [30] The 76 mm cartridge reduced this to 83 rounds. [1] By late 1943, the Army had adopted the wet storage system of water containers among the rounds, to reduce fires and for the 76 mm gun this provided 71 rounds of ammunition, while the 75 mm could carry 104 rounds. [31] Storage depended on organization: The 76-mm T72 Gun Motor Carriage, designed to mount the 76-mm on the M10 GMC chassis in a T23 turret lightened for the job, carried 99 rounds (but not in wet storage). [32]

Variandid

  • T1: Originally 57 calibers long gun, [6] reduced to 52 calibers after tests in effort to improve balance [11]
  • M1: 52 calibers long version of gun adopted for use [1]
  • M1A1: M1 with longer recoil surface to allow it to be mounted on trunions placed 12 inches further forward [15]
  • M1A1C: M1A1 threaded for muzzle brake [19]
  • M1A2: M1A1C with rifling twist changed from 1:40 calibers to 1:32 calibers [33]

A muzzle brake was tested in January 1944, authorized in February 1944 with production starting June 1944. Not all guns received them. The threads of those without a brake were covered by a protector visible in many pictures. [21]

Ammunition

While the 76 mm had less High Explosive (HE) and smoke performance than the 75 mm, the higher-velocity 76 mm gave better anti-tank performance, with firepower similar to many of the armored fighting vehicles it encountered, particularly the Panzer IV tank and StuG assault gun vehicles. Using the M62 APC round, the 76 mm gun penetrated 109 mm (4.3 in) of armor at 0° obliquity at 1,000 m (3,300 ft), with a muzzle velocity of 792 m/s (2,600 ft/s). The HVAP round was able to penetrate 178 mm (7.0 in) at 1,000 m (3,300 ft), with a muzzle velocity of 1,036 m/s (3,400 ft/s). [34]

Round summary [25] [35]
Projectile Complete round Projectile weight Filler/core Muzzle velocity Vahemik
M42A1 HE 22.11 lb (10.03 kg) 12.87 lb (5.84 kg) 0.86 lb (0.39 kg) 2,700 ft/s (820 m/s) 14,650 yd (13,400 m)
M62A1 APC 24.55 lb (11.14 kg) 15.43 lb (7.00 kg) 0.144 lb (0.065 kg) 2,600 ft/s (790 m/s) 16,100 yd (14,700 m)
M79 AP 24.24 lb (11.00 kg) 15 lb (6.8 kg) Puudub 2,600 ft/s (790 m/s) 12,770 yd (11,680 m)
M88 Smoke 13.43 lb (6.09 kg) 7.6 lb (3.4 kg) 3.3 lb (1.5 kg) 900 ft/s (270 m/s) 2,000 yd (1,800 m)
T4 (M93) HVAP (APCR) 7.6 lb (3.4 kg) 3.9 lb (1.8 kg) 3,400 ft/s (1,000 m/s)

The M42A1 High Explosive shell contained a 0.86 lb (0.39 kg) explosive filler of TNT or a 0.85 lb (0.39 kg) mixture of 0.08 lb (0.036 kg) of cast TNT and 0.77 lb (0.35 kg) 50/50 Amatol. [35] A reduced charge load existed with a velocity of 1,550 ft/s (470 m/s) and range of 8,805 yd (8,051 m). [36]

The standard M62A1 Armor Piercing Capped projectile was of the APCBC design. [35]

The substitute standard M79 Armor Piercing solid monobloc shot had no filler, windscreen, or penetrating cap. [35]

The M88 H.C. B.I. Smoke Shell contained a filler of H.C. [35] Based on a British design, it was intended to provide a slow-release "curtain" of smoke versus the exploding white phosphorus shell available to the 75-mm and other cannon originally designed for artillery spotting but which could also cause damaging burns. [25]

The M26 brass cartridge case was used for all loaded rounds, with a weight of 5.28 lb (2.39 kg) and length of 21.3 in (54 cm). [37] It was an entirely different case from the 3-inch MKIIM2 case used for the 3-inch M3 anti-aircraft gun and 3-inch M5, M6, and M7 guns used on the a towed anti-tank gun, M6 heavy tank, and M10 Gun Motor Carriage. [38] The 76-mm chamber capacity varied by projectile (also given is the capacities for similar 3-inch rounds to illustrate the size differences):

76-mm M1 vs 3-inch M3/5/6/7, Chamber Capacities
Gun M42 HE M62 APC M79 AP M88 H.C. B.I.
76-mm M1 [35] 140.5 cu in (2,302 cc) 142.6 cu in (2,337 cc) 143.66 cu in (2,354.2 cc) 143.6 cu in (2,353 cc)
3-inch M3/5/6/7 [39] 203.5 cu in (3,335 cc) 205.585 cu in (3,368.93 cc) 203.5 cu in (3,335 cc) Puudub

The 3 inch cartridge was not completely filled by the propellants used a distance wad was used to keep the propellant pressed against the primer end. [38] By way of comparison the 75 mm M3 gun had a chamber capacity of about 88 cu in (1,440 cc) for the M61 armor piercing projectile and about 80 cu in (1,300 cc) for the M48 high explosive projectile [40] and the British 17pdr 300 cu in (4,900 cc). [41]

Alternatives to the 76 mm M1

The 76 mm M1 was a project initiated by the Ordnance Department itself. [2] Various entities suggested other weapon options which were not pursued.

  • In October 1942, the Aberdeen-based Ballistics Research Laboratory suggested that research begin into two options: (1) arming the M4 medium tank with the 90 mm gun (if need be by altering the cartridge case and gun) and (2) designing a 3-inch gun firing a 15 lb (6.8 kg) shot at 915 m/s (3,000 ft/s). [42]
  • The Armored Board (the Armored Forces evaluation center at Fort Knox) [17] suggested the production of 1,000 M4 medium tanks armed with 90-mm guns in the fall of 1943. [42]
  • The British expressed interest in mounting their 17-pounder on the M4 in August 1943, offering a monthly allotment of 200 weapons and ammunition, which could begin three months following acceptance. [43] By the time that the US took this up in 1944, the British were too busy with their own conversions resulting in the Sherman Firefly. [3] Some conversions destined for the US Army were performed in 1945 but did not see combat. [44]

US service

The 76 mm gun saw first use in a test batch of M18 Hellcat gun motor carriages in Italy in May 1944, under their development designation T70. [45] The moderate performance of the 76 mm gun by 1944 standards was one of three reasons the plans for M18 production were cut from 8,986 to 2,507, of which 650 were converted to unarmed utility vehicles. [46] An experiment was performed mounting the 90-mm armed M36 turret on an M18 to provide more firepower than the 76-mm. [47]

The first M4 tanks armed with 76 mm guns intended for combat were produced in January 1944. [48] Tanks equipped with the gun began arriving in Britain in April 1944. [18] The issue with muzzle blast had not been addressed and higher-level commanders had doubts about the use of, let alone need for, the new weapon. [18] The medium-velocity 75 mm M3 gun, which first armed the standard M4 Sherman, was quite capable of dealing with most of the German armored fighting vehicles met in 1942 and 1943, and had better high explosive capability and fewer issues with muzzle blast. It was not until July 1944 that a call for M4s armed with 76 mm guns was put out in France after unexpectedly high losses by US tank units and the arrival of numerous Panther tanks on the US sector of the front. [3]

Deliveries of the 76-mm armed tanks lagged such that by January 1945 they made up only 25% of the tanks in Europe. Plans were made by field units to directly replace the 75s on some tanks using a weight welded to the turret rear to balance it. A prototype was built, but the supply of ready-made tanks increased and that project ended. [49]

The 75 mm armed M4 tanks were never completely replaced during the war with some units in Europe still had about a 50/50 mix. [50] Units in Italy readily accepted the 76 mm, [51] but were never shipped as many as desired. [44] The US units in the Pacific Theater relied mainly on the 75 mm gun. [52] The 76 mm-armed M18 did see use in the Pacific late in the war. [53]

Jõudlus

Ordnance told me this 76 would take care of anything the Germans had. Now I find you can’t knock out a damn thing with it.

The 76 mm M1, while an improvement over the previous 75 mm, was a disappointment in its promised performance vis-à-vis the Panther tank and upgraded models of the Panzer IV H/J in the frontal arcs. This was the case of the 76 mm M1 versus the frontal armor of these tanks only. The other arcs did not present a problem. [55] The cause of this was the M62A1 APC round issued with the gun. [56] Another issue surfaces on detailed analysis with a change induced by the problem with the M18 turret and the weight of the original 76/57 development gun. The problem is that the M18 turret was strained by the forward weight of the barrel. [57] In production, the 76mm M1 was shortened to 52 calibers to address this issue. The result was a loss in velocity and this also affected the anti-armor performance of the shell. [58] In response to the lack of performance and displeasure expressed at high levels at the lack of performance, a new shell was developed. The 76 mm M93 High-Velocity, Armor-Piercing Tracer (HVAP-T) was a large improvement being an Armor Piercing Composite Rigid shot, where the full bore, lightweight outer shell contained a slug of tungsten alloy. This improved velocity, thus penetration, but the APCR slowed faster than the AP shot or APHE shell, such that penetration dropped below that of the previous two rounds at around 1,500 yards. The American APCR data seems to indicate that US designs were superior to German and their Soviet copies in retaining their velocity to longer ranges. The US Army did not adopt the APDS shot until the middle 1950s as the British designs had significant dispersion problems from point of aim, being less accurate. In the ETO the determination of the effective range of engagements between armor fell into at or under 890 yards. [59] The shell brought the Panzer IV turret penetration to 1,850 yards. The Panther remained immune in the frontal arc. The side and rear arcs remained vulnerable out to 2,500 yards. [60]

British service

The UK had developed a more effective anti-tank gun before the 76 mm gun became widely available. Although only slightly longer at 55 calibers, their Ordnance QF 17 pounder (76.2 mm) anti-tank gun had a much larger 76.2×583mmR cartridge case, which used about 5.5 lb (2.5 kg) more propellant. The anti-tank performance of the 76 mm was inferior to the British 17-pounder, more so if the latter was using APDS discarding sabot rounds, though with that ammunition the 17-pounder was less accurate than the 76 mm. The 17-pounder was also much larger and had a longer recoil than the 76 mm, which required a redesign of the turret and despite this, made the turret very cramped. The 17-pounder also had a less effective HE round. The 76 mm gunned Shermans supplied to the British were only used in Italy or by the Polish 1st Armoured Division in North-West Europe. The British and Commonwealth units in north-west Europe supported their 75 mm gunned Shermans with 17-pounder armed Sherman Fireflies.

Russian service

The first 76-mm-armed Shermans started to reach Red Army units in late summer 1944. In 1945, some units were standardized to depend mostly on them, transferring their T-34s to other units. Parts of the Polish First Army also briefly used M4A2 (76 mm) tanks, borrowed from the Red Army after heavy losses in the conquest of Danzig.

Post-war service

Korea

By the end of 1950, more than 500 76mm gun M4A3E8 tanks were in Korea. These 76 mm-armed Shermans served well in the Korean War and, having better crew training and gun optics, had little problem piercing the armor of North Korean-manned T-34/85 tanks when firing HVAP rounds, which were amply supplied to units. [61] Some 76 mm-armed M4s [62] and M18s were distributed around the world and used by other countries post-war. [63] The 76 mm gun was sometimes replaced by a more powerful weapon in service with other nations after WWII. [6] [61] [63]

The Middle East

France delivered 76 mm-gunned Sherman tanks to Israel which used them in Operation Kadesh in 1956 and in the 1967 Six day war, particularly in the conquest of Jerusalem. Some were still used as dozer tanks in the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

The Balkans

Some M4A3E4s, retrofitted with the M1A1 76 mm gun, as well as a few M18s, were used by various sides during the civil conflicts of former Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

India and Pakistan

Pakistan bought 547 M4A1E6(76)s during the 1950s and used them in 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani Wars with neighbouring India, which also fielded Sherman tanks (M4A3E4s) as well.

Uganda

Uganda purchased a few ex-Israeli M4A1(76)Ws and used them during the Idi Amin regime up until the Ugandan-Tanzanian War.

Vehicles mounted on

With British Commonwealth designations in parentheses:

Towed variant

From 1943, at the instigation of the head of the Armored Force General Jacob Devers, US Ordnance worked on a towed anti-tank gun based on the barrel of the M1, known as "76 mm gun T2 on carriage T3". Later interest in the project declined and the program was officially cancelled in 1945. [64]


Sisu

Teine maailmasõda [redigeeri | allika muutmine]

US Marines from the 9th Defense Battalion on New Georgia or Rendova manning a 90mm AA gun around July or August 1943.

The 9th Defense Battalion as activated at Marine Barracks, Parris Island, South Carolina on 1 February 1942. ΐ] Originally a training detachment, it consisted of 75 enlisted men sent over from the 5th Artillery Group located at Parris Island. Α] The 13 February 1942 the battalion departed from Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia on board the USS William P. Biddle (APA-8) arriving at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba on 19 February. Α] The battalion consisted of 3 batteries 90mm AA artillery 2 batteries 155 mm “Long Tom” seacoast artillery 3 batteries each 40mm, 20mm and 50 caliber weapons designed as both anti-tank and anti-air artillery. Together with fire control apparatus, transport, and support units the battalion comprised about 1,300 men.

Defense battalions deployed early and often throughout the Pacific campaigns, serving in a succession of distant places, some dangerous, others boring. They did not benefit from post-battle rest— though few rest areas lived up to their name —nor were their accommodations comparable to those of an aircraft wing sharing the same location. The Marines of the defense battalions endured isolation, sickness, monotonous food, and primitive living conditions for long periods, as they engaged in the onerous task of protecting advance bases in areas that by no stretch of the imagination resembled tropical paradises. After putting up with these conditions for months [or years], many of these same Marines went on to serve as replacements in the six Marine divisions in action when the war ended.

Guadalcanal [muuda | allika muutmine]

After Guantanamo Bay the battalion was sent through the Panama Canal to Nouméa, New Caledonia where equipment was trans-loaded onto the attack transport USS Hunter Liggett that took the battalion to Guadalcanal in November 1942. Γ] The battalion setup its weapons at Koli Point, and promptly shot down a dozen enemy planes. Δ ]

Rendova [ edit | allika muutmine]

In June 1943 the battalion left Guadalcanal and took part in the Landings on Rendova, set up its artillery and fought off attempts by the Japanese to regain control. The battalion's 155 mm “long Tom” artillery shelled Japanese positions across the Blanche Channel on New Georgia and elements were progressively moved onto the island of New Georgia to support the Drive on Munda Point and later defend the Munda Airfield and assist in the operations to seize the surrounding islands (e.g. during the Battle of Arundel Island).

The 9th Defense Battalion deployed light antiaircraft guns, such as this Bofors 40mm weapon, in the Solomons on Rendova and New Georgia, both to protect the Zanana beachhead and to support the accelerating advance against the Munda airfield.

After securing New Georgia the battalion was moved to Mbanika in the Russell Islands for a period of rest and relaxation prior to its next assignment that involved the recapture of Guam in the Marianas Islands.

Guam [ edit | allika muutmine]

The battalion landed near Agana, Guam on 21 July 1944. Ε] They were tasked with air defense and coastal and perimeter defense of the area from Agat south to Bangi Point. Ζ] On Guam most of the Japanese defenders retreated to the cliffs at the northern end of the island where thousands committed suicide by jumping to their deaths. The Battalion suffered from very high rates of dengue fever during the Guam campaign and while this was not fatal it did incapacitate many Marines. Like all other defense battalions, the unit was re-designated as the 9th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion on 1 September 1944. ΐ] The unit remained on Guam for the duration of the war and returned to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina in February 1946. Η]

Late 1940s through 1956 [ edit | allika muutmine]

The battalion was redesignated on 12 May 1946 as the 1st Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion. On 30 November 1949 the battalion was again redesignated, this time to the 1st 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. The last redeisgnation came less than a year later on 21 August 1950 when it was titled the 2nd 90mm Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Battalion. The unit was transferred to Marine Corps Base 29 Palms, CA in October 1953. The battalion was deactivated on 15 September 1956. Ώ]


The M-1 75mm Pack Howitzer

Waves of United States Marines moved toward their landing beaches on the tiny volcanic island of Iwo Jima in February 1945. Aboard their LVTs (landing vehicles, tracked), the more experienced among them hunkered down as low as they could to avoid the expected Japanese fire. Yet no defensive fire greeted the Americans as they approached Sulfur Island’s sandy black shore. Instead, the Japanese waited until the leathernecks were on the beach before letting loose with a withering fire from their well-concealed positions.

Corporal Roy Benson was a member of Company C, 2nd Armored Amphibian Battalion, which was charged with supporting the landings. He rode aboard an LVT also, but his was an LVT(A)4, equipped with an M-1A1 75mm pack howitzer in a turret, and he was the weapon’s gunner. The LVT(A)4 was designed to provide fire support to the landing forces after the naval barrage had been lifted. Benson’s vehicle, in the leading wave, was one of the first LVTs to climb up onto the shore. Unfortunately for the Marines, the fine layer of volcanic ash that covered the island prevented most of the tracked LVTs from moving forward, and they quickly bogged down. Those that could still move backed into the surf and moved along the shoreline, firing at known and suspected enemy positions. Those that could not return to the water were soon victims of Japanese fire.

The crewmen of Benson’s LVT(A)4 used their howitzer to good effect, firing at several likely targets. When the vehicle commander pointed toward some rocks above the shoreline, Benson saw a Japanese soldier holding binoculars and using a radio. He was a forward observer, directing enemy fire onto the struggling Marines. Taking careful aim, Benson fired and killed the enemy soldier with one shell from his howitzer.

Such was the accuracy of the M-1 75mm pack howitzer, one of the more unsung weapons of the war. Often overlooked because it was smaller than the better-known 105mm and 155mm cannons that equipped most Army and Marine artillery units, it was its size that enabled the pack howitzer to find a useful niche. The small gun had a mobility advantage—it could go where the larger fieldpieces could not, into jungles and mountains, where soldiers and Marines depended on it for close fire support. The M-1 was also adaptable, suitable for use on a number of vehicles and easily broken down for parachute drops. Despite its many uses, though, this highly successful artillery piece barely made it into production it was only the demands of a global war that saved the 75mm pack howitzer from the scrapheap.

Like other armies around the world, after World War I the U.S. Army began evaluating the performance of its various branches with an eye toward being better prepared for any future conflict. To update its artillery, the Army convened the Westervelt Board. Among other things, this board was charged with designing a weapon that was 3 inches in caliber, with a range of at least 5,000 yards and light enough to be broken down into no more than four loads, portable by mules. The board set to work and developed several models of what, by 1927, became standardized as the M-1 pack howitzer.

The M-1 weighed 1,269 pounds and required at least six mules to carry it, but the new 75mm gun had an impressive range of more than 9,400 yards. It could hurl its 14-pound high-explosive shells at a maximum rate of six rounds per minute, with a sustained rate of fire of three. The tube could elevate to 45 degrees and depress to 4 degrees. That was quite an achievement for an artillery piece only 13 feet, 1 inch long, 4 feet wide and just over 3 feet high.

The new howitzer fit into the American divisional structure as well. Each division had three artillery regiments. In each of the regiments, one battalion was equipped with the new howitzer while the other two battalions operated the heavier 155mm howitzer. As impressive as the new design was, its development coincided with severe fiscal constraints that were beginning to be placed on the Army during the interwar period. Rather than receive the much anticipated new howitzer, artillery units were eventually forced to get by with the older M1897 75mm gun, large numbers of which were left over from World War I. December 7, 1941, changed all that.

With the beginning of World War II, the great need for artillery of all types did away with the financial limitations, and production increased. A newer, modernized carriage for the howitzer, designated the M-8, replaced the original M-1 carriage. The steel and wood tires of the older carriage were replaced by steel rims with rubber tires, and the split trails that opened to stabilize the gun were eliminated in favor of a nonopening box trail.

As the war progressed, the military urgently sought artillery to equip its newly forming airborne and armored divisions, and the pack howitzer came to the fore. Its compact size and low weight coupled with its ability to be quickly assembled or taken apart for transport made it ideal for lightly equipped parachute units. The retirement of horses and mules in favor of the ubiquitous jeep also eliminated many of the issues of breaking down and transporting the weapon, and it was easily adaptable to various vehicles as a self-propelled gun for mechanized units.

For airborne use, the M-1 could be loaded complete into a glider, towed by jeep or pulled by the gun crews using leather straps attached to the weapon. Airborne artillerymen spent hours in training, pulling their howitzers at the double. Disassembled, the pack howitzer could be airdropped by parachutes. Nine “paracrates” were used to prepare the weapon for airdropping at a total weight of 2,549 pounds. Some of the paracrates could be slung under the fuselage of a Douglas C-47 transport plane, while other loads were pushed out the cargo bay doors. Once on the ground, a well-trained gun crew could unpack the howitzer from its paracrates, reassemble and prepare the gun for action in seven minutes. The major drawback to dropping the guns by parachute was that if all the components couldn’t be recovered—a parachute blowing off course, or damage to the contents on landing—the entire gun was out of action.

American airborne divisions organized their parachute field artillery battalions into three firing batteries of four guns each, plus a headquarters battery. British paratroopers used the pack howitzer as well, their division having an “air-landing light regiment” for its divisional artillery component. This regiment was based on three batteries of 75mm pack howitzers replacing the 3.7- inch howitzers previously used. Each battery had six guns instead of four, and each gun section had two jeeps and three trailers for towing and ammunition hauling. The regiment was rounded out with two additional batteries of antitank guns and one of light anti-aircraft guns. British airborne troops found the glider to be the most suitable way to transport their artillery.

Paratrooper John McKenzie served in the 456th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion, 82nd Airborne Division. He later wrote of his experience with this pack howitzer–equipped unit. The 456th entered combat in Normandy, arriving by ship a few days after the airborne landings. McKenzie recalled the fighting there, and the work emplacing the guns. The howitzers’ exact location had to be known to the fire direction centers so they could accurately calculate firing data for the guns, to enable them to put precise fire on the targets spotted by the observers. Survey teams would determine the location a battery was to occupy. The howitzers would be dug in, placed in firing pits to protect them from German counterbattery fire. Once located by the enemy, the guns would often have to be moved to a new site. The 456th had to move its guns 25 times during its 33 days of combat in Normandy.

McKenzie continued with the unit through to the American counterattack in the Ardennes in January 1945. The German offensive had run out of steam, and the 82nd was part of the effort to harass their retreat. McKenzie was one of a team of forward observers assigned to a battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. On one occasion, his group took up a position overlooking the village of Vielsalm. Suddenly a German column approached the town, some 500 troops in halftracks and trucks. The observers prepared a fire mission for the guns of an entire battalion. The subsequent barrage landed as the Germans were at a crossroads, disabling some of the vehicles and blocking the route. Mortar fire then landed at the head of the enemy convoy, stopping it. This left the Germans vulnerable to an ambush by American infantry. In a short time, it was over almost all the German force lay dead, wounded or captured. The action outside of Vielsalm was just one incident demonstrating that if used in combination with other weapons, the small howitzer could be just as lethal as its larger brethren.

Pack howitzers also proved effective when used by armored and mechanized forces. The gun’s small size meant that it could be easily fitted into the armored vehicles in production at the start of the war. The first vehicle to be so adapted was the T-30 halftrack, which was essentially a modified M-3 that mounted the howitzer in the passenger compartment. Never standardized, 500 of the modified M-3s were used until a proper replacement could be produced for the new medium tank battalions.

Thanks to the gun’s effectiveness, the replacement was armed with the small howitzer as well. The M-8 howitzer motor carriage was based on the chassis of the M-5 Stuart light tank. In place of the M-5’s 37mm gun turret, the M-8 mounted a 75mm pack howitzer in a larger, open-topped turret. While by no means heavily armored, it gave better protection to the crew than a halftrack. In all, 1,778 were built, and they saw extensive service in armored cavalry units. French armored units supplied by the Americans were also equipped with 174 of them.

Not to be outdone, the Marines also found a use for the versatile little gun. Faced with the hazards of opposed landings, the tracked LVT was modified as a gun platform. Designated the LVT(A)1, the hybrid landing vehicle was fitted with a turret from the M-5 Stuart. When the landing forces needed even more firepower, it was only natural to fit the M-8’s 75mm turret to an LVT. This became the LVT(A)4. Its main purpose was to provide support between the time naval gunfire lifted and artillery units came ashore and were ready to fire.

There were two theaters of operation where the M-1 howitzer was transported as originally intended—on the back of a mule. In Italy, the mountainous terrain precluded towing the guns with jeeps or trucks, and mules were called back into service. The four-legged wonders were used to carry guns as well as general cargo and casualties. The 10th Mountain Division’s artillery was equipped with pack howitzers in four battalions, each with 12 howitzers and a veterinary section to provide care for the animals that supported the battery. Besides the six mules that carried the gun itself, five more were needed to haul ammunition and one to carry tools and other equipment.

The other battlefront where mule skinners brought the compact howitzer into play was the China-Burma-India Theater. Here the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional), the famed “Merrill’s Marauders,” used two pack howitzers to provide close fire support in April 1944. The unit’s namesake, Brig. Gen. Frank Dow Merrill, requested the two guns be flown to the unit at Hsamsingyang, Burma. Gun crews were formed from men who had previously served in pack artillery units. Both guns were dropped by parachute and were in action within two hours. They proved popular with the troops and soon gained the nickname “the fatboys.”

The two pack howitzers were used in a direct fire role during the fighting in Burma, rather than the traditional indirect fire method of arcing rounds onto a target from beyond visual range. Often the guns were aimed directly at targets within sight. Radio transcripts convey the usefulness of these guns. During the Hsamsingyang fighting, the guns fired at pillboxes in the Japanese lines, scoring a direct hit on one and forcing the enemy out of another. The guns also proved useful against machine gun nests. When a lieutenant saw strong Japanese positions on a hill and began to take fire, he called for the pack howitzers, saying, “Japs are in strength on the next hill…put some fatboys on the hill for us.” Men fighting on the front lines called for the pack howitzers over and over during the battle, depending on their power and accuracy to both support their attacks and defend their positions.

The M-1 pack howitzer was useful on all fronts despite its relatively small caliber. It is still in service today as the M-120 saluting gun, used at military ceremonies with blank ammunition—a final salute in itself to a proven and tested design.

Originally published in the March 2006 issue of Teine maailmasõda. Tellimiseks klõpsake siin.


Ajalugu

Areng

During the inter-war period, the Americans had access to the 3-inch Gun M1918 anti-aircraft gun in their inventory that fired a high-velocity 76.2 mm shell. In September 1940, it was decided to adapt the gun into an anti-tank role. Though the adaption was a success with a towed variant and mounted on the M10 tank destroyer, it was too heavy and cumbersome for a medium tank mount. Sometime in 1942, the development of a new gun to replace the 75 mm on the M4 Sherman's mount began as the 76 mm Gun T1. It should be noted that despite the name, it has the same exact bore as 3-inch (76.2 mm) and is only named such to avoid ammo compatibility error between the 3-inch and the 76 mm. The developed 76 mm used a barrel lighter than the 3-inch, had the breech ring assembly of the 75 mm, and could be mounted in the Sherman's M34 mount. The gun used the same projectiles as that of the 3-inch, but a different propellant case design with enough powder to fire a round at 2,600 ft/sec muzzle velocity, identical to the 3-inch gun. Ώ] ΐ] Α]

Two 76 mm T1 guns were made and shipped to Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Tests started on 01 August 1942, with one gun put on a fixed mount while the other was installed in a M4A1 turret in place of the 75 mm. Initial tests showed that the gun, 57 caliber in length, was too unbalanced. 15 inches were shaved off from the gun barrel, turning the barrel length to 52 caliber to the detriment of the anti-armour performance. Additionally, weight was added to the breech ring as a counter-weight. Α] On August 17, Aberdeen stated the 76 mm was satisfactory inside the M4 Sherman turret. Classified as Substitute Standard, the 76 mm T1 was approved as the 76 mm Gun M1 and it was recommended that the production orders for Shermans be modified for 1,000 Shermans with the new 76 mm gun. However, General Jacob Devers from Armored Force did not approve of this plan as the new tanks had not been tested by his board. This led to another trial period, with the 76 mm tried in the newer M34A1 gun mount using the telescopic sight, the response to the Sherman's combat experience in North Africa. Α] The same imbalance issue as previous tests arose, but this was solved by adding an 800 pound counterweight to the rear of the turret to counterbalance the barrel. Production of the tank started with 12 tanks from the Pressed Steel Car Company for evaluation by Aberdeen, Armored Board, and Tank Destroyer Board. These tanks arrived on 2 February 1943 and tests lasted until April 5th. The conclusion was that the Armored Board found the constrained space in the turret, caused by the larger gun, unsatisfactory and that the tank was a rushed "quick-fix" design and rejected the tank. This cancelled the type classification and brought the 76 mm tank procurement to a halt. Ώ ]

Ordnance continued to tinker about with their designs and on 03 May 1943, recommended the production of two pilots of an improved 76 mm gun mount for the Sherman. These vehicles were designated as the M4E6 and were fitted with turrets from the T23, a variant of the T20 tank series. Ώ] Meanwhile, the 76 mm gun was also improved into the M1A1 variant with changes to the tube contour and a lengthened recoil surface to allow the trunnions to be moved forwards for better balancing of the weapon. ΐ] The two M4E6 were built by Chrysler, with one sent for evaluations at Aberdeen in July 1943 before being sent to Fort Knox for Armored Board to take a look. Ώ] The tests proved satisfactory and on 17 August 1943, Armored Board recommended the M4E6 be put into full production for 1,000 units, with even the possibility of completely replacing the 75 mm production with the 76 mm. The latter however was contested by General Alvan Gillem, who took over Devers role in May 1943, by stating the 76 mm's flaw of a lower HE charge compared to the 75 mm (76 mm's 12.37 lbs HE shell carries only 0.86 lbs explosives whereas the 75 mm's 14.6 lbs shell carries 1.47 lbs explosives) and its tendency to create dust clouds with its muzzle blast, all for only 1 more inch of armor penetration compared to the 75 mm. Α ]

Still, 76 mm production was still in consideration and further improvements were made to the gun. The issue with the muzzle blast was solved with a new long primer ammunition that reduced the smoke left from the burning powder and the installment of a muzzle brake on the gun that diverted the muzzle blast sideways so it does not disturb the dust as much. The improvement of the muzzle brake led to the request that all 76 mm guns be fitted with a muzzle brake. 76 mm Gun M1 retooled with a threaded end for the muzzle brake were designated the M1A1C, though production of muzzle brakes for these threads did not begin until July 1944, so the threads were covered by a thread protector until muzzle brakes were available. The next model of the 76 mm, the 76 mm Gun M1A2, featured more improvements. The rifling on the gun was tighter with one turn per 32 caliber rather than one turn per 40 caliber on previous models, which helped improve ballistics at longer ranges. Every M1A2 design also had a muzzle brake attached. Ώ] Α]

Combat usage

The first batch of 130 M4A1 (76) Shermans were sent to Britain on 10 April 1944, but despite their presence and even reports at the Italian Theater facing some of Germany's newer vehicles like the Panther, they were not sent to Normandy on the onset of D-Day. Major General Hugh Gaffey of the 2nd Armored Division advocated for this decision as there were only so few of them available, the troops were not properly trained on the new tank gun, and the logistic situation would be a mess to supply the new ammunition. As such, it was proposed by General W.B. Palmer that the 76 mm be delayed for tank battalions and only specified for such battalions rather than intermingling the 76 mm and 75 mm in mixed units. Either way, not one 76 mm Sherman landed in France in June 1944. Even attempts to interest the US Third Army on 12 June 1944 fell short as a report went "All of the commanders were reluctant to see it take the place of the 75 mm tank gun in any quantity". The reason for this desire to keep around with the 75 is the belief that the 75 mm could still do the job defeating enemy armour as the newer tanks, like the Tiger I since Tunisia, have been handled with the 75 mm cannon. Even the Panther were not taken seriously, not necessarily because it could be handled by the 75 mm, but because it was believed that Panther was a specialized heavy tank allocated in small numbers. It was not until Normandy that the U.S. fighting forces would experience first hand how numerous the Panthers were. Α ]

By June 1944 in Normandy, criticism from tankers on the ineffectiveness of the 75 mm on the new Panthers came to light. On July 2, Eisenhower relayed the complaints to Ordnance and in July 12, a board was created to determine what weapons were available that could defeat the Panther. The board determined after tests that none of the U.S. standard weapons could defeat the Panther from the front, and the 3-inch on the M10 could only do so on the gun mantlet from 200 yards outs. Suddenly, the 76 mm Shermans sitting idly at Britain became very sought out and General Bradley of 1st US Army ordered as many of the 76 mm Shermans be sent into France for Operation Cobra. 102 M4A1 (76) tanks arrived to France and became a key part of the operation, marking their debut of combat on 25 July 1944 , the second day of the operation. The success of the operation helped vindicate the relevance of the 76 mm Sherman and new 76 mm tank models on the M4 and the M4A3 soon arrived in September 1944. However, the 76 mm Shermans, now combat tested, ended up in another pitfall when they still proved ineffective against the Panther's front. Eisenhower, when hearing of the issue, remarked on the predicament:

You mean our 76 won't knock these Panthers out? Why, I thought it was going to be the wonder gun of the war. Why is it that I'm the last to hear about this stuff? Ordnance told me this 76 would take care of anything the Germans had. Now I find you can't knock out a damn thing with it.

In August 1944, an improved ammunition for the 76 mm started to come in, the T4 (M93) HVAP ammo. With its tungsten ammunition, it could penetrate the Panther on the mantlet up to 1,000 yards out. 2,000 of the new HVAP ammo arrived by air in August 1944. Though 20,000 were ordered, the supply was never able to keep up with the demand. By February 1945, the average 76 mm tank have received a total of five HVAP round, meaning an acquiring rate of one HVAP per month a tank. A total of 18,000 HVAP came to Europe by March 1945, with 42% of the total being for the 76 mm and the rest for the 3-inch gun. Α ]

The Battle of the Bulge turned a few heads for the 76 mm. Before that, German armour were only experienced in sporadic situations, with only minor counter-offensives at areas like the Battle of Arracourt. There were divided feelings about the 76 mm due to its decreased HE performance compared to the 75 mm, and that the 75 mm has specialized ammo like the white phosphorus round that the 76 did not have. Thus, proposals to completely replace the 75 with the 76 were met with objections. But after the Battle of the Bulge, the criticism changed to the inadequacy of the 75 mm against the German tanks like the Panther and the heavier Tiger II. 12th US Army Group on 29 January 1945 even requested that all US tanks that arrive in Europe be the 76 mm version, refusing anymore 75 mm Shermans. Α ]



Kommentaarid:

  1. Melyon

    See on lihtsalt suurepärane idee

  2. Jaime

    Minu arvates eksib ta. Ma olen kindel. Ma suudan seda tõestada. Kirjutage mulle PM -is, rääkige.

  3. Oswin

    Hurray !, the one who wrote nishtyak wrote!

  4. Wematin

    Ma arvan, et sa eksid. Pakun seda arutada. Kirjuta mulle PM-i.

  5. Scowyrhta

    Nõus, kasulik tükk

  6. Braeden

    Selles on midagi. Nüüd on kõik selge, suur tänu teabe eest.



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